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Losing a job has, in modern societies, been one of the most important causes 
of downward social mobility. Recent debates suggest that nowadays, workers 
face even greater risks on the labor market than before. Against this 
background, The Impact of Losing Your Job: Unemployment and Influences 
from Market, Family, and State on Economic Well-Being in the US and Germany 
provides an in-depth analysis of economic insecurity due to unemploy-
ment in the US and Germany. Building on life course sociology, it considers 
influences from market, family, and welfare state on the impact of losing 
a job. Household panel data has been used to analyze the occurrence of 
losing a job, its consequences, and the coping strategies found among the 
working-age population between the 1980s and the late 2000s.
Both in the US and in Germany, economic insecurity due to losing a job 
is unevenly distributed among social strata. Groups that are already 
disadvantaged lose their jobs more often and have fewer private resources 
to cope with the loss. However, the German welfare state mitigates this 
disparity to a higher degree than its American counterpart. Yet, economic 
insecurity associated with risks on the labor market increased in Germany 
while we see no such trend in the US prior to the Great Recession.
Martin Ehlert is a researcher at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center. 
He has also published journal articles in Social Science Research, Research 
in Social Stratification and Mobility, and Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und 
Sozialpsychologie.
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1 Introduction
Job loss and unemployment are major problems of modern capitalist 
societies. It is beyond question that employment instability is connected 
to many unfavorable outcomes for individuals and countries. At the same 
time, such instabilities are, to some degree, inevitable elements of labor 
markets in capitalist economies. Despite the existence of employment 
protection legislation in most countries, there are always f irms that displace 
employees for a variety of reasons. For those affected, losing a job has severe 
consequences for many aspects of their lives (Brand 2015). This is even more 
pronounced if they are not able to obtain a new job after displacement 
and enter a longer spell of unemployment. Among all of the negative con-
sequences that job loss entails for individuals, I focus on the most obvious 
in this study: decreases in individual economic well-being. While there 
are other important effects of job loss, for example on life satisfaction as 
well as on physical and mental health, the effects on economic well-being 
are arguably the most far-reaching. The aim of this study is to advance the 
knowledge about economic insecurity that job loss causes over the life 
course. In particular, I want to f ind out which factors offset and which 
factors increase the impact of displacements on economic well-being.
Labor income is the prime income source in most households, except for 
those who are retired. Therefore, large parts of the population rely on stable 
jobs to maintain their standard of living. This concerns both those who are 
employed and their dependents in the household, because labor income is 
usually pooled and shared within a household. Even though the actual alloca-
tion of income within households may be unequal, total pooled labor income 
in a household is a good indicator of the household members’ economic well-
being. If job loss and subsequent unemployment hit one household member, 
the whole household experiences a decrease in its economic well-being. 
Thus, job loss is one of the important causes of income insecurity over the 
life course (Western et al. 2012). Income loss in households implies that levels 
of consumption cannot be upheld, and rents and mortgages can no longer be 
paid. Also, the economic insecurity that job loss creates makes it diff icult to 
plan ahead, to decide about investments or savings. This has negative effects 
on individual life courses and societies as a whole. On the individual level, 
income losses cause downward social mobility. On the aggregate level, if 
job loss and unemployment affect a large part of the population, decreases 
in domestic demand may send the economy into a downward spiral and 
reduced social cohesion may breed political instability.
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Nevertheless, the effects of job loss and unemployment on economic 
well-being are not determined by losses in labor income alone. Because 
of the risks entailed in job loss, all modern welfare states implement some 
form of unemployment insurance. These programs usually replace a fraction 
of the lost wage for a certain amount of time. Thus, at least for a while 
after job loss, the welfare state cushions some of the losses in income if 
re-employment does not occur. Furthermore, there are two other ways 
through which downward income mobility after job loss may be mitigated. 
First, rapid re-employment in a well-paid job may maintain economic well-
being. Second, other household members could provide income to offset 
the losses. Hence, the extent of economic insecurity after job loss emerges 
from the nexus between the market, the family, and the state. This also 
implies that there are variations between individuals, families, and nations 
in the effects of job loss on economic well-being. The present study starts 
from this observation and asks how job loss and unemployment affect 
the economic well-being of individuals in different contexts. In doing so, 
I want to carve out the mechanisms that shape economic well-being after 
job loss. This knowledge is important to devise ways of reducing economic 
insecurity due to job loss.
Economic insecurity recently received much public and academic at-
tention. Books such as Jacob Hacker’s (2006) The Great Risk Shift or Peter 
Gosselin’s (2009) High Wire describe a trend toward growing volatility of 
incomes and, consequently, economic insecurity in the United States. Ac-
cording to them, this is due to the government and corporations retreating 
from safeguarding against risks. Instead, individuals now carry the burden 
of most risks themselves. These accounts gained much public attention in 
the United States. In Germany, this issue also surfaces in public debates. For 
example, in the German magazine Der Spiegel, journalists see the advent of 
an “era of insecurity” (Dettmer et al. 2010: 82; translation M.E.) in Germany. 
Especially the growth of atypical employment, such as contract work and 
temporary employment, and the recent turn to employment-centered 
social policy are often held responsible for this development. Therefore, 
Butterwegge (2012) discusses a “crisis of the welfare state,” brought about 
by politicians dismantling social protection. He argues that the German 
welfare state, which has traditionally been more generous than its coun-
terpart in the United States, becomes “Americanized” (cf. Starke et al. 2008; 
Alber 2010) and, consequently, economic insecurity grows.
In the academic discourse, research on economic insecurity is a growing 
sub-f ield in the study of social stratif ication (Western et al. 2012). A grow-
ing body of research not only considers inequalities in the cross-sectional 
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perspective, but also risks and instabilities that occur over the life course. 
The dynamic perspective on social stratif ication is especially appealing 
to researchers, because it comes closer to the experiences in everyday life 
than cross-sectional perspectives on inequality. Also, this perspective illu-
minates mechanisms through which cross-sectional inequality changes or 
persists. In their overview of the f ield, Western et al. (2012) distinguish two 
branches: f irst, research that analyzes economic insecurity more generally 
by considering, for example, income volatility. And second, research that 
focuses on the influence of “trigger events” (DiPrete 2002) on economic 
insecurity. In this line of research, the focus is on adverse events or risks 
over the life course and their consequences for economic well-being. The 
present study falls in the second group.
In the trigger events approach, economic insecurity due to adverse 
events is disaggregated into two factors: the risk of experiencing the 
event, and its immediate and long-term consequences (DiPrete and 
McManus 2000a; DiPrete 2002). The advantage of this disaggregation is 
the identif ication of mechanisms that influence economic insecurity. On 
the one hand, there are mechanisms that influence the occurrence; on the 
other hand, there are mechanisms that influence the consequences. The 
latter set of mechanisms may be again divided into factors that offset the 
consequences directly and strategies that individuals pursue to offset the 
negative consequences of the event. The mechanisms in this framework 
derive from institutions: they generate events, mediate consequences, 
and set incentives for individual strategies. Together, these institutions 
constitute “mobility regimes” that govern social mobility over the life 
course. This framework offers a set of categories that are useful starting 
points for this study. It integrates the above-mentioned market, family, 
and state influences on the consequences of job loss with a perspective on 
economic insecurity by considering the occurrence of the event as well. 
Empirical work in the trigger events framework consists of three steps: 
f irst, an analysis of the incidence of the adverse event; second, an analysis 
of the consequences of the adverse event focusing on the factors that 
directly cushion the consequences; and third an analysis of the occurrence 
and magnitude of strategies to offset the consequences. Figure 1.1 graphs 
the trigger events approach.
Research on economic insecurity using the trigger events approach is 
rooted in the f ield of life course research (Elder et al. 2003; Mayer 2000, 
2009). This connection is obvious, yet rarely stated explicitly. I argue that 
analyzing economic insecurity and trigger events as parts of life courses 
generates important insights. Life course research is an interdisciplinary 
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endeavor to understand the whole course of peoples’ lives from birth to 
death. According to Mayer (2004), life courses are shaped by self-referential, 
multidimensional, and multilevel processes. Self-referentiality implies that 
life courses have to be considered in their entirety. Thus, specific transitions 
within a life course can only be understood in the context of the whole life 
course up to the transition. Furthermore, life courses are multidimensional 
because they proceed in different life domains, such as work and family. 
Finally, life courses are influenced on different levels, such as the labor 
market or the welfare state.
The theoretical background of this study builds on the trigger events 
approach and embeds it in the sociology of life courses to broaden its scope. 
Thus, instead of focusing on events and consequences only, I aim at a more 
encompassing approach that situates trigger events within the life course 
and the different dimensions and levels in which it proceeds. I begin with 
the notion that individual life courses are shaped by nation-specif ic “life 
course regimes” consisting of a specif ic institutional configuration (Mayer 
1997, 2001, 2005). These institutions not only structure the life course, but 
also influence the incidence and the impact of adverse life events. The 
Figure 1.1  The trigger events approach
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welfare state is a form of “social risk management” that cushions risks 
generated by the labor market (Leisering and Leibfried 1999; Schmid 2006). 
These notions are similar to DiPrete’s “mobility regimes.” Yet, they are 
based on a holistic view of the life course and not just on trigger events. 
A major drawback of all of these approaches is that they mainly focus on 
the labor market and the welfare state. Yet, as mentioned earlier, the fam-
ily and the household are also important providers of income security, 
because they pool incomes and risks. To include this into the theoretical 
framework, I use the concept of “linked life courses” inside families and 
households (Elder 1994; Moen 2003). Following this notion, I conceptualize 
economic insecurity due to job loss as embedded in (previous) life courses 
and influenced on different levels (individual, household, and welfare state) 
and in different life domains (work life and private life). Figure 1.2 provides 
a graphical illustration of my approach. Compared to Figure 1.1, the events, 
consequences, and mechanisms of the trigger events approach are now 
embedded in the life course. The individual life course, in turn, consists 
of several domains and levels (family, career). Finally, the nation-specif ic 
life course regime shapes all of these processes. This framework will be 
described in greater detail in the following chapter.
The regulation of economic insecurity through the market, the family, 
and the welfare state is a topic where research on economic insecurity and 
life courses overlaps with research on welfare state regimes. This line of 
research identif ied systematic differences in the set-up of welfare states be-
tween countries. Early work in this f ield mainly concentrated on the nexus 
between the market and the state. Esping-Andersen (1990) showed that 
there are different modes of taming the labor market (“decommodification”) 
and the distribution of benef its (“stratif ication”) in welfare states. From 
this observation, he identif ied his well-known three ideal types of welfare 
states. However, feminist scholars criticized that Esping-Andersen’s analysis 
omits the role of households and gender (Sainsbury 1999). Therefore, Orloff 
(1993) proposed to expand the analysis to the nexus between the market, the 
state, and the family. Clearly, the focus of the two f ields differs: Research on 
welfare states aims to explain the emergence and stability of these institu-
tions, whereas in research on life courses, institutions are used to explain 
outcomes such as income losses. Nevertheless, the two traditions have 
strong influence on one another. For example, Mayer’s above-mentioned 
“life course regimes” build on Esping-Andersen’s typology. Thus, it is not 
surprising that the framework omits the role of the family. Therefore, the 
feminist critique also applies to life course regimes. As argued above, this 
can be amended through the inclusion of the family as a unit where life 
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courses are linked and the treatment of life courses as multidimensional 
processes that incorporate different life domains.
Based on these considerations, this study aims to make both theoretical 
and empirical contributions. On the theoretical side, I integrate the trigger 
events framework into life course sociology, especially in the sub-field of the 
family. On the empirical side, I want to provide a comprehensive analysis of 
the impact of job loss on economic well-being over the life course that not 
only includes labor market and welfare state influences, but also considers 
the family and the household as determinants. The main research question is 
therefore: How do the market, the family, and the state influence economic 
insecurity due to job loss? Of special interest to this study are differences 
in the impact of job loss between social strata and household types that 
follow from the influence of the market-family-state nexus. To answer this 
question, I compare the occurrence of job loss and its consequences between 
individuals, households and countries. I measure the consequences in terms 
of changes in household net income in the short- and in the long run after 
job loss. Additionally, I analyze which income sources buffer losses in labor 
earnings due to displacement. Finally, I look into strategies to offset income 
losses that households pursue after job loss. Thus, I analyze the full set of 
factors that DiPrete (2002) proposed in his trigger events framework for the 
analysis of mobility generating events. Yet, going beyond this, I consider 
Figure 1.2  The trigger events approach embedded in the life course
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group differences that derive from the integration of this framework into 
life course sociology.
The results generated in this study address important scientif ic and pub-
lic debates about economic insecurity, social inequality, and welfare states. 
First, I can show to what extent job loss and unemployment contributed 
to the growth in economic insecurity as described above. Also, the results 
are of interest for contemporary debates about the interrelationship of risk 
and social inequality in western societies. Some researchers argue that 
risks increasingly affect everyone, regardless of their position within social 
stratif ication. Beck (1986) argues that the “risk society” is the successor of 
the class society, where risks were concentrated on certain individuals. 
Likewise, Leisering and Leibfried (1999) conclude from their research that 
poverty is increasingly temporal and hits large numbers of people at least 
once during their life courses. According to these accounts, life becomes 
more precarious for everyone. Other scholars, however, suggest a different 
distribution of risk in modern societies. They argue that existing inequali-
ties, structured, for example, by class or education, still shape the occurrence 
of risks (Breen 1997; Layte and Whelan 2002; Groh-Samberg 2004). One social 
mechanism that may generate such a concentration of risk is “cumulative 
disadvantage” over the life course, which means that existing disadvantages 
within a life course cause further disadvantages (DiPrete and Eirich 2006). 
Accordingly, life course trajectories are mainly shaped by initial conditions 
such as education (Manzoni et al. 2014). These claims can be evaluated with 
regard to the risk of job loss using the data in the empirical chapters.
The present study also aims to provide empirical data on contemporary 
debates in welfare state research. In these discourses, job loss and unem-
ployment are hotly debated topics. Everyone agrees that unemployment 
has negative consequences in many dimensions. Nevertheless, there is 
little agreement on the best policy solution ameliorating the impact of job 
loss. Some see private initiative as the key and demand that social policy 
should primarily generate incentives for rapid re-employment, for example 
through low unemployment benefits. Others believe that the government 
should do more to enable the unemployed to help themselves, for example 
by providing retraining and education. Yet another fraction does not believe 
that high unemployment benefits discourage re-employment. They argue 
that these benefits enable the unemployed to f ind good jobs because they 
are freed from economic pressures. This list is not exhaustive, but it shows 
that there are different assumptions about how social policy interacts with 
individual behavior in shaping living situations. One way of evaluating 
the different policy approaches is to assess how people fare after job loss. 
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Following Goodin et al. (1999), I argue that research should focus on the 
economic well-being of households to compare different welfare states. In 
comparison to other approaches, such as the analysis of macro data, this 
approach captures the joint impact of the market, the family, and the state. 
In particular, the role of the family has rarely been studied in research on 
unemployment and social policy.
In this study, I apply a comparative research design. The two countries 
studied are the United States and Germany. Generally, these two countries 
constitute opposing models of government influence on society. In the 
United States, the government intervenes less into the economic sphere 
than in Germany (Hall and Soskice 2001). This is mirrored in the configura-
tions of the respective welfare states, where the “liberal” regime in the 
United States only provides little safeguard against social risks while the 
“conservative” German regime alleviates the adverse consequences of most 
risks during the life course (Esping-Andersen 1990). Thus, in the United 
States, private initiative to overcome f inancial hardship is much more 
important than in Germany. Labor market institutions in the two countries 
also conform to this general notion. The labor market in the United States 
is characterized by low employment protection and low occupational 
boundaries through a focus on general skills. In Germany, the opposite is 
the case. Together with social policy, this leads to labor market mobility 
regimes where the “individualist” regime in the United States leads to high 
labor market turnover while the “collectivist” regime in Germany leads to 
lower turnover (DiPrete et al. 1997).
Yet, this well-known characterization of Germany mainly applies to 
West Germany. East Germany differs in many regards, because it is still 
influenced by the economic turmoil following reunif ication and a distinct 
institutional legacy (Mayer et al. 1999; Matysiak and Steinmetz 2008). 
Therefore, I conduct the cross-national comparisons mainly between the 
United States and West Germany. However, in some cases I will exploit the 
institutional divergence within Germany. One of the main differences is 
family policy. In East Germany, the availability of childcare is much higher 
than in West Germany (Kreyenfeld and Hank 2000). As a consequence, 
more women work full-time. Since one aim of this study is to analyze family 
income support after job loss, I use the variation in family policy to explore 
its impact on income after job loss.
The United States and Germany are clearly “dissimilar systems” in terms 
of institutions (Przeworski and Teune 1970). This design does not allow the 
separation of single institutions’ inf luences, because the two countries 
vary on many dimensions. Instead, I focus on the influence of the whole 
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nation specif ic regime – the sum of all institutions – on the outcomes. 
Therefore, I provide thorough descriptions of the institutional structure 
and formulate expectations about differences in micro processes between 
the two countries. Then, I test whether these expectations are supported 
by the micro analyses. The comparison of such distinct social models also 
has practical relevance, since the two countries often serve as role models 
in public debates about unemployment.
This study proceeds with the following steps: In the following section, I 
review the existing empirical literature about the incidence and the conse-
quences of job loss, highlighting where this study advances this literature. 
Then, in Chapter 2, I develop a theoretical framework for this study. This is 
supplemented by a description of institutions and labor market structures 
in the United States and Germany in Chapter 3. I use both Chapters 2 and 3 
to develop hypotheses about the impact of job loss on economic well-being. 
These hypotheses are stated at the beginning of each of the three empirical 
chapters. Chapter 4 then describes the data and methods used to test these 
hypotheses. Before I turn to the analysis of income trajectories after job loss, 
I consider the incidence of job loss in Chapter 5. Since job loss only occurs 
to a fraction of the total population, it is important to describe and explain 
differences in incidence rate between groups to understand the resulting 
income trajectories. Chapter 6 presents analyses of income trajectories after 
job loss both cross-nationally and for sub-groups. Next, I focus on families’ 
capacities to buffer income by analyzing the employment behavior of the 
unemployed’s partners in Chapter 7. I aim to f ind out whether an “added 
worker effect” exists and which factors shape its magnitude. Finally, Chapter 
8 summarizes the f indings and provides an outlook.
Existing research
In this section, I give an overview of existing research in the three important 
dimensions of the trigger events framework: the incidence of job loss and 
unemployment; the economic consequences of job loss and unemploy-
ment; and strategies to offset the negative impact of job loss. Based on 
this, I identify research gaps and indicate where this book advances the 
knowledge about income mobility after job loss. Clearly, the literature on 
each of these f ields is vast (Brand 2015). Therefore, I mainly concentrate 
on work that considers the effects of the market-family-state nexus on 
incidences, consequences, and strategies, at least in part. Also, I primarily 
cover literature on the United States and Germany. I begin with literature 
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on the incidence of job loss and unemployment and then move on to the 
economic consequences and household strategies to offset these.
The incidence of job loss and unemployment
Generally, job loss and unemployment are two different, albeit connected 
risks: the risk of becoming displaced and the risk of staying without a 
job. While there are factors that influence both risks, it is important to 
separate the two, because there are also different mechanisms at work in 
each risk. The risk of job loss mainly depends on factors on the demand 
side of the labor market, i.e. labor market opportunities for workers. 
Staying unemployed, on the other hand, depends on both opportunities 
and the unemployed’s choices given the opportunities (labor supply) (cf. 
Logan 1996). In the following, I f irst review literature on the incidence of 
job loss and then on the incidence and prevalence of unemployment after 
job loss.
A part of the debate about growing economic insecurity centers around 
the question of whether employment relationships became more unstable 
over time and thus the risk of becoming displaced increased (for an overview, 
see: Hollister 2011). The results of these studies are mixed: While there is 
some evidence that average employment tenure decreased over time in both 
the United States and Germany (Farber 2008b; Bergemann and Mertens 
2004), the results for the trends in the rates of job loss are inconsistent. In 
the United States, Valletta (1999) for example f inds an increase in the risk 
of job loss over time whereas Gottschalk and Moff itt (1999) f ind no such 
trend. More recent analyses in the United States show that the risk of job 
loss remained level even though the economy became stronger (Stewart 
2002; Keys and Danziger 2008). This could also be interpreted as an increase 
in relative risk. In Germany, Bergemann and Mertens (2004) concluded 
that the risk of job loss has increased overall since the 1980s. Erlinghagen 
(2005) also f inds a slight increase in the rate of involuntary job loss. At the 
same time, the number of voluntary job terminations also grew. He thus 
concludes that there has been no major change on the German labor market 
in terms of employment insecurity. Instead, the business cycle dominates 
the trend in displacements.
Looking at sub-groups, however, there are clear trends in employment 
insecurity in both countries. Giesecke and Heisig (2010) show that low 
educated individuals face increasing rates of job loss over time whereas 
there are no trends for other groups in Germany. Likewise, Erlinghagen 
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(2006) f inds an increasing polarization in employment insecurity over time. 
Klein (2015) argues that the polarization is mainly due to worsening macro-
economic conditions over time in Germany. The results in Giesecke et al. 
(2015), on the other hand, suggest that the trend is secular and likely to be 
caused by structural changes on the labor market and welfare state reforms. 
Evidence from the United States also indicates that employment instability 
increased for certain already disadvantaged groups such as blacks and high 
school dropouts (Neumark et al. 1999; Stewart 2002). Overall, the literature 
shows that rates of job loss vary with the business cycle and differ between 
groups. There are a few signs of a decline in job security over time, but this 
mainly affects already disadvantaged groups. Hence, existing individual 
differences seem to become more important over time.
Beyond these trends over time, job loss seems to belong to the “cumu-
lative disadvantages” over the life course in both the United States and 
Germany (DiPrete and Eirich 2006). That is to say, job loss often hits those 
who are already disadvantaged because of earlier events during their life 
course. Education, in particular, has a large effect: High school dropouts in 
the United States and people without vocational or university training in 
Germany face much higher risks of job loss than other educational groups 
(Keys and Danziger 2008; Bergemann and Mertens 2004; Wilke 2005). Ad-
ditionally, workers with low tenure lose their jobs more often than workers 
with high tenure (Farber 2008a). Thus, seniority not only increases wages, 
but also employment security. However, in Germany, the incidence of job 
loss increases with age, especially above age 55 (Gangl 2003). This is partly 
due to the possibility of de facto early retirement after job loss for people 
over the age of 58, which was in place until 2008 (Mauer and Mosley 2009). 
Thus, some people who lost their jobs were actually entering early retire-
ment. Beyond these disadvantages, which are rooted in the life course, 
job loss rates also vary with ethnicity. Blacks in the United States and 
migrants in Germany seem to be disadvantaged in this respect (Keys and 
Danziger 2008; Erlinghagen 2006). The incidence of job loss also depends on 
company characteristics. The risk of job loss is higher among those working 
in small f irms in Germany (Erlinghagen 2005, 2006). This may be because 
larger f irms are less likely to close down. Also, work councils have a greater 
influence on decisions about change in personnel in larger f irms and may 
use this to stop mass lay-offs. Similarly, in the United States, job losses are 
more common in the private sector than in the public sector where unions 
are still stronger (Farber 2008a).
In addition to individual and labor market influences, there are also 
institutional inf luences on the occurrence of job loss. Employment 
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protection legislation (EPL) limits f irms’ abilities to dismiss employees. 
For example, EPL may contain regulations that employees may only be 
displaced if the company faces bankruptcy. The scope and strictness of 
EPL differs among countries. As expected, there is a strong connection 
between the strictness of EPL and the number of dismissals in an economy 
(OECD 2004).
Household effects on employment stability are less well researched. 
Some scholars analyzed mutual influence on employment participation 
and mobility within couples. Bernasco et al. (1998) found that partners’ 
education and work experience decrease the probability of employment 
exit among men in the Netherlands. The authors explain this f inding 
with shared networks, skills, and knowledge within a couple. Women, 
on the other hand, leave employment more often if their partners have 
high education and work experience. Unfortunately, the authors do not 
distinguish between the types of exits. In line with these results, Verbakel 
and De Graaf (2008) found that a partner’s labor market resources lower the 
probability of transitions to jobs with lower status. A related study in the 
Netherlands found that holding a precarious job increases the probability 
that the partner’s job is also insecure (De Lange et al. 2013). Extending this 
research, Grotti and Scherer (2014) showed that accumulation of employ-
ment risks within couples occurs in many European countries. Yet, this 
research mainly focused on couples and omitted single adult households, 
which are a growing in numbers in many countries.
The risk of staying unemployed after job loss has also attracted much 
research. Analyses generally show that low-educated and older people as 
well as ethnic minorities often experience longer unemployment spells 
(Bender et al. 2000; Gangl 2003; Wilke 2005). Thus, the same groups of 
people who have a high incidence of job loss also often stay unemployed. 
Further results also indicate that unemployment spells show “duration 
dependence”; that is, the longer the spell, the lower the probability of re-
employment (Heckman and Borjas 1980). However, duration dependence 
seems to be mainly caused by selection based on unobserved variables: 
those with good chances of f inding a new job leave the unemployed group 
quickly. Those who stay longer are therefore negatively selected based on 
unobserved variables that influence re-employment (Van den Berg and 
Van Ours 1996).
There are also several institutional effects on unemployment duration 
that are discussed in the literature. Some researchers argue that strict EPL 
decreases the chances of becoming re-employed because employers offer 
fewer positions if they cannot easily dismiss them again (Siebert 1997). 
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This was often cited as a major cause of high unemployment on the rigid 
European labor markets compared to the f lexible American labor market. 
Taking a closer look at the European labor markets, however, Nickell (1997) 
argued that the cause of long periods of unemployment has different roots 
than strict EPL. He considers another institutional inf luence as more 
important for high levels of unemployment in Europe: the presence of 
generous and long-lasting unemployment benef its without the pressure 
to take up a job. Unemployment benef its increase the options that indi-
viduals have after job loss: because they are f inancially secure, they can 
stay unemployed for a longer time and search for suitable jobs. Research 
shows that longer benef it durations increase unemployment durations. 
Yet, this increase is not as high as some critics may think: Schmieder et 
al. (2012), for example, f ind that a one-month increase in unemployment 
benef its leads to, on average, a 0.1-month increase in unemployment 
duration. Likewise, Gangl (2003) f inds that benef it durations explain 
only a small part of the difference between unemployment durations 
in the United States and Germany. Instead, he shows that the business 
cycle has much greater effects on unemployment duration than benef it 
duration. Furthermore, he shows that longer spells of unemployment are 
actually desirable, because they enable the unemployed to f ind better 
jobs. I enlarge on this below when I discuss f indings about income losses 
after job loss.
Family effects on unemployment duration also received some scholarly 
attention. As argued in the introduction to this study, other incomes in 
the household may also act as an insurance against unemployment. This 
is confirmed by the f inding that greater wealth is correlated with longer 
unemployment durations in Denmark (Lentz and Tranaes 2005). Taking a 
closer look at the mutual influence of household members on unemploy-
ment duration in Germany, Jacob and Kleinert (2014) show that there are 
strong gender differences in the effect of such household influences. Men 
return to work more rapidly if they have a partner, and even more so if 
they are married. Women’s unemployment duration, on the other hand, 
increases if they are married. If they contributed only a little to household 
income, their unemployment spells are, on average, even longer. The authors 
interpret this as the result of gender role expectations: Especially married 
couples act upon the male breadwinner principle, which makes men’s 
returns to employment more important than women’s. However, beyond 
this, Jacob and Kleinert (2014) also f ind that women’s education decreases 
men’s unemployment duration, implying that a partner’s experience and 
networks play a role as well.
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Economic consequences of job loss and unemployment
Previous studies about the economic consequences of job loss and unem-
ployment can be grouped in two categories: f irst, research that deals with 
labor earnings in the new job after unemployment; and second, research on 
household income after job loss. Clearly, earnings after unemployment are 
a major part of household income after job loss. Yet, as previously argued, 
there are factors beyond labor earnings that influence economic well-being 
after job loss, especially during unemployment when there are no labor 
earnings. The present study is mainly concerned with economic well-being 
and therefore analyzes household income. However, I also review the lit-
erature on labor earnings after unemployment because it yields important 
insights on economic well-being.
The literature on labor earnings after job loss and unemployment usually 
compares the wages in the new job to the wages in the old job. If earnings in 
the new job are lower than in the old job, researchers denote this as a “scar” 
in individuals’ earnings trajectories. Income scarring through unemploy-
ment is quite common and occurs in different countries and sub-groups. 
However, individual characteristics and institutions influence the extent 
of the scars. On the individual level, age is an important determinant of the 
scars in income trajectories after job loss. Older workers usually have larger 
earnings losses compared to their pre-unemployment incomes than younger 
workers. Also, women usually have larger scars than men (Gangl 2006; 
Strauß and Hillmert  2011). Another difference can be found between income 
groups: the larger labor earnings were before job loss, the higher the scars 
(Burda and Mertens 2001). Apparently, it is more diff icult to f ind a similar 
new job if earnings were high before. This may be one of the reasons why 
older workers experience larger scars through unemployment. Finally, the 
length of the unemployment spell also influences re-employment wages. 
Generally, scars grow as individuals stay out of work for a long time (Addison 
and Blackburn 2000). This is because they become more willing to accept 
lower wages.
Institutions mediate the scarring effects of unemployment. If an 
unemployed individual receives unemployment benef its, the negative 
effect of longer unemployment durations that Addison and Blackburn 
(2000) f ind is partly offset. Other studies conf irm the positive effect of 
unemployment benefits on wages after unemployment. In international 
comparison, scarring effects are smaller if unemployment benefits are more 
generous (Gangl 2004, 2006). This relationship exists because unemploy-
ment benefits enable the unemployed to search longer without f inancial 
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pressure. This enables them to f ind well paid jobs. A second labor market 
institution also proved to be connected to lower scars: strict EPL leads to 
higher re-employment wages because it reduces wage differences between 
f irms (Gangl 2006). Overall, strictly regulated European labor markets 
protect workers’ wages better than the liberal American labor market. Thus, 
although they slightly prolong unemployment, as indicated in the previous 
section, unemployment benefits and EPL lead to better outcomes among 
the affected population in the long run.
Next, I turn to the effects of job loss and unemployment on household 
income. Broadly speaking, there are two approaches used to study this. One 
line of research analyzes whether household income falls below a certain 
poverty line. A second approach examines relative income losses after job 
loss. I begin with a discussion of the literature on poverty entry after job 
loss.1 Research on poverty dynamics revealed that poverty is not a static 
state for many of those who are poor in a given year. Instead, there are 
huge numbers of transitions in and out of poverty. The pioneering work by 
Bane and Ellwood (1986) demonstrates that, in the United States, job loss 
often triggers poverty entry and re-employment often ends poverty spells. 
In addition to this result, they also demonstrated that exits from poverty 
are often triggered by other family members’ entry into the labor market. 
Hence, household composition plays an important role. A large body of 
research reproduces the f inding that the loss of labor income is associated 
with poverty entry (e.g. McKernan and Ratcliffe (2005) for the United States 
or Andreß (1996) for Germany).
Comparative literature also shows how different institutional configura-
tions mediate the influence of unemployment on poverty entry. Comparing 
European countries, Layte and Whelan (2003) calculated that the proportion 
of people who become impoverished after a loss in labor earnings varies 
greatly, a result they explain with the regime types developed by Esping-
Andersen (1990). The generous “social democratic” welfare regimes in 
Scandinavia protect the unemployed much better from poverty than residual 
“liberal” regimes, for example in the United Kingdom. McGinnity (2004) 
conducted a related study, looking at poverty transitions after job loss in Ger-
many and the United Kingdom. Her theory also builds on Esping-Andersen’s 
1 Clearly, there are many def initions of poverty lines. In the United States, there is an off icial 
federal poverty line that the census bureau calculates using consumption data. Hence, poverty 
is def ined in absolute terms. In Europe, most countries use a relative def inition, typically 60 
per cent of median household income. The relative def inition proved to be better suited for 
comparative research, since it takes the country context into account (Brady 2003). In this 
review, I mainly cover literature that uses the relative approach.
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welfare state typology and her results are in line with its predictions: German 
unemployed people are better protected than the unemployed in the United 
Kingdom. Clearly, this is because unemployment benefits are more generous 
in Germany than in the United Kingdom. McGinnity also demonstrated that 
households with only one adult – single or single-parent households – are 
worse off than couple households after unemployment because they cannot 
profit from other earnings within the household.
Beyond the effects of household structure and the welfare state in 
shaping poverty risks after job loss, there is little research on the effect of 
other factors. Vandecasteele (2011) shows that job loss has an equally strong 
poverty-triggering effect for all educational groups and classes. Yet, she 
does not consider poverty exit, where individual characteristics presumably 
play a more important role given the f indings on unemployment dynamics 
summarized above. Kohler et al. (2012) show that poverty risk after job loss 
changes over historical time. This is especially the case in the United States, 
where the business cycle influences poverty risk to a great extent because 
the welfare state is relatively weak.
Overall, research on poverty dynamics illuminates the importance of 
the market, the family, and the state in influencing economic well-being 
after job loss. The focus on a discrete poverty line has certain advantages for 
describing the outcomes: the researcher is able to count how many people 
enter a precarious income position through unemployment. However, 
this line of research disregards income losses of those not crossing the 
poverty line. However, their income trajectories are also important in order 
to understand the effects of unemployment on household income. Thus, 
dynamic poverty research discards a large amount of interesting variation 
that can be used to learn more about the mechanisms that connect job loss 
to household income.
Research on income losses after displacements considers all affected 
individuals. However, the measurement of losses differs. Burkhauser and 
Duncan (1989), for example, report the percentage of people with different 
adverse life events in the United States who experienced a 50 per cent 
drop in their household income during the 1970s and 1980s. They f ind that 
about 20 per cent of those who live in a household where the head loses a 
job experience a 50 per cent drop in household income. Reductions in the 
work hours of the secondary earner, which are almost always wives, lead 
to a much smaller chance of a serious drop in income. Thus, household 
composition and who becomes unemployed are important determinants 
of losses in household income. Denier and Smith (2012) analyze the impact 
of the welfare state after job loss by comparing losses in household income 
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before and after taxes and transfers during the 2000s. They f ind that un-
employment reduces household incomes post-tax by 13 per cent in couple 
households and 26 per cent in single households. Before taxes and transfers, 
the losses are 16 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively. Thus, the welfare 
state clearly reduces losses due to job loss. In West Germany, Klein and 
Zimmermann (1991) f ind that becoming unemployed reduced household 
income by about ten per cent on average during the 1980s. Thus, household 
composition and unemployment benefits clearly offset much of the loss in 
earnings (Klein 1987; Landua 1990). For the 2000s in Germany, Heyne (2012) 
calculates household income losses after job loss of 18 per cent (2001-2004) 
and 14 per cent (2006-2009). However, none of these studies tried to gauge 
the relative impact of the household and the welfare state. Also, they all 
focus on one country and therefore do not allow an analysis of the effect 
of different welfare state institutions.
DiPrete and McManus (2000a) analyze household income after differ-
ent adverse life events – among them job loss – in the United States and 
Germany. Going beyond previous studies, they not only consider short-
term losses but also long-term income trends after job loss. They f ind that 
German men have lower household income losses than American men 
directly after job loss. Also, German men recover faster than American 
men from the income loss. Among women, losses in household income after 
displacement are much smaller compared to men and more similar in the 
two countries. By calculating the effect of job loss on both household income 
before and after taxes and transfers, the authors show how much influence 
the welfare state has on household income trajectories. The results show 
that the German welfare state buffers income volatility much more than 
its American counterpart. Also, they compare losses in labor earnings with 
losses in household income before taxes and transfers. In doing so, they 
show the impact of other household members incomes. The authors f ind 
that German men profit more from their partners’ incomes than American 
men. In a further study, DiPrete and McManus (2000b) also compared 
the consequences of unemployment between individuals with different 
previous household incomes. They show that household income losses after 
displacement are higher in the upper parts of the income distribution than 
in the lower parts in both the United States and Germany. However, they 
do not explore the causes of this f inding.
Research on the consequences of unemployment that goes beyond 
poverty transitions is able to draw a much more complete picture of the 
processes that shape the living situations of households. This approach 
allows comparison between losses in earnings and household income before 
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and after taxes in order to gauge the influence of the household and the tax 
and transfer system (DiPrete and McManus 2000a). Thus, it integrates the 
trends in labor earnings after a spell of unemployment with the support 
of the household and the government. This allows the individual-level 
employment and earnings dynamics described above to be linked with 
household income. Also, it considers the whole range of the income distribu-
tion and not just those who become impoverished. It is therefore possible 
to trace the income trajectories for the upper segments of the distribution 
as well. Heisig (2015) implemented this approach to analyze the economic 
consequences of late-career job-loss in the US and Germany. He f inds that 
German men suffer slightly more than American men after job losses when 
they are 55 years of age or older. In Germany, public benefits played a greater 
role in buffering the income losses whereas in the US men are more often 
supported by their partners’ incomes.
Household strategies to offset income losses
The f inal part of the literature review covers studies that analyze other 
household members’ employment behavior after job loss. Usually, research-
ers study the occurrence and magnitude of increases in women’s work hours 
or earnings after men’s job losses. In labor economics this increase is known 
as the “added worker effect” (AWE) (Lundberg 1985). Men are rarely studied 
in this regard because they are most often the main earners and cannot 
increase their incomes further whereas many women in couple households 
are inactive on the labor market.
Many opposing views on the added worker effect exist in the literature. 
To begin with, some researchers claim that the strategies to buffer income 
losses after job loss inside households do not exist. Instead, they argue that 
employment statuses of partners in a couple are positively correlated (De 
Graaf and Ultee 2000; Verbakel et al. 2008). That is to say, if one partner is 
unemployed, the other is likely to be unemployed as well. The reasons for 
this are local labor market conditions, educational homogamy, and the 
resources of partners to help each other in f inding a job. According to this 
reasoning, the result of partner’s unemployment is more often “double 
unemployment” than an increase in the partner’s income. Looking at dif-
ferent European countries, De Graaf and Ultee (2000) f ind considerable 
levels of double unemployment in some countries like the United Kingdom 
whereas others, like Germany, show very low rates. However, the analytical 
strategy they apply is limited because they rely on cross-sectional analyses 
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of labor force participation. Unemployment and, consequently, the AWE, 
is best understood through longitudinal analyses because they capture 
different manifestations of unemployment. For example, in cross-sectional 
analyses, the long-term unemployed are often overrepresented because 
short unemployment spells that end before or start after the survey are 
not covered. The question of whether strategies such as the added worker 
effect exist can thus not be answered using cross-sectional data. Therefore, 
I mainly review longitudinal studies in the following.
Economists conducted many studies to gauge the extent of the AWE. 
Almost all of these only consider women’s reactions to male unemployment. 
Some researchers in the United States found a small effect (Lundberg 1985; 
Stephens 2002), but others concluded that it is non-existent (Maloney 1991; 
Yeung and Hofferth 1998). In Europe, only a few papers address this ques-
tion. Prieto-Rodríguez and Rodríguez-Gutiérrez (2003) concluded that 
the AWE exists in only a few European countries, among them Germany. 
Nilsson (2008) shows that when men in Sweden become unemployed, their 
partners do not respond with increased rates of labor market participation.2
These varying results suggest that there are factors not included in the 
analyses, which drive the results. Dex et al. (1995) showed that the differ-
ent rules about additional income in unemployment insurance schemes 
lead to different responses by wives of unemployed men. If benef its are 
means-tested, as they are in the United Kingdom, additional incomes 
decrease benefits or even render households ineligible. Thus, they create a 
disincentive for labor market entry. Their research analyzed this relation-
ship cross-sectionally: in the United Kingdom, wives of unemployed men 
are also likely to be unemployed. McGinnity (2004) confirmed this f inding 
using longitudinal data: when a male becomes unemployed in the United 
Kingdom, his wife is not likely to enter the labor market. For Germany, on 
the other hand, McGinnity showed that the added worker effect is present. 
The reason for this cross-national difference is that, unlike in the United 
Kingdom, German unemployment benefits in the f irst year are not means-
tested. Thus, there is no disincentive affecting women’s labor market entry: 
Increases in women’s earnings do not render the household ineligible.
Furthermore, not only the institutional setup creates these disincen-
tive effects, but benefit generosity is also important in this respect. In a 
study comparing states within the United States, Cullen and Gruber (2000) 
found that higher benefits received by unemployed husbands “crowd out” 
2 To my knowledge, the latter study is the only one that also analyzes men’s behavior after 
women’s job losses.
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female labor market participation. Moreover, private f inancial transfers 
to unemployed families are lower if unemployment benef its are higher 
(Schoeni 2002). Hence, there is an interaction between public and private 
income buffering mechanisms. Macroeconomic conditions also play a role 
in determining the extent of spousal labor supply while the husband is 
unemployed. Comparing labor market entry of spouses during the 2008/09 
recession with that in 2004/05 in the United States, Mattingly and Smith 
(2010) found that the added worker effect was greater during the recession. 
The women reacted to the dire employment prospects of their husbands.
From a theoretical point of view, all of the cited studies use the rational 
actor approach to family behavior to explain the added worker effect. In 
this reasoning, families rationally choose to re-allocate work within the 
family after job loss based on expected utility. Some authors introduced 
the idea that institutions constrain these decisions by changing the util-
ity of the options a family faces. However, this addition remains within 
the general model of New Home Economics. None of the studies included 
intra-household factors in their analyses. Thus, the impact of the family is 
often measured without taking the structure of the family into account.
Summing up, the literature on the incidences and economic consequences 
of job loss and unemployment as well as on strategies to offset ensuing 
income losses mainly focuses on labor market and welfare state impacts. 
With a few exceptions, family and household influences are rarely incor-
porated. The present study aims at f illing this gap by providing a thorough 
analysis of economic well-being after job loss that considers all aspects of the 
market-family-state nexus including interactions between the factors. The 
literature review showed that the analysis of household income trajectories 
after job loss is suitable for this project. By breaking down household income 
into labor earnings as well as pre- and post-government household income, 
the different factors can be uncovered, as DiPrete and McManus (2000a) 
proved. However, going beyond their work, I explore the effect of job loss in 
sub-groups, especially those connected to different types of households to 
carve out the impact of the family. Also, I present an integrated analysis of 
all three groups of mechanisms through which job loss generates economic 
insecurity over the life course: the incidences, the consequences, and the 
strategies to offset the consequences. In the following chapter, I develop a 
theoretical framework that spans all of these dimensions.
2 Life Courses and Trigger Events: 
Theoretical Considerations
In this chapter, I describe the theoretical framework used in this study and 
derive expectations about the impact of job loss on economic well-being. 
Like other scholars, I start with the notion that the market, the family, and 
the welfare state shape economic insecurity caused by job loss over the life 
course (DiPrete 2002; Western et al. 2012). As indicated in the literature 
review in Chapter 1, previous research has revealed interdependencies 
between the welfare state and the labor market in influencing the impact of 
job loss (Gangl 2003). Also, the capacity of welfare states to cushion income 
losses due to displacements has received scholarly attention (Goodin et al. 
1999; DiPrete and McManus 2000a). Yet, little light has been shed on the 
role of households and families and the interactions between the household 
level, the individual level, and the welfare state. In this chapter, I add to 
the literature by advancing existing theoretical considerations in order 
to include labor market and welfare state influences as well as household 
level influences on economic instability caused by displacements. The key 
concept that combines these three realms is the sociology of the life course.
The life course framework is able to capture the complex interdependen-
cies between the market, the family, and the state because it conceives the 
life course as shaped by multilevel, multidimensional, and self-referential 
processes (Mayer 2004; Huinink and Feldhaus 2009). These three analytical 
dimensions are connected to my research in the following ways: First, the 
life course as a multilevel process points to the different levels and contexts 
that shape the life course, such as individual (inter) actions, the household, 
and the welfare state. Thus, the framework takes the different levels of my 
research into account. Second, the multidimensionality of the life course 
highlights the interaction of several life domains. The two domains of inter-
est for this study are work and family. This incorporates the link and possible 
frictions between the family and the labor market in influencing economic 
insecurity caused by job loss. Finally, the self referentiality of the life course 
calls attention to the influence of past events within a life course on future 
events. Individuals can cumulate resources or disadvantages over the life 
course that have an effect on the further course of their lives. Following 
this notion, economic insecurity is not only determined by singular events, 
but also by previous life courses. This is important for understanding why 
economic insecurity varies between individuals.
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As mentioned in the introduction, this study builds on the “trigger events 
approach” to social stratif ication developed by DiPrete (2002). This includes 
three steps of analysis: f irst, an analysis of the incidence of job loss; second, 
an analysis of the economic consequences of job loss and income sources 
that buffer the losses in labor earnings; and third, an analysis of long-term 
consequences and strategies that individuals and households pursue to 
offset the consequences. In this chapter, I describe this approach in greater 
detail and extend it to include the whole market-family-state nexus and 
embed it into the life course framework. However, before I do so, I briefly 
detail four key concepts in this study: the incidence of job loss; economic 
consequences; income buffering; and strategies to offset consequences.
The incidence of job loss simply denotes the involuntary termination of 
employment relationships, i.e. the transition from a job to unemployment 
or another job. The analysis of the incidence of displacements includes the 
comparison between different groups to f ind out about the distribution 
of such events. Economic consequences, in turn, are def ined as changes in 
economic well-being after job loss. My main focus in this study is on changes 
in household income after taxes and transfers, adjusted for household size, 
because it is a good measure of a person’s standard of living (Sørensen 2000; 
DiPrete 2003; Western et al. 2012). Building on this, I def ine income buffer-
ing as any amelioration of income losses after job loss through actions, 
resources, or welfare state transfers in the short- and long-term after job 
loss (DiPrete and McManus 2000a). Job loss and subsequent unemployment 
obviously entail losses in labor earnings. Yet, labor earnings are not the 
only possible source of income in a household. There may be other incomes 
from household members or welfare state transfers, such as unemployment 
insurance, which add to the “income package” of a household (Rainwater et 
al. 1986). Income buffering is thus the impact of other incomes besides labor 
earnings on economic well-being after job loss. Because of these factors, 
losses in individual earnings do not necessarily translate directly into the 
same losses in household income. The buffer may also consist of additional 
incomes that are the outcome of strategies to offset consequences in the 
household. Such strategies consist of, for example, taking a job or increasing 
hours in a current job.
The chapter is structured as follows: First, I review theoretical approaches 
about institutional influences on the life course. This serves as the core 
of my theoretical approach. However, in this perspective, the family and 
individual unemployment dynamics are not suff iciently incorporated, as 
I will show below. Therefore, I review theoretical perspectives on the fam-
ily and the life course as well as approaches that explain individual-level 
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unemployment dynamics in the following sections. Combining the three 
perspectives, I extend the trigger events approach by embedding it into 
the life course framework. At the end of this chapter, I use this extended 
trigger events framework to develop theoretical expectations about market, 
family, and state influences that guide my analysis of economic instability 
generated through job loss.
2.1 Institutional influences on the life course
For a long time, the influence of institutions on the life course received 
comparatively little attention in scholarly debates. From modest beginnings 
at the beginning of the twentieth century to the development of large scale 
databases since the 1960s, life course analyses have become an important 
part of social scientific research today (Elder et al. 2003; Mayer 2009). Despite 
this progress, Mayer and Müller (1986) observed already at an early stage 
that many researchers consider life courses “as if they were occurring in a 
stateless structure” (217-8). Given the progress in comparative research on the 
welfare state (e.g. Flora and Heidenheimer 1981), Mayer and Müller argue that 
the sociology of the life course should incorporate welfare state influences.
Mayer and Müller (1986) sketched a theoretical framework to include the 
welfare state into the sociology of the life course. They propose four ana-
lytical questions that can be used to explore the relationship between life 
courses and the welfare state. First, they apply a historical perspective and 
ask how the development of the modern state and the modern life course 
are interrelated. Second, they consider how the welfare state structures the 
life course. Third, they inquire about the influence of the welfare state on 
individual action within the life course. And f inally, the fourth question 
regards the influence of the welfare state as an employer and provider of 
transfer incomes. These four questions provide important guidelines for my 
analysis. They point to two micro-macro linkages that are useful in order to 
analyze the effects of institutions on economic insecurities generated by job 
loss. First, institutions def ine stages and transitions within the life course. 
As an example, they def ine who is counted as unemployed and hence 
receives unemployment benef its, which cushion ensuing income losses. 
Second, institutions influence behavior by providing opportunity structures 
and incentives that render certain decisions during the life course rational. 
For example, the duration and benefit level of unemployment insurance 
influences the time available for job search. If benefit duration is short, it is 
rational for the unemployed to take jobs that are below their qualif ication 
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level in order to maintain their household income, even if this leads to 
declining career prospects. If benefit duration is long, the unemployed are 
enabled to search longer. Finally, they point to the fact that institutions 
change and life courses may be influenced by these trends. Likewise, there 
may be changes in life courses that induce changes in institutions.
Based on this conceptual groundwork, Mayer (1997) explores several ways 
in which life courses can be related to socio-economic macro structures. 
He uses the term life course regime to describe nation-specif ic life course 
patterns. Across nations, these patterns are linked to types of “political 
economies”. That is to say, they are linked to nation-specif ic combinations 
of government policies and economic structure. Mayer (1997) explores the 
usefulness of different political economy typologies, among them “varie-
ties of capitalism” by Hall and Soskice (2001) and “three worlds of welfare 
capitalism” by Esping-Andersen (1990). In a later paper, Mayer (2001) relies 
mainly on the latter approach. Esping-Andersen’s focus on social rights ap-
plies better to individual life courses than Hall and Soskice’s f irm-centered 
framework.3
Allmendinger and Hinz (1998) apply the life course regime approach to 
the analysis of men’s occupational careers in Germany, the United Kingdom, 
and Sweden. They consider the impact of educational systems, vocational 
training, and social policy on job changes and class changes during a career. 
According to Esping-Andersen (1990), each of the three countries belongs 
to a different welfare state regime type: Germany is a conservative welfare 
state; Sweden belongs to the social democratic cluster; and the United 
Kingdom is an example of a liberal welfare regime. Allmendinger and Hinz 
base their analysis on this typology and detail how the regimes lead to cer-
tain career patterns via the educational system and the influence of social 
policy. In Germany, for example, the vocational training system equips 
trainees with standardized industry specif ic skills that hamper downward 
mobility. In addition, social policy fosters status preservation through wage 
related benefits. Therefore, occupational careers are relatively stable. In the 
United Kingdom, on the other hand, training is mostly f irm specif ic and 
social policy only provides minimum security. Thus, occupational careers 
are characterized by high job mobility and also high class mobility. This 
example shows that the link between life courses and welfare state regimes 
can be established to explain individual-level life course dynamics.
3 Clearly, both typologies lead to a similar grouping of countries. Therefore, it may be argued 
that they both mirror an underlying historical heritage and thus may be used interchangeably 
(Schröder 2009).
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A major drawback of the work by Allmendinger and Hinz is that they 
only focus on the welfare state’s influence on men’s careers and omit the 
family’s influence. Hence, they ignore two important aspects that influ-
ence individual careers over the life course. First, class positions of male 
household heads become a less reliable indicator for the position in the 
social stratif ication because a growing number of households rely on two 
incomes (Sørensen 2000; Blossfeld and Drobnič 2001b). Second, work and 
family are interwoven over the life course: the family influences career 
decisions and vice versa (Moen 2003).
One way to include the family into the analysis of life courses is to 
measure intra-generational social mobility differently. Instead of using 
individual characteristics such as occupation or class, other researchers 
looked at household income. In “Time and Poverty in Western Welfare 
States”, Leisering and Leibfried (1999) analyze transitions into and out of 
social assistance in the German city of Bremen. Movements into and out of 
social assistance measure household income poverty, because the benefit is 
means-tested on the household level. Their approach derives from an early 
study by Rowntree (1901) who described workers’ life courses in York at the 
end of the nineteenth century. Rowntree found that poverty is concentrated 
in specif ic periods within male workers’ life courses. They were likely to 
be poor while they had dependent families and as they became older and 
lost their capacity to work. Rowntree’s work inspired many researchers to 
view poverty not as a static phenomenon but as part of biographies (e.g. 
Bane and Ellwood 1986; Layte and Whelan 2003).
Leisering and Leibfried (1999) use a framework of institutional influ-
ence on the life course similar to Mayer’s approach. They also assume that 
institutions structure the life course. Yet, beyond structuring, there are also 
integrative institutional effects that provide security during the life course. 
Leisering and Leibfried (1999) term this “risk management”. According to 
them, risk management includes programs such as unemployment insur-
ance or social assistance that cushion disruptions during the life course. 
The perception of social insurance programs as risk management highlights 
the dynamic nature of these policies and their outcomes. This notion is 
useful for my analysis because it explicitly includes the welfare state as a 
buffer for risks over the life course. The concept has not only been used as 
an analytical tool, but also as a normative concept in the “transitional labor 
markets” approach by Günther Schmid (2006). According to Schmid, the 
life course perspective is important for designing social policies that cater 
to the growing uncertainties within careers. Hence, this concept can also 
guide policymaking.
40 THE IMPAC T OF LOSING YOUR JOB 
Leisering and Leibfried’s framework complements the life course regimes 
perspective. It introduces the idea of life courses as income trajectories and 
the integrative effect of institutions that manage social risks over the life 
course. This complements Mayer’s notion of the structuring influence of 
institutions. Yet, like Mayer’s “life course regimes”, Leisering and Leibfried 
consider only institutions and individuals, not households as levels of 
analysis. Although poverty dynamics derive from household income, they 
consider only institutional influences on individual careers and make no 
effort to introduce the family as a level of influence.
DiPrete (2002) developed an approach that includes elements of both 
the above mentioned frameworks. Like Leisering and Leibfried (1999), 
he concludes that the measurement of transitions between occupational 
positions is insuff icient for the study of life course dynamics, because 
this approach only considers those on the labor market. He argues that 
household income is a better choice because it captures the “life conditions” 
of all household members and is able to include the increasingly complex 
living arrangements that emerged as the male breadwinner model loses 
importance (cf. Sørensen 2000). Yet, going beyond Leisering and Leibfried, 
he focuses on total household income mobility during the life course and 
not just transitions into poverty or benef it receipt. Still, transitions are 
also important in his framework: “trigger events” that alter income such 
as job loss or promotion inf luence income mobility. By considering all 
income mobility patterns after events such as job loss and not just entry 
into poverty, DiPrete’s framework provides a more complete picture of 
economic insecurity over the life course. Hence, he examines all parts of the 
social stratif ication and not just those who become poor. This enables the 
researcher to look more closely at changes in economic well-being among 
those affected by job loss and other events.
DiPrete outlines two groups of mechanisms though which macro 
structures influence life courses. The f irst group contains mechanisms 
that influence the rate at which events occur during the life course. As 
an example, employment protection legislation influences the incidence 
of job losses. This resembles the structuring of the life course through 
institutions discussed by both Mayer and Müller (1986) and Leisering and 
Leibfried (1999). The second group contains mechanisms that influence the 
consequences of events. This includes, for example, unemployment insur-
ance, which replaces lost labor income. Thus, this group of mechanisms is 
similar to the processes that Leisering and Leibfried (1999) termed “risk 
management”. However, DiPrete goes beyond their focus on institutions 
by including private strategies to offset income losses as a second mode 
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of influence on the consequences of events. This includes, for example, 
re-employment or other household members’ incomes. Hence, the macro 
structure in a society influences income mobility by generating events and 
altering their consequences in DiPrete’s framework. Yet, he also considers 
individual and household level processes.
DiPrete’s trigger events perspective can be seen as an extension of the life 
course regimes approach. However, DiPrete mainly focuses on the middle of 
the life course, whereas life course regimes consider the whole life course. 
Like Mayer’s life course regimes, DiPrete applies a broader notion of macro 
structures that influence life courses than Leisering and Leibfried, who 
mainly consider welfare state policies. According to DiPrete (2002), each 
country has a “mobility regime” consisting of institutions that alter the rate 
and the consequences of trigger events. This, for example, also includes the 
labor market and the educational system. The main difference between 
DiPrete’s and Mayer’s approach is that life course regimes focus more on 
how institutions and the economic structure shape the life course as a 
whole. That is to say, they consider the structural and normative frame in 
which life courses proceed (Diewald 2010). The trigger events framework, on 
the other hand, focuses more on the micro-level by establishing direct links 
between events, consequences, and factors mediating the consequences.
Moving beyond earlier empirical studies, the trigger events approach 
explicitly considers the role of the household. Clearly, this notion is also 
present in the life course framework, as mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter. However, few studies to date included a thorough analysis of the 
household level into research on economic insecurity over the life course. 
DiPrete incorporates the role of buffering strategies inside the household 
through the notion of “counter-mobility strategies”. These are def ined as 
reactions inside the household to offset income losses. One example of such 
a strategy is that other persons in the household enter the labor market 
after job loss. Hence, the consequences of an event initiate another mobility 
generating event.
For my analysis, the trigger events perspective has many advantages, but 
there are also some issues that still need to be addressed. The framework 
includes micro-level employment dynamics, the family level, and institu-
tional influences. Because it uses household income dynamics as life course 
outcomes, there is a direct link to living situations and economic insecurity. 
Yet, there are two issues in this concept that require further elaboration. 
First, DiPrete (2002) makes no direct reference to the inequality of inci-
dences and consequences among different groups within a country. As 
shown in the literature review in Chapter 1, it is well known that incidence 
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rates of job loss differ in terms of education, class, and other characteristics 
(Keys and Danziger 2008; Giesecke and Heisig 2010). Also, income trajecto-
ries after risks during the life course differ along these lines (DiPrete and 
McManus 2000b; Vandecasteele 2011, 2015). However, this perspective has 
not been theoretically incorporated into the trigger events approach. The 
second issue is the treatment of the household as a unit of analysis in the 
approach. DiPrete’s framework is vague about the mechanisms that shape 
behavior inside the household. Both issues can be solved by integrating the 
mobility regimes approach into the life course framework. I capture the 
stratif ication of incidences and outcomes by conceptualizing life courses 
as self-referential processes where previous events influence future events. 
The family influence, in turn, can be included by conceiving of life courses 
as proceeding in different life domains.
In the following two sections, I discuss theoretical literature about fam-
ily and labor market influences on the life course that complement the 
approaches introduced in this section. The life course approach and the 
trigger events framework clearly provide interfaces for such additions. Yet, 
since welfare state institutions have been the main focus of the discussed 
approaches, family and labor market influences have seldom been included. 
The insights from this review will then be integrated into the trigger events 
framework in the remainder of this chapter.
2.2 Family influences on the life course
In this section, I introduce theoretical approaches focusing on the impact 
of the family and the household on life courses. DiPrete’s (2002) trigger 
events framework, described above, includes the family as a level of analysis. 
Also, he makes implicit assumptions about family influence and family 
behavior after mobility generating events such as job loss. By measuring 
the living situation of a person through household income, he assumes a 
common interest among household members in maintaining and improv-
ing household income. Consequently, not only individual well-being, but 
also family well-being influences individual behavior. Hence, he assumes 
interdependencies between life courses within the household. If the 
household loses income through job loss, the trigger events framework 
predicts that “counter-mobility events” occur inside the household. He 
also mentions that incentives and structural constraints inf luence the 
occurrence of these events. Yet, there is no further theoretical elaboration 
of these processes. Below, I therefore review two approaches that address 
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this interdependency of individuals within households and discuss their 
usefulness for my study. First, I introduce New Home Economics and second, 
the “linked lives” approach.
Before I begin the review, I f irst briefly discuss the “family” as a unit of 
analysis in this study. The definition of the individual level and the welfare 
state level are straightforward whereas the family can be thought of in 
different ways. At one end of the possible spectrum there is the cohabiting 
family (often termed household); at the other end there is the whole family 
including all of a person’s cohabiting and non-cohabiting kin. All of these 
possible forms of family may influence economic insecurity. For example, in 
the household, cohabiting adults such as the partner may provide f inancial 
help after adverse events. Yet, parents or other non-cohabiting kin might 
also provide money in times of need. In this study, however, the analysis is 
restricted to the cohabiting family, for two reasons. First, the mutual influ-
ence on life courses and of the welfare state is much more straightforward 
within this type of family. Applying a broader definition of the family would 
introduce another level of complexity that would go beyond the scope 
of this study. Second, there is little data available about kin outside the 
household.4 Hence, in the following, I use the terms family and household 
interchangeably, both denoting a cohabiting family.
New Home Economics assumes that there is a common interest that 
guides the actions of a family (Becker  1981). This theoretical approach 
portrays the family as an actor that tries to improve family utility. Inside 
the family, individuals jointly decide which strategies to pursue to reach 
this goal. One important assumption of New Home Economics is that family 
members have complete information about the outcomes of strategies and 
therefore decide rationally which strategy to follow. For example, following 
this line of reasoning, the male breadwinner household is a rational decision 
if men earn more on the labor market and women are more eff icient at 
housework.
If households lose income after job loss, the family decides how to 
maintain its utility given the options’ expected outcomes (Lundberg 1985; 
Stephens 2002). If there are no credit constraints, the family borrows money 
assuming that there will be new employment soon. However, if access to 
credit is hampered, the family might decide to reallocate labor supply. In 
male breadwinner households where the husband becomes unemployed, the 
wife’s housework loses value because the husband is able to do housework 
4 However, f inancial help by family members outside the household is an interesting direction 
in the study of social inequality (Pfeffer 2011).
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tasks himself now that he stays at home. If the potential earnings of the wife 
surpass the reduced value of her housework, the family decides that the wife 
enters the labor market. This is known as the “added worker effect” (Lund-
berg 1985). Thus, New Home Economics provides a theoretical background 
for family strategies to offset the consequences of job loss. By assuming that 
there is a common utility function within the family, the theory provides a 
link between individuals inside the family. Consequently, housework and 
employment are just different forms of generating this utility.
The assumption of joint and rational decision-making within the family 
has often been contested. Therefore, ref inements of this theory included 
power differences between the spouses to model bargaining inside the 
household. The “resource bargaining model” posits that the main sources 
of bargaining power are earnings, hence the person in the household with 
the highest earnings has a greater say in the household’s decisions (for 
an overview, see: Brines 1993). Many sociologists argued, however, that 
the ref ined theory still omits important aspects of linkages between 
individuals within the household, because it does not include structural 
constraints and gender differences (Moen and Wethington 1992; Blossfeld 
and Drobnič 2001c; Rusconi and Solga 2008).
Sociological literature aims at developing a more encompassing theory of 
family influence on the life course. Researchers often use Glen Elder’s (1994) 
term “linked lives” to describe the complex interrelationships between life 
courses inside families. In particular, the interrelationship between work 
and family, sometimes termed “work-family interface” (Moen 2003), has 
received much attention. The notion of the work-family interface implies 
that work and family exist in different spheres each with its own rationale. 
The two rationales may conflict if processes in the household apply to both 
the sphere of work and the sphere of the family. Much of the literature fol-
lowing this notion deals with couples’ career trajectories and how work and 
family life are interrelated in shaping distinct life courses. A general f inding 
is that gender plays a major role for family effects on life courses. Men’s 
careers proceed largely independent of their partner’s careers, whereas 
women’s careers depend heavily on the partner and the family. This is even 
true for women with high earnings potential compared to their husbands. 
This contradicts the specialization hypothesis stemming from New Home 
Economics (Blossfeld et al. 2001; Han and Moen 2001): Even in households 
where women are equally productive in employment compared to men, 
they still do more of the housework. Hence, contrary to the assumption 
of economic theory, there are constraints that frame individual decisions 
within the household.
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Yet, which constraints are important and where do they stem from? 
Rusconi and Solga (2008) propose a multilevel framework for the study of 
couples’ careers that provides a systematic treatment of these processes and 
constraints. They separate three levels: the individual level, the external-
couple level, and the inner-couple level. The individual level includes all 
of the factors that influence a person’s career independent of the family. 
Here, labor market structure is crucial. The external-couple level comprises 
the factors that arise because someone lives in a partnership. On this level, 
institutional regulations that are geared toward couples are of importance. 
Finally, the inner-couple level comprises the influence from within the 
family. Here, the distribution of bargaining power within the household 
plays a major role.
Gender is an important dimension in all of these levels of family and 
household influence on the life course (Krüger and Levy 2001). On the labor 
market, gender segregation and the gender pay gap influence career pros-
pects. There are jobs that are gender typical and often “men’s jobs” involve 
better careers and earnings than “women’s jobs”. On the external-couple 
level, being a woman in a couple may imply certain role expectations, such 
as being a homemaker. Such role expectations have often been institutional-
ized into laws that promote certain living arrangements, like the German 
joint taxation that benefits single earner couples. On the inner-couple level, 
these constraints on women’s careers in couples lead to lower bargain-
ing power in joint decisions on careers. Hence, the three levels are highly 
interrelated. In sum, inner-couple decision-making about the work-family 
interface is constrained by institutions and gender specif ic norms.
What do these considerations imply for economic insecurity generated 
by job loss? I argue that the same factors that shape careers in couples 
may also influence the incidence of job loss and strategies that are aimed 
at buffering income inside the family. This seems likely because research 
on couples’ careers identif ied many ways through which the family and 
the labor market interact. However, there is little research so far on this 
influence in the context of economic insecurity. The only exception to this 
rule is literature on family reactions to changing circumstances within the 
linked lives framework. In a review about such “family adaptive strategies”, 
Moen and Wethington (1992) conclude that the concept needs ref inement 
and should be embedded in a life course framework where both individual 
agency and structural constraints can be included.
Some empirical work applied the concept of family adaptive strategies 
in a life course framework. Most of the studied strategies focus on adapting 
to challenges at the work-life interface such as childbirth. Research showed 
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that the strategies are influenced by gender. Women often stay at home 
after childbirth, even in couples stating egalitarian gender values (Moen 
and Sweet 2003). Therefore, a strategy for women to maintain their careers 
is to postpone childbirth (Altucher and Williams  2003). International 
comparisons of couples’ careers also discovered institutional effects on 
couples’ strategies. For example, dual-career couples with two full-time 
jobs after childbirth are much more common in Northern Europe than 
in other countries because of extensive public services such as childcare 
(Blossfeld and Drobnič 2001a). Also, cross-national variations in gender role 
expectations seem to be important. An analysis of women’s employment 
behavior after childbirth showed that West German women are less likely 
to return to work than East German women (Matysiak and Steinmetz 2008). 
The researchers explain this pattern with more traditional values among 
West German women and a lower dispersion of child care facilities in West 
Germany. This difference is due to the employment regime in the former 
GDR, which actively promoted dual earner couples. However, in this stream 
of literature there is no study so far on income buffering strategies like the 
added worker effect described above.
Summing up, the review suggests that life courses are strongly shaped 
by the household a person lives in. This especially applies to labor market 
careers. Therefore, it is plausible that there are household influences on 
economic insecurity due to job loss. The linked lives perspective proved to 
be fruitful for the analysis of these influences. This perspective especially 
points to the importance of gender in shaping household inf luence on 
the life course. After reviewing theories about unemployment dynamics 
over the life course in the following section, I integrate the linked lives 
perspective into the trigger events approach below to advance its scope.
2.3 Unemployment dynamics over the life course
In addition to the literature on institutional and familial influences on 
the life course, it is also important to review approaches that explain the 
occurrence and the duration of unemployment over the life course. Im-
plicitly, unemployment dynamics are already present in the trigger events 
framework since they are a type of mobility during the life course. However, 
since this framework concentrates on institutions there is little elaboration 
of the micro-level processes behind unemployment dynamics. Questions 
concerning who is affected by job loss and the time until re-employment 
are important determinants of economic insecurity caused by job loss. 
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A plethora of theoretical and empirical work – mainly rooted in Labor 
Economics – deals with these issues. Broadly speaking, this literature identi-
f ies three factors that influence incidence and duration of unemployment: 
the economic cycle, labor market structure, and individual characteristics. 
However, this line of research seldom addresses the consequences of its 
f indings for economic well-being.
My theoretical considerations on unemployment dynamics build on the 
notion that employment outcomes are shaped by two-sided processes con-
sisting of opportunities and choice (Logan 1996). That is to say, employers 
provide job opportunities that people may choose to take. Both opportunity 
and choice are governed by distinct mechanisms that have to be assessed 
individually. If both employers and workers agree on an employment 
relationship this is called a job match. Accordingly, unemployment starts 
once these matches are dissolved. By definition, in my analyses, job loss 
always stems from the opportunity side because I only consider involuntary 
job loss. After being laid off, the unemployed person starts to look for job 
opportunities and makes a choice from those available. This is the basic idea 
behind most theoretical accounts of unemployment dynamics. However, 
as I show below, theories differ with regard to the emphasis they put on 
opportunities versus choice.
First, I cover individual factors that influence outcomes after job loss. 
Several factors, such as education and experience, determine the attractive-
ness of the unemployed to employers. Consequently, low-educated and 
inexperienced people have longer unemployment durations until they f ind 
a new job (Wilke 2005). Unemployment duration, in turn, may influence the 
“scars” unemployment leaves in individuals’ earnings trajectories. That is to 
say, the degree to which post-unemployment wages are lower than wages 
without job loss would have been. However, there are competing hypotheses 
about the direction of the relationship between scars and unemployment 
duration. Human Capital Theory predicts lower wages as unemployment 
duration increases because human capital devaluates while it is unused 
(Becker 1975). Signaling Theory predicts the same outcome but states a 
different mechanism. According to this theory, spells of unemployment 
are signals for low productivity. Since employers cannot assess productivity 
directly they base wages on observable factors. Therefore, they pay lower 
wages to those who have been unemployed before (Spence 1973). Thus, 
both theories base their predictions only on employer’s decisions, i.e. the 
opportunities they generate.5 Search Theory, on the other hand, takes both 
5 Labor economists also call this “demand side arguments”.
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opportunity and choice into account. Here, job seekers receive job offers at 
a certain rate and choose from them depending on their preferences and 
f inancial constraints (Mortensen and Pissarides 1999). That is to say, they 
search until they f ind a good match or run out of funds and have to settle 
for a worse job than preferred. This reasoning predicts the opposite: long 
unemployment durations can be used to search for better jobs and therefore 
post-unemployment wages should be higher when unemployment duration 
becomes longer.
There is evidence supporting both predictions. Researchers often found 
“duration dependence” in unemployment spells meaning that re-employ-
ment chances decrease as unemployment duration increases (Heckman 
and Borjas 1980). However, most studies agree that this is not due to the 
mechanisms described in Human Capital Theory and Signaling Theory, but 
rather a selection effect because those with high re-employment chances 
leave unemployment earlier and those remaining have considerably lower 
chances (Van den Berg and Van Ours 1996). On the other hand, longer job 
searches, made possible by unemployment benefits, seem to improve re-
employment outcomes (Addison and Blackburn 2000; Gangl 2004).
These micro-level relationships are, however, mediated by institutions 
and other macro-level factors. Therefore, I turn to the two macro factors 
influencing the incidence and duration of unemployment: the economic 
cycle and labor market structure. In the two-sided job search framework 
the macro factors mainly affect opportunity; that is to say, how many job 
matches are dissolved and how many job offers exist. The influence of the 
economic cycle is well known: in economic booms job loss becomes less 
prevalent and there are more job offers. Conversely, in economic downturns 
workers face a higher risk of losing a job and f inding a new job becomes 
diff icult (Bover et al. 2002).
Besides the business cycle, labor market structure is a major determinant 
of unemployment dynamics. Labor market structure emerges from three 
types of institutions that govern labor market mobility: f irst, policies af-
fecting job security such as employment protection legislation; second, the 
educational system; and third, welfare state policies such as unemploy-
ment insurance (DiPrete et al. 1997). Institutions that provide job security 
decrease the number of job losses. Yet, they also decrease opportunities for 
job seekers because fewer jobs become available. Thus, countries with high 
employment protection legislation typically have a “low-flow equilibrium” 
(Gangl 2003: 8) on their labor markets where overall mobility is low.
The educational system, on the other hand, inf luences labor market 
segmentation (Marsden 1990; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001). In some countries, 
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the educational system is strongly connected to f irms and educational 
certif icates bound to certain occupations shape career trajectories. In 
this case, skills learned in the educational system are often occupation 
specif ic or f irm specif ic. In other countries, where the coupling of the 
educational system and f irms is less pronounced, labor market mobility is 
less influenced by occupational boundaries. Here, the educational system 
often provides general skills that can be used in any job.
Marsden (1990) characterized the labor market structures that result from 
these differences in educational systems as “occupational labor markets” 
(OLM) and “internal labor markets” (ILM). In OLMs, the job opportunities of 
an unemployed worker are generally limited to their own occupation, which 
decreases the pool of possible jobs. On the other hand, the standardization 
of skills enables the unemployed to return to equally paid positions. They 
can generally apply their skills in any firm that employs certain occupations. 
In ILMs, on the other hand, skills are more often f irm specif ic. Thus, the 
unemployed can generally apply for any job on the market. However, since 
their skills are not likely to be useful in the new job, they have to start again 
in lower positions and work their way up within the internal labor market 
of the new f irm.
Estevez-Abe et al. (2001) point out that welfare states influence workers’ 
skill specificity. In a welfare state with little employment protection and low 
unemployment benefits, workers have incentives to invest in general skills 
that enable them to f ind a new job rapidly. In generous welfare states, on 
the other hand, investment in f irm specif ic skills is less risky because job 
loss is less common and the f inancial consequences are less severe. Thus, 
welfare states and educational systems are complementary in creating a 
distinct labor market structure. Likewise, DiPrete et al. (1997) show that 
the interaction of labor market structure and welfare state regimes shape 
labor market mobility. Comparing workers in shrinking occupations across 
countries they f ind that occupational change is more common if the welfare 
state is weak. In strong welfare states, on the other hand, workers from 
shrinking occupations often move to non-employment instead of changing 
occupations.
The welfare state may influence both opportunity and choice for unem-
ployed workers. Job opportunities arise if the welfare state offers public 
employment options. Also, active labor market policies that foster training 
of unemployed workers enhance their opportunities. On the other hand, 
unemployment insurance affects the choices available to the unemployed: 
if benefits are low and short-term, the unemployed have to choose the f irst 
job they come across. Long-term and generous benefits, on the other hand, 
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enable them to search longer, which is beneficial for post-unemployment 
wages (Gangl 2004). Thus, unemployment insurance acts as a “search sub-
sidy” for the unemployed that enables them to find better jobs (Burdett 1979).
In sum, the review suggests several important factors that influence 
unemployment dynamics over the life course: the economic cycle, labor 
market structure, and individual characteristics. Labor market structure, 
in turn, is influenced by different institutions such as the welfare state 
and the educational system. Consequently, these factors are also linked to 
economic insecurity. I will incorporate these aspects into the trigger events 
framework in the following section.
2.4 Embedding the trigger events approach in the life course
In this section, I advance the theoretical ideas about life course regimes and 
trigger events with further considerations about market, government, and 
family influence on the life course. I use these enhancements to develop 
a theoretical framework for my study. The basic idea for my framework is 
to start with DiPrete’s (2002) mobility regimes approach. This approach 
suggests that income mobility after adverse life events such as job loss are 
best understood by analyzing three dimensions: f irst, the incidence of the 
event; second, the immediate consequences and income buffers that have 
an immediate impact; and third, consequences and income buffers that 
emerge through “counter mobility strategies” pursued after the event. The 
income buffering mechanisms that offset income losses after displacements 
can be classif ied in two categories: the family buffer consisting of all income 
sources from within the household, and the welfare state buffer consisting 
of welfare state benefits.
The review of the theoretical approaches suggests that economic inse-
curity due to job loss originates from a complex interaction of individual 
agency and social structure. The incidence of job loss and the immediate 
consequences are mostly governed by structural forces such as labor mar-
ket structure and the welfare state. The position on the labor market and 
institutions influence who becomes displaced. Then, the configuration of 
unemployment insurance and further benefits influence the consequences 
of job loss. Beyond this, the literature on linked lives also suggests that 
there are household inf luences on these processes. This aspect will be 
elaborated below. In the case of counter mobility strategies, individual 
agency plays an important role. For my analysis, I conceptualize individual 
agency as nested in the life course. Life courses, in turn, are linked within 
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the family. Finally, both the individual life course and the family are nested 
in the macro structure of a society. My general – and obvious – behavioral 
assumption is that individuals try to offset income losses due to job loss 
using a variety of strategies. These strategies may either be caused by the 
event or sometimes adopted in anticipation of the event. The availability 
of these strategies as well as the constraints they face in this attempt, how-
ever, depend on socio-structural factors, the family, and their previous life 
courses. Additionally, following the notion of the multidimensionality of 
the life course, the buffering mechanisms within the household differ from 
those that stem from the market or the welfare state. Household strategies 
to offset income losses always affect both the work and the family sphere 
and therefore follow a different logic than other income buffers. In addition, 
resources accumulated over the life course influence available strategies in 
interaction with the socio-structural factors and the family.
DiPrete (2002) developed the trigger events framework mainly to analyze 
the effects of the welfare state and the labor market between countries. 
These depend on the configuration of nation-specific institutions. I describe 
the relevant institutions in Chapter 3 and generate expectations based on 
this information. In his empirical work, DiPrete also considered counter 
mobility strategies originating from within the household (DiPrete and 
McManus 2000a). Yet, this aspect is not well integrated into the framework. 
Also, the selectivity of mobility triggering events and differences in con-
sequences among groups are an underdeveloped issue. To integrate these 
dimensions, I supplement the approach with theories about the family and 
the life course introduced above. In the following section, I introduce the 
notion of family income buffering after job loss and formulate theoretical 
expectations about the occurrence of this type of income buffering. There-
after, I address the issue of differences in incidences and consequences 
between social strata and show how this can be included in the trigger 
events framework.
Family income buffering
The family buffers income losses in two ways that are similar to buffering 
mechanisms generated by the welfare state. This is, f irstly, a form of direct 
insurance because other sources of income in the family ameliorate income 
losses. Among the additional sources of income, the presence of a second 
earner is the most important factor. Thus, for example, in a dual-earner 
household where both partners contribute equally, job loss reduces house-
hold labor income by 50 per cent compared to 100 per cent in the case of a 
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single-earner household. Second, it is a source for “counter mobility events” 
because other family members may initiate events that buffer income losses. 
Here, the most important event is an increase in partner’s earnings. This can 
be achieved either by labor market entry or an increase in hours. However, 
as the discussion above indicated, the family is a complex structure and 
several constraints as well as opportunity structures from within the family 
and from outside the family shape these two mechanisms. Building on the 
framework for the study of couples’ careers by Rusconi and Solga (2008), I 
distinguish structural influences on three levels: f irst, factors that influence 
the individual level independent of being in a family; second, factors that 
originate from being in a family; and third, factors that originate from 
within the family.
Following the considerations above, I expect that individual character-
istics, family characteristics, and institutions shape these factors. Thus, 
certain patterns of family buffering should be identical in the two countries 
studied here whereas others should differ. In the following, I begin with 
expectations about income buffering through the family that should occur 
in both countries. Then, in the following Chapter, I describe the institutional 
structure in the two countries and carve out how these patterns should 
differ between the United States and Germany.
Regarding the income buffering effect of existing incomes in a household, 
family structure has an important influence. Clearly, single-adult house-
holds do not have access to this buffer. Therefore, these considerations only 
apply to couple households. Yet, also in couple households, there may be 
only one income and if there is a second income it may be marginal. Thus, 
for this part of the family buffer, I have to consider the existence and the 
actual structure of dual-earner couples. In the United States and Germany, 
as in most western countries, men in couples are most often employed 
full-time whereas women’s labor market attachment is lower on average. 
Therefore, a f irst expectation is that the family buffers more of the income 
losses after women’s job losses. Yet, this is merely because of the lower share 
of total household income that women provide on average. However, there 
are variations both within and between countries that I detail below.
The share of household income that women provide depends on joint 
decisions of couples about the work-family interface given structural and 
normative constraints. These two constraints are clearly interrelated. It is 
beyond the scope of this study to explain couples’ employment strategies. 
However, on the family level, the division and the amount of housework are 
crucial factors. The division of housework is clearly influenced by gender 
norms (Lewin-Epstein et al. 2006). If women do most of the housework 
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because they follow prevailing gender role expectations their time to do paid 
work is limited. Moreover, children in the household increase the amount of 
housework further and reduce the employment potential for the caretaker. 
This is especially the case if no external child care is available. Thus, at one 
extreme of the spectrum, there are “traditional couples” where the man is 
the main earner and the woman stays at home. Men in such traditional 
households do not have access to family income support initially if they 
become unemployed.
The other ideal type is the “modern” dual-earner couple where men’s job 
losses are partly offset by the existing second income if they become unem-
ployed. There are many possible configurations of women’s employment 
in couples from marginal part-time to full-time jobs. As mentioned above, 
couples negotiate the extent of employment given structural influences 
on different levels. On the family level again, children are presumably 
an important factor for this decision. Depending on the availability of 
childcare, women often work part-time. Men, on the other hand, rarely 
reduce their hours because of domestic work. Thus, the buffering of men’s 
losses through existing incomes in a household depends on the degree to 
which women can reconcile work and family duties.
The decision about the work-family interface is influenced by institu-
tional factors. The influence of childcare duties might be offset by public 
provision of childcare that enables women to participate in the labor market 
to a greater extent. Hence, the family buffer for unemployed men in couples 
with children should be greater if there are public childcare arrangements. 
Furthermore, tax regulations may influence couples’ employment behavior. 
Joint taxation of couples often entails signif icant tax advantages for single-
earner households compared to dual-earner households. This forms an 
incentive to form single (often male) breadwinner households. In countries 
with individual taxation, there is no such incentive (Dingeldey 2001). 
Therefore, in the following chapter, I examine the institutional structure 
in the United States and Germany with special focus on institutions that 
influence couples’ decision making about the work-family interface. This 
includes tax laws and welfare state programs.
Besides these institutional influences on household labor supply, there 
may also be a connection between household formation, household struc-
ture, and the mobility regime. As mentioned before, the family can be a 
form of insurance against economic risk. Therefore, it may be a strategy 
for individuals to form a dual-earner household if they face economic 
uncertainties. If this is true, countries with high rates of job loss and low 
unemployment benefits should show higher rates of dual-earner couples. 
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Likewise, people with high unemployment risk should have a high prob-
ability of being in a dual-earner couple. However, these people may also have 
diff iculties f inding a partner because they do not have a stable income. I 
will return to this point when I consider selection effects below.
The second income buffering mechanism provided by the family is the 
capacity of other family members to increase their incomes, the so-called 
added worker effect. Again, this strategy is part of couples’ joint deci-
sions about the work-family interface given opportunity structures and 
constraints. Therefore, it is influenced by the same factors as the earner 
configuration. Because of the prevailing gender division of work in couples 
described above, this mechanism almost exclusively buffers men’s incomes; 
women are often not full-time employees and can therefore increase their 
work hours if their partners become unemployed. Two starting points can 
be distinguished: f irst, women who are not on the labor market and second 
women who already work. The situation between the two cases is clearly dif-
ferent: in the f irst case, the couple separated work and family duties. Hence, 
they are a traditional couple. However, after the job loss, this arrangement 
is under pressure since the only source of market income is lost. In the 
second case, the couple decided that at least one of them does both paid 
and domestic work, which applies mostly to women. Hence, these modern 
couples have more experience in dealing with the work-family interface.
Thus, one expectation is that the added worker effect appears more often 
in modern couples than in traditional couples, because they face fewer 
normative barriers to increased labor force participation on the part of 
women. Moreover, not only current, but also previous labor force attach-
ment of women in couples may be important here. If the couple is generally 
open to a dual-earner configuration and women have labor force experience 
this should increase the incidence of the added worker effect. A test for the 
impact of gender role expectations is the analysis of couples with children 
who are mainly at home. In a gender neutral world, the unemployed men 
could take up the caring responsibilities while their partners enter the labor 
market or increase their hours. However, if the role expectations directed at 
women cause them to keep the responsibility for the children they cannot 
increase their labor force participation.
Beyond these factors that influence individual life courses in couples, 
there are further constraints stemming from the labor market. First, those 
women who already have a job may have diff iculties increasing their hours 
because many jobs do not allow such a change. Thus, they face “hours 
constraints” in their job. Several studies showed that a change of jobs 
is often the only possibility to increase hours (Altonji and Paxson 1992; 
LIFE COURSES ANd TRIGGER EvENTS: THEORETICAL CONSIdERATIONS 55
Reynolds and Aletraris 2010). Job changes, in turn, are not always feasible. 
This mechanism may counteract the positive effect expected for modern 
couples. Additionally, there is gender segregation on the labor market that 
may hamper women’s ability to increase their earnings after their partner’s 
job losses (Reskin 1993). Typical “women’s jobs” are often lower paid than 
“men’s jobs”. Also, there may be constraints in the flexibility or work hours. 
For example, Petrongolo (2004) shows that many women involuntarily work 
part-time in Europe. Also, f ixed-term contracts are more common among 
women than among men controlled for productivity. Thus, a perfect added 
worker effect where the increase in women’s incomes completely offset 
men’s losses is very unlikely.
Additionally, education may play a role in shaping the extent of the added 
worker effect. Women who are not currently on the labor market when their 
partners lose their jobs may be faced with problems when looking for a job. 
First, their skills may have depreciated through inactivity. Also, employers 
may see their inactivity as a negative sign in terms of productivity. However, 
the degree to which employers use credentials for their hiring decisions 
may ameliorate this negative effect. If credentialism is strong, women may 
have more chances of returning to a job if they have the required qualif ica-
tions. Thus, I expect that the extent of the added worker effect depends on 
women’s previous educational achievements and their labor market careers.
Welfare state institutions should also influence the occurrence of the 
added worker effect. If welfare state benefits are high, an increase in earn-
ings on the part of the partner may not be necessary in order to stabilize 
household income. In the following chapter, I analyze the generosity and 
the eligibility criteria of unemployment benefits in the two countries to 
formulate expectations about the cross-national difference in the added 
worker effect.
The stratification of incidences and consequences
In addition to a thorough treatment of the family, I also supplement the 
trigger events framework with perspectives on the stratif ication of inci-
dences and consequences. This serves two goals: First, I want to develop 
expectations about the selectivity of job loss that also include household 
structure. Second, I want to generate hypotheses about differences in the 
consequences of job loss between groups. These two additions bridge the gap 
between the trigger events approach and traditional approaches to social 
stratif ication that focus on differences between individuals. Analyzing who 
is affected by job loss, and comparing the losses between individuals, yields 
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a more encompassing analysis of economic insecurity due to job loss than 
just considering the average consequences of an event.
As mentioned earlier, the stratif ication of the incidences and conse-
quences of job loss follows from embedding the trigger events approach in 
the life course framework. Life courses are self-referential; that is to say, 
previous events influence future events. Individuals accumulate advantages 
and disadvantages as their life courses proceed. For example, entry into 
higher education depends on, among other things, performance in school 
and, consequently, leads to better paid jobs. This process is known as 
“cumulative advantage” (CA) (or disadvantage) (DiPrete and Eirich 2006). 
However, it is not always clear whether the process is CA in a strict sense, 
since this would require that later outcomes depend solely on previous 
events and not on individual specif ic characteristics. Heckman and Borjas 
(1980), for example, show that incidences of unemployment depend on indi-
vidual characteristics, rather than on previous incidences of unemployment. 
However, in this study, I do not aim to test CA in a strict sense, but instead 
use the idea of accumulation over the life course as a descriptive tool.
With these considerations in mind, I expect that accumulated advan-
tages and disadvantages over the life course influence both incidences and 
consequences of job loss. Concerning incidences, previous research has 
already revealed the influence of the labor market and the welfare state, as 
summarized above. However, the influence of the family and the household 
has not received much attention to date. Therefore, I develop expectations 
about the selectivity of job loss between household types in the following 
section. Subsequently, I turn to the stratif ication of consequences after 
job loss. Here, I argue that income buffering mechanisms generated by the 
market, the family, and the state differ between groups. Consequently, I 
expect differences in economic well-being between these groups.
The selectivity of job loss between household types
In research on social mobility over the life course, it is a well-established 
fact that job loss hits already disadvantaged groups more often than others 
(see literature review in Chapter 1). Research on the household’s influence 
on the incidence of job loss, however, is scarce. Clearly, this link is less 
apparent. However, it f its the idea formulated by Rusconi and Solga (2008) 
that being in a couple influences labor market outcomes because of role 
expectations and laws that institutionalize those. Although the relation-
ship between households and job loss has not been addressed so far, there 
is a substantial literature devoted to a similar phenomenon: household 
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influence on wages. Results from this f ield may guide expectations about 
the incidence of job loss.
Many researchers have tried to analyze the causes of the “marriage pre-
mium”, i.e. why married men earn more than unmarried men on average (e.g. 
Korenman and Neumark 1991; Pollmann-Schult 2011). Also, much research 
focused on the negative influence of childbearing on subsequent wages 
for women, the so-called “maternal penalty” (e.g. Budig and England 2001; 
Gash 2009; Gangl and Ziefle 2009; Cooke 2014). Presumably, some of the 
mechanisms that bring about these effects also influence job security and, 
consequently, the incidence of job loss. Therefore, I will f irst describe these 
mechanisms and then carve out their influence on the incidence of job loss.
The literature reveals two broad strands of explanations for the “marriage 
premium” (Pollmann-Schult 2011). According to the first hypothesis, it is due 
to selection into marriage; that is to say, the same individual characteristics 
that make people more attractive marriage partners also improve their 
wages. The second line of argument posits that there are causal effects of 
being married or living with a partner on wages. The empirical literature 
generally finds huge selection effects. Single men differ from married men in 
many regards that are crucial for high wages. A common explanation is that 
women are looking for men with high earning potential, a good education, 
upward career prospects, and other favorable characteristics. Yet, after 
these factors are controlled for, married men still earn more (Korenman 
and Neumark 1991). Even when comparing monozygotic twins, a positive 
effect of marriage on wages can be detected (Antonovics and Town 2004).
The causal effects presumed in the literature are on the individual, 
household, and f irm level. On the individual level, the attitude hypothesis 
formulated by Gorman (2000) states that married men are more interested 
in high wages than singles, because they now have to support for a whole 
family. Because of this changed attitude towards work they put more effort 
into their jobs or search for better paid employment. Reed and Harford 
(1989) likewise hypothesize that married men make more concessions 
regarding job quality to provide a high income. Empirical studies found 
some evidence supporting this argument. Married men are less satisf ied 
with their pay and value high income more than single men (Gorman 2000; 
Pollmann-Schult 2011).
The explanation on the household level derives from Becker’s (1981) 
specialization hypothesis: As soon as a man moves in with a woman, he 
can specialize in paid labor and therefore his productivity increases. At 
the same time, women specialize in household production. Singles, on the 
other hand, have to do both housework and paid work and can therefore 
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not be as productive. Empirical literature generally refutes this hypothesis. 
The marriage premium does not seem to vary with the share of housework 
(Hersch and Stratton 2000; Pollmann-Schult 2011).
Finally, on the firm level, married men may receive preferential treatment 
compared to unmarried men. This may be because the employer values mar-
riage and wants to help those with a family. Alternatively, the employer may 
see marriage as a positive signal for productivity. Additionally, work councils 
may support the promotion of workers with a family because they have greater 
need. To test this influence, Pollmann-Schult (2011) estimated separate models 
for employees and self-employed people. His results support the hypothesis 
that employers favor married men, because he found a marriage premium 
for dependent employees but not for self-employed people who are married.
Like the “marital premium”, there are many possible explanations for 
the “maternal penalty” (Budig and England 2001; Gash 2009). Some of these 
explanations resemble aspects discussed above. Firstly, a selection effect is 
likely here as well: Women with low labor force attachment and little career 
ambitions may be more likely to have children, whereas women with high 
ambitions may delay childbirth. For women who face problems acquiring 
a job on the labor market, childbirth may even be an “alternative career” 
(Friedman et al. 1994). Empirical evidence shows that women with a high 
level of education have children much later than women with low educa-
tion. Also, childlessness is more common among highly educated women 
(Blossfeld and Jaenichen 1992; Rindfuss et al. 1996; Schmitt 2012). Clearly, 
if reconciliation of work and family are problematic, women who invested 
in higher education have a lot to lose if they interrupt their careers with 
childbirth. However, the penalty remains if selection is controlled for (Budig 
and England 2001). Hence, we can assume that there are other mechanisms 
behind this effect. Again, I distinguish between effects stemming from the 
individual, household, and f irm level. Additionally, there is also evidence 
of welfare state effects on the extent of the maternal penalty.
On the individual level, it may be that childbirth causes women to value 
family higher than work. Therefore, they look for “mother friendly” jobs 
that allow them to reconcile work and family obligations. Such jobs often 
pay less than standard jobs. Research shows that mothers often return to 
part-time jobs, which are often less well paid than full-time jobs (Gash 2009). 
Such a change in attitudes may be explained by prevailing gender norms: 
If women are seen as responsible for childcare, they adapt their attitudes 
toward work to comply with the norm. Furthermore, women’s skills may 
depreciate while they are on parental leave. This, in turn, decreases their 
chances of f inding a well-paid job.
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On the family level, a hypothesis is that the increased amount of 
housework caused by having children may decrease the effort women put 
into their jobs. This derives from Becker’s (1985) specialization hypothesis: 
Women usually specialize in housework while men specialize in paid work 
because they are both more productive in the respective area. Consequently, 
women put less effort into paid work because they spend most of their 
energy on domestic work. Trying to test this hypothesis, Anderson et al. 
(2003) compared the motherhood penalty among different educational 
groups. They derived from Becker’s hypothesis that the motherhood penalty 
should be largest among women with college education because their jobs 
should require most effort. Contrary to this expectation, mothers with 
high school education had the largest penalty. Thus, the effort explanation 
is not supported.
Analogous to positive discrimination toward married men, there may be 
negative discrimination toward women with children on the f irm level. If 
employers assume that mothers are less flexible and less productive, they 
may hire them only for low paid jobs, if at all. Confirming this, Correll et al. 
(2007) found that employers discriminate against mothers but not against 
fathers when looking for employees. All of these effects may be influenced 
by welfare state provisions for working mothers. Gash (2009) shows that 
the “maternal penalty” is smaller or even non-existent in countries that 
foster mothers’ employment.
How do these theories and f indings about the marital premium and the 
maternal penalty relate to employment insecurity? Firstly, they suggest 
that there is a strong selection effect in the incidence of job loss between 
different household types. One of the main reasons for this is selectivity of 
partnership formation with regards to socio-economic status and education. 
If we accept that women tend to marry upwards or an equal, whereas men 
tend to marry downwards or an equal, two groups face diff iculties f inding 
a partner: low-educated men and high-educated women (Lichter et al. 1995; 
Blossfeld and Timm 2003a). Thus, especially male singles are negatively 
selected with regard to social status. Recent analyses additionally suggest 
that women with low earning potential also increasingly remain single in 
the later cohorts (Sweeney and Cancian 2004; Lengerer 2012). Hence, people 
that have a high risk of job loss and low re-employment probabilities are 
single more frequently than others. Therefore, when comparing couple 
to single households, I have to account for this fact. Another important 
selection effect may occur in connection with motherhood. The literature 
suggests that highly educated women who pursue a labor market career 
often delay childbirth or even stay childless. Therefore, when comparing 
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women with and without children, I have to consider possible differences 
in education and age between them.
Yet, beyond this, there may be mechanisms stemming from being in 
a partnership and having children that may further impact differences 
between different types of households in terms of employment security. 
First, it may be that married men not only strive for higher wages, but also 
for higher employment security in order to support their family in the long 
term. Presumably, men who have to support a family have a taste for stable 
jobs and hence choose a secure position. Another mechanism leading to this 
outcome is that employers prefer married men. Consequently, single men 
have more diff iculties f inding a stable position. Regardless of the cause, 
this should lead to sorting of married men into stable positions and hence 
higher rates of job loss among single men.
For women, higher rates of job loss are presumably connected to moth-
erhood: whether they chose “mother friendly” jobs because of attitude 
changes, gender role expectations, or the increase of housework, they are 
likely to be in less stable employment relationships. Likewise, discrimina-
tion against mothers in the hiring decision could lead to a similar effect. 
The need to f ind jobs that allow a reconciliation of work and family may 
lead to higher incidences of job loss for them. This may be even more the 
case for single mothers who face even greater diff iculties in reconciling 
work and family (Zagel 2014). Also, employment interruptions because of 
childbirth may hamper access to stable jobs.
The second argument about the influence of the employer can also be 
turned around: If a f irm has to dismiss employees, they discriminate against 
singles because they do not have to support a family. Additionally, discrimi-
nation against mothers on the labor market may have the same effect for 
them. Not only are they likely to take worse jobs to reconcile family and 
work, their decreased flexibility may make them vulnerable to dismissals in 
the case of restructuring or downsizing in the f irm. These two hypotheses 
assume gender specific employer behavior. In the case of fathers, the assump-
tion is that employers want to support families. In the case of mothers, the 
hypothesis assumes a negative reaction by employers to being in a family.
In sum, there are some reasons to believe that singles have a higher risk 
of job loss beyond the selection effect mentioned above. Presumably, this 
difference is especially salient for men, because living in a partnership or 
marriage should entail advantages especially for them. Women’s job loss 
risks, on the other hand, should be influenced by motherhood. The group 
at the intersection of these factors, single mothers, presumably faces the 
highest probability of job loss.
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So far, I have only covered the effect of household structure on the 
incidence of job loss – yet, there may also be the reverse connection: job 
loss changes household structure. This may affect household formation, 
childbirth, and household dissolution. Economic theories of household 
formation usually state that expected economic advantages from the joint 
household lead to partnership formation (Becker 1981). In other words, 
one of the reasons people move in together is economic gain. Therefore, 
economic uncertainty in the form of job loss may discourage people from 
forming unions because they feel they are not desirable partners. In male 
breadwinner societies, this argument should apply mainly to men, because 
they are the main income providers. From this perspective, those who 
lose jobs are also less likely to form a union. On the other hand, a person 
with an unstable career may want to move in with someone to secure her 
or his standard of living. Research shows that men with unstable careers 
have generally lower probabilities of union formation. As women become 
more active on the labor market over time, this phenomenon is also visible 
for them (Sweeney 2002). However, cohabitation seems to be an option 
for people with unstable jobs: research shows that economic uncertainty 
makes a cohabiting union more likely (Clarkberg 1999; Oppenheimer 2003; 
Kalmijn 2011) This is explained by “trial relationships”; that is to say, people 
with unstable careers also form couples but on a less formal basis. Still, 
union formation including cohabitation is less common among those who 
experience unstable careers. They often postpone union formation until 
they have acquired a stable position.
Further research shows that unemployment and insecurity influences 
the timing of childbirth and the incidence of family dissolution. Using 
German data, Gebel and Giesecke (2009) f ind that unemployment in the 
household delays the decision to become a parent. According to this study, 
the strongest effect on fertility decisions was that of men’s unemployment 
in West Germany, where the male breadwinner model is still widespread. 
Women’s labor market insecurities proved to be more or less unrelated 
to the timing of childbirth. However, Kreyenfeld (2010) f inds that low-
educated women have an even higher incidence of childbirth in the face of 
job insecurity. The author explains this with a change in roles: Faced with 
diff iculties on the labor market, low-educated women retreat into the role 
of the homemaker.
The second possible influence of job loss on household structure is that 
the event may cause partnership dissolution. Yeung and Hofferth (1998) 
assume that job loss is a major cause for stress within a relationship. One 
way of relieving this is break up. In their analyses of American families, 
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they show that job loss leads to an increased probability of break up and 
divorce. Sayer et al. (2011) explored the mechanisms behind this connection 
in the United States. Men’s unemployment leads to a higher probability of 
divorce because it violates norms of the male breadwinner and lowers the 
economic incentives for women to stay. Women’s unemployment, on the 
other hand, has no effect on marital dissolution. Instead, high labor force 
participation on the part of females increases the probability of break-up if 
the wife is not satisf ied with the marriage. Thus, economic independence 
enables women to leave if they are unhappy with the union. Consequently, 
male unemployment seems to cause partnership dissolutions. Therefore, I 
have to control for changes in the household after men’s job losses.
In sum, the literature suggests that careers dominated by employment 
insecurity often go together with living in a single household: such careers 
delay union formation and increase the probability of union dissolution. 
Combining this evidence with the results about the incidence of job loss 
in different types of households, it becomes apparent that men living in a 
single household are negatively selected in a broad range of characteristics 
that influence labor market success. Yet, beyond this, several mechanisms 
depicted above may lead to a further accumulation of disadvantages: em-
ployment insecurity decreases their probability of union formation; this, in 
turn, decreases their career prospects, which leads to job loss and further 
disadvantages. For women, motherhood seems to cause disadvantages on 
the labor market. This may be especially salient for single mothers. Thus, 
the literature suggests that household structure influences living situations 
beyond the f inancial aspect of family income support.
The stratification of income consequences
The theoretical considerations in this chapter suggest that not only in-
cidences, but also consequences of job loss differ between social strata. 
This is due to differences in the effects of buffering mechanisms. This 
perspective is an important addition to the trigger events framework, 
because combining the information about who is most affected by job loss 
and who loses most income gives a more complete picture of economic 
insecurity caused by job loss. In the following, I discuss possible variations 
in the impact of the relevant buffering mechanisms among social strata and 
their consequences for economic well-being after job loss. This comprises 
re-employment, partner’s employment, and welfare state benefits.
On the individual level, income buffering through re-employment 
is the most common strategy to buffer income losses and return to the 
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previous income level. The opportunities for re-employment, however, are 
influenced by the previous life course in connection with the labor market. 
An often replicated f inding is that unemployment leaves scars in earnings 
trajectories (Arulampalam 2001; Burda and Mertens 2001). That is to say, 
workers affected by unemployment have lower wages in their new job 
than comparable workers without unemployment experience. Numerous 
studies show that higher education leads to rapid re-employment and lower 
chances of scarring (e.g.: Kuhn 2002; Gangl 2003). Clearly, those people 
receive more and better job offers on the labor market. On the other hand, 
there are indications that workers with long job tenure and high wages prior 
to job loss face higher losses in their post-unemployment jobs (Burda and 
Mertens 2001). Thus, workers who climbed high in the internal structure of 
a f irm seem to have diff iculties returning to an equally well-paid position.
Theories about the mutual influence of the educational system and the 
labor market suggest cross-country differences in re-employment outcomes 
for different income groups (Marsden 1990; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001). As 
introduced above, some countries are characterized by occupational labor 
markets (OLM) in which skills and credentials are occupation specif ic. 
This enables employees to move between f irms within the same sector. 
For example, if one company closes down, employees move to another 
f irm and use their credentials to enter into a job that is comparable to 
their previous one. Thus, their human capital is less likely to devaluate. 
In other countries, internal labor markets (ILM) dominate. In f irms with 
ILMs, skills are f irm specif ic. Thus, after job loss, employees cannot use 
their skills in other f irms and their human capital depreciates. Therefore, 
I expect larger wage scars among people with high pre-unemployment 
wages in ILMs than in OLMs.
In addition to these factors, the household level also influences re-em-
ployment chances. One influence derives from the selectiveness of house-
hold formation. As indicated above, male singles often have low education 
and unstable careers because labor market success influences partnership 
formation. Consequently, male singles’ re-employment chances should be 
lower than those observed for men in couples. For women, the effect of 
household composition is less clear since being single often results from hav-
ing a higher level of education and high labor force attachment. However, as 
women’s incomes become more important within couple households, labor 
market chances seem to become a more important predictor of partnership 
formation for them as well (Sweeney and Cancian 2004; Lengerer 2012). Thus, 
depending on education, female singles are either positively or negatively 
selected with regards to chances on the labor market.
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Beyond selection, there are also causal influences of certain household 
characteristics on labor market careers as the discussion of the “marriage 
premium” and the “maternal penalty” indicates. Men in couple households 
should have advantages with regards to re-employment that go beyond selec-
tion effects due to employer discrimination and a different attitude toward 
work. Also, their partners’ resources, such as information about available jobs, 
may reduce unemployment duration and improve re-employment outcomes 
(Jacob and Kleinert 2014). For mothers, on the other hand, I expect disad-
vantages in re-employment chances because of work-family reconciliation 
diff iculties. It is also possible that some mothers who become unemployed 
and face these diff iculties when searching for a new job retreat from the 
labor market completely and assume the role of a homemaker (Friedman et 
al. 1994). The existence of such an “exit strategy” is supported by the f inding 
that low-educated mothers react to job loss with childbirth (Kreyenfeld 2010).
Income buffering through partner’s employment is also unequally dis-
tributed. First, since only couples have access to this form of income buffer, 
the same selectivity described above applies: higher educated men have 
higher probabilities of living in a couple household than lower educated 
men. Consequently, lower educated men’s incomes after job loss are less 
likely to be buffered by the family. For women, the pattern is different: 
both high- and low-educated women have a higher likelihood of living 
alone than those with average education. Second, the buffering capacity 
of the family depends on partners’ education: Higher education leads to 
higher possible labor earnings. Since people living in a couple are likely to 
have similar education, higher educated people are likely to have a higher 
educated partner with high income buffering potential. Such “educational 
homogamy” emerges from segregated marriage markets: Most individuals 
meet their partners while attending school (Blossfeld 2009). Although 
the rate of homogamy increased with educational expansion, two gender 
specific patterns remained: men are more likely and women are less likely to 
marry downward. Hence, in couple households high-educated women have 
a high likelihood of having a high-educated partner while high-educated 
men’s wives may also have lower education. In international comparison, 
the United States and Germany exhibit about the same rate of homogamous 
couples (Blossfeld and Timm 2003b). Therefore, in both countries, individu-
als in couple households with high education should be protected by the 
family to a greater degree. Those with low education, on the other hand, 
should be less protected.
The impact of the welfare state on incomes after job loss also differs 
depending on the prior life course. According to Esping-Andersen (1990), 
LIFE COURSES ANd TRIGGER EvENTS: THEORETICAL CONSIdERATIONS 65
welfare states not only decommodify, i.e. ameliorate the losses, but also 
stratify. That is to say, welfare state benefits are not equally accessible for 
all. For example, eligibility rules make benef its conditional on certain 
characteristics, such as having paid into the insurance system for a certain 
amount of time. Also, there may be ceilings in benef it payout or means 
tests that limit benef it payout to certain amounts depending on prior 
incomes and other incomes inside the household. Taking up this notion, 
I also analyze the stratifying impact of welfare state institutions geared 
toward the unemployed in the following chapter. This information will be 
used to formulate hypotheses about the stratifying impact of the welfare 
state after job loss.
2.5 Expectations about differences in economic insecurity 
due to job loss
In this chapter, I discussed several mechanisms through which the labor 
market, the family, and the welfare state influence economic insecurity due 
to job loss. Following DiPrete (2002), I identif ied two sets of mechanisms: 
f irst, mechanisms that affect the incidence of job loss and second, mecha-
nisms that influence the consequences of job loss, i.e. income buffering 
mechanisms. Within the second set, there are factors that influence the 
consequences directly, and so-called “counter mobility strategies” that 
individuals or households pursue to offset the loss. I grouped these factors 
into the family buffer, which contains income support from within the 
household, and the welfare state buffer, which includes income support from 
the welfare state. I also consider counter mobility through re-employment. 
Together, these mechanisms shape social stratif ication by inf luencing 
economic insecurity over the life course; that is to say, they inf luence 
who is at risk of job loss and who loses most if it occurs. My theoretical 
considerations show the importance of considering market, family, and 
welfare state influences on the life course jointly. Mayer’s (2004) idea of 
life courses as multi-level, multidimensional, and self-referential processes 
helps to structure these influences and to generate expectations about the 
consequences of job loss.
Below, I sum up the expectations about differences in incidences and 
consequences between individuals and household types that derive from 
my theoretical considerations. In the following chapter, I describe institu-
tional differences between the United States and Germany and develop 
expectations about cross-national differences. I order the expectations 
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by the empirical chapter they are tested in: f irst, expectations about the 
incidence of job loss and re-employment (tested in Chapter 5); second, 
expectations about the immediate and long-term consequences of job loss 
as well as buffering effects (tested in Chapter 6); and third, expectations 
about the incidence of counter mobility through the added worker effect 
(tested in Chapter 7). For the sake of clarity, I repeat these expectations in 
the empirical chapters and formulate testable hypotheses there.
The discussion in the previous section yielded expectations about 
individual level and household level differences in the incidences of job 
loss and unemployment. As indicated above, low-educated people and 
those holding low-paid jobs are more likely to experience job loss. They are 
often in segments of the labor market or occupations that feature low job 
stability. Also, re-employment is more diff icult in this group because they 
are less sought after on the labor market. Thus, I expect to f ind that those 
who are already in disadvantaged socio-economic positions face further 
diff iculties through job loss and longer duration of unemployment. Beyond 
individual level differences, I also expect to find differences in job losses and 
re-employment between household types and gender specif ic roles within 
these households. Single men and mothers should be more affected by job 
loss than other groups. There are two possible mechanisms influencing 
this: f irst, single men and mothers may hold less stable jobs and second, 
employers may discriminate against singles and single mothers when laying 
off workers. For single mothers, this could cumulate in even higher rates 
of job loss. Also, these groups are presumably disadvantaged in terms of 
re-employment. Employers might discriminate against them because they 
expect lower flexibility in the case of mothers and lower productivity in 
the case of singles. Also, singles lack the support that a partner could give, 
for example in terms of information about new jobs. In Chapter 5, I analyze 
whether these expectations are true.
With regard to economic well-being after job loss, I expect to f ind dif-
ferences between household types as well as between social strata. This 
is because income buffering differs along these lines according to the 
theoretical considerations introduced above. In respect of household types, 
I expect that the presence of a partner is an important stabilizer for house-
hold income. Consequently, single households should have much higher 
decreases in economic well-being than couple households. Within couple 
households, I distinguish between immediate buffering through a partner’s 
existing income and buffering through increases in partner’s income after 
job loss. Generally, gender and the division of housework and paid work 
play an important role in the capacity of partners to buffer income losses in 
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couple households. In modern western societies, men in couple households 
are almost always employed full-time whereas women’s employment varies. 
Therefore, the family buffer in couple households depends on women’s 
labor force participation. For men, the extent to which their partners are 
employed and are able to increase income governs the family buffer and, 
consequently, household income losses after job loss. Women in couples, 
on the other hand, almost always have a full-time working partner. Thus, 
household income losses after job loss depend on the share of household 
income they provide. Small children in the household presumably further 
influence income trajectories after job loss. If they are at least partially cared 
for within the household, they increase housework and thus reduce time 
for paid employment. In couples, women usually reduce their employment 
after childbirth because of gender role expectations. This may reduce the 
family buffer and consequently increase household income losses after 
men’s job losses. In single parent households, household income losses are 
even more long-lasting, because re-employment into a job that facilitates 
a reconciliation of work and childcare is diff icult.
Also, the position in the social stratification prior to job loss may influence 
economic well-being after job loss. First, this may be due to re-employment 
probabilities and earnings in the new job after unemployment. It could be 
that those with well-paid jobs face diff iculties securing an equally paid 
position and therefore lose most. On the other hand, it may be that this 
group has better chances of f inding a well-paid position because their skills 
are valuable on the labor market and therefore lose least. The theoretical 
considerations above indicated that this depends on the structure of the 
labor market. I will return to this in the following chapter on institutional 
differences. The discussion of family income support yielded the expectation 
that higher social strata are better off after job loss because they are likely to 
have a partner with high earning capacity. This follows from the observation 
that many marriages are homogamous in terms of education. Thus, I expect 
to f ind a higher impact of the family on income buffering in the upper 
strata. However, the welfare state could counteract this through a stratif ied 
tax and transfer system. To explore this, I analyze the welfare states in the 
two countries with respect to their built-in stratif ication in the following 
chapter. The question is, whether the buffering impact of the welfare state 
on incomes after job loss differs among social strata. To test the expectations 
about differences in income trajectories and income buffers, I need to f ind 
suitable measures. I therefore operationalize these quantities in Chapter 4.
I also expect differences in the occurrence and the magnitude of ad-
ditional family incomes after job loss – the so-called added worker effect 
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(AWE). Firstly, individual factors should play a role. Most obviously, if 
someone already works full-time, the AWE is unlikely. Therefore, the 
AWE should only be observable among women. Also, education and work 
experience should be important. Women with low education or little work 
experience may have a hard time f inding a job or increasing their hours. 
This, however, partly depends on the labor market. On the household level, 
I expect differences depending on the way the couple reconciles the spheres 
of paid and unpaid work. In traditional couples, where the wife stays at 
home to care for children, the AWE could be less likely because gender role 
expectations prevent these women from entering the labor market even 
though their partner is unemployed. In modern or semi-modern couples 
where women are on the labor market, the AWE should occur more often 
because these couples have experience in non-traditional distributions of 
paid and unpaid work between them and are presumably less constrained 
by gender role expectations.
In the following chapter, I describe the institutional setting and economic 
conditions in the United States and Germany. This information supple-
ments the expectations formulated here. The expectations based on my 
theoretical considerations in this chapter, together with the expectations 
about cross-national differences, will be condensed into hypotheses at the 
beginning of each empirical chapter (Chapters 5 to 7). However, before I turn 
to the analysis, I f irst describe my data set and the operationalizations of 
the main quantities of interest, namely job loss, (household) income, and 
income buffering in Chapter 4.
3 Welfare State Institutions and Labor 
Market Trends
The previous chapter identif ied several institutions and other macro 
structures that influence economic insecurity due to job loss. To gauge the 
inf luence of these macro factors, I conduct an international comparison. 
The two country cases used here are the United States and Germany. 
Within the group of modern capitalist economies, the two countries 
differ greatly. In commonly used typologies of countries, they are often 
presented as ideal types of a certain variant of capitalism or welfare state 
(e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990; Hall and Soskice 2001). Thus, the institutions 
in the two countries differ in a plethora of ways. Consequently, differ-
ences between the two countries cannot be causally ascribed to a certain 
institution. Instead, it is always the nation-specif ic bundle of macro 
conditions that drives the comparative f indings. The research design is 
therefore a “most different systems design” (Przeworski and Teune 1970). 
Such a design is usually applied to f ind out if micro mechanisms have the 
same effect in different contexts. Hence, the international comparison 
in this study can be used to identify differences, but not to explain 
differences.
Although the research design does not test the impact of institutions 
directly, I aim to explain the cross-national results with the help of a thor-
ough description of the country cases. Thus, the explanations are based on 
theoretical considerations rather than statistical methods. To accomplish 
this, I review differences in the institutions that govern economic insecurity 
caused by job loss in this chapter. Using this information and the theoretical 
framework developed in the previous chapter, I formulate expectations 
about differences between the United States and Germany. I begin with 
a review of social policy aimed at the unemployed, then cover family and 
tax policy, and f inally examine labor market structure. Finally, I turn to 
changes on the labor market over time.
3.1 Social policy
Generally, in the United States and Germany, there are two types of gov-
ernment programs that protect against the economic consequences of 
unemployment: wage-related unemployment insurance (UI) and targeted 
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minimum income schemes.6 Unemployment insurance in the United States 
is regulated at the state level. The federal government has passed only a 
few policy guidelines for implementation in all states – such as the cover-
age of almost all industries – leading to a wide variety of unemployment 
compensation policies throughout the country. Wage replacement rates 
vary at around one-half of lost wages up to an earnings ceiling among the 
states. In all but two states, the maximum duration of regular benefits is 
26 weeks. In addition, there are federal programs that extend the duration 
of benefits by up to one year in times of economic crises. Eligibility criteria 
vary widely among the states. There are considerable barriers to receiving 
benefits in some states for low-wage and part-time workers. In 2000, for 
example, workers who had been employed for half a year at 20 hours per 
week and who were earning the federal minimum wage did not satisfy the 
earnings requirement in eight states (Wenger 2003).
There are indications that income buffering by means of unemployment 
benefits has changed over time in the United States between the 1980s and 
the 2000s. Benefits have become subject to federal income tax since 1986, 
which led to lower actual benefits and a decline in take-up rates (Anderson 
and Meyer 1997). In addition, the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
(OBRA) made it more diff icult for states to borrow money from the federal 
government if their unemployment insurance ran a def icit. Consequently, 
at least 44 states tightened the monetary and/or non-monetary eligibility 
criteria (US General Accounting Off ice 1993). During the 1990s and the 
2000s, however, many states lowered the barriers to benefit receipt again 
(Wenger 2003). Hence, while the 1980s saw cuts in actual benefits through 
taxes and tightened eligibility criteria, these changes were partly reversed 
during the decades afterward.
After UI benefits are depleted, there are no further government programs 
directed at the unemployed. However, there are some targeted programs 
that provide a minimum income for those in need. Among these programs, 
food stamps (later: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)) 
have the widest coverage. Food stamps are vouchers that can be exchanged 
for food in grocery stores. The eligibility criterion for this program is low or 
no income.7 The benefit amount of this in-kind transfer is low, however. In 
6 For further information about welfare state policies for the unemployed in the United 
States and Germany and their changes over time, see Grell (2011) and Wörz (2011), who provide 
detailed overviews of this topic.
7 The eligibility criteria are complex and changed numerous times. Welfare Reform in 1996 
made receipt conditional on working for “Able-bodied adults without dependents”.
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2011, the average monthly benefit among single households amounted to 
$ 153 (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2013). Beyond food stamps, Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) provided a low but unlimited 
benefit to single mothers with children. However, the program was discon-
tinued in 1996 and replaced by Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF) 
through the Welfare Reform Act (Blank 2002; Haskins 2004). TANF is both 
less generous than AFDC and limited to f ive years per claimant. Currently, 
TANF is below 50 per cent of the federal poverty level in all states (Finch 
and Schott 2011).8 When looking at US welfare policy, tax policy must also 
be considered. The tax system offers low-wage workers a refundable tax 
credit, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). This wage subsidy improves 
the f inancial situation of those who have taken up a low-paid job after job 
loss. The EITC has been continuously expanded during the last decades 
(Blank 2010).
In Germany, unemployment insurance is administered at the federal 
level, which is reflected in a much more uniform institutional arrangement. 
Unemployment benefits provide the unemployed with an earnings-related 
benef it. Since 1998, the unemployed receive 67 per cent of their former 
monthly net wages if they live with children and 60 per cent if they live 
without children (pre-1998: 67 per cent and 63 per cent, respectively). 
Maximum payout is governed by an earnings ceiling of currently € 5,800 per 
month above which no further contributions to unemployment insurance 
have to be made. The normal duration of benefits is one year after having 
worked in insured employment for about two years. For older workers with 
long tenure, the duration of the benefits is longer. The minimum duration of 
work that grants eligibility for a reduced period of unemployment benefits 
is one year. Thus, as in the United States, the short-term employed are 
excluded from benefits. Low-wage workers, on the other hand, are eligible 
in Germany because there is no earnings requirement.9
When unemployment benef its are depleted, unemployed persons in 
Germany are eligible for further programs. Until 2004, unemployment 
assistance paid unemployed persons with children 57 per cent and 
those without children 53 per cent of their former income. In contrast to 
unemployment benef its, this benef it was means-tested. If the eligibility 
criteria were fulf illed, the duration of the benefit was unlimited. The 2004 
8 Note that the US federal poverty level is below the relative poverty level, measured as 60 
per cent of median income that is usually used in international comparisons (Brady 2003).
9 However, so called “Mini Jobs” with monthly earnings below a certain threshold are 
excluded. The threshold is € 450 in 2016.
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Hartz Reforms, among other things, abolished unemployment assistance 
and established a new benefit for unemployed persons who are not or no 
longer entitled to unemployment benefits, which is called Unemployment 
Benefits II (Kemmerling and Bruttel 2006). This scheme accommodates all 
long-term unemployed persons who are able to work. Although, like the 
former unemployment assistance, it is directly targeted at the unemployed, 
its benefits are now paid as a lump sum.10 Furthermore, several reforms 
increased the pressure on the long-term unemployed to take up a new 
job. For example, the possibility to decline a job offer because it is below a 
person’s qualif ication level has been gradually abolished. Also, the Hartz 
Reforms implemented monetary sanctions that can be imposed on the 
unemployed if they reject a job offer or do not search actively.
In sum, public protection in the event of unemployment is much stronger 
in Germany than in the United States. This applies to both initial unemploy-
ment insurance and benef its for long-term unemployed. According to a 
simulation by the OECD (2007b), wage replacement rates amount to 73 per 
cent in Germany and 56 per cent in the United States for one-earner married 
couples with two children earning an average wage. In the long run, the 
estimated replacement rate falls to 40 per cent in the United States while 
it remains at 62 per cent in Germany.11 The differences compared to the 
statutory replacement rates indicated above are due to taxes and further 
transfers that are included in the simulations.
Based on these descriptions, I expect cross-national differences in the 
amount of income buffering through the welfare state, the incidence of the 
added worker effect, and the stratif ication of benefits. First, the buffering 
effect of the welfare state should be greater in Germany, both initially and 
also in the long run. Second, the added worker effect should be stronger in 
the United States because of lower government help. Third, welfare state 
impact in both countries should be stronger for low-income groups because 
of the ceiling in benef it payout. However, difference between high and 
low income groups should be smaller in the United States, because some 
unemployed with low previous income are excluded from UI benef its, 
which should lower the relative advantage of the low-income groups. In 
Germany, on the other hand, the unlimited safety net at the bottom provides 
a minimum income that almost nobody can fall below, apart from those 
10 Currently in 2016 the benef its amount to € 768 for a couple without children plus costs of 
accomodation up to a locally-set maximum. The household receives another € 237 to € 306 for 
each child depending on its age.
11 The difference is similar for other household types and different previous earnings.
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who become sanctioned. Thus, low-wage earners do not fall much deeper 
than they already were if they become unemployed. This should increase 
the advantage of low-income groups relative to high-income groups.
Over time, both welfare states became less generous for the long-term 
unemployed. Also, both countries implemented activation measures di-
rected at the unemployed. Yet, despite the common trend, the difference 
between the two countries in buffering potential through the welfare state 
presumably remained stable. The United States provided little support 
for the long-term unemployed even before Welfare Reform. Thus, the 
retrenchment presumably affected only a small group. In Germany, by 
contrast, there is still a safety net for the long-term unemployed after the 
Hartz Reforms. Yet, the welfare state lost its status-preserving element by 
providing the same benefit amounts for all long-term unemployed. Taken 
together, I expect to f ind a lower welfare state buffer in the long run after 
job loss in both countries. Whether this translated into higher overall losses 
is an open question, since the decrease in the welfare state buffer might 
have been offset by other income buffers.
3.2 Family policy and tax policy
The theoretical considerations about the family’s influence in Chapter 2 
suggest that family policy and tax policy should generate nation-specif ic 
patterns of income buffering through the family. Two factors are important: 
the taxation of couples and the organization of childcare. In the following, I 
describe the differences and similarities in the two policy f ields and develop 
expectations about cross-national differences in the family buffering ef-
fect. Generally, in both countries, income tax is progressive; that is to say, 
higher incomes lead to higher taxes. However, income tax is much higher 
in Germany and the German tax system is more progressive (OECD 2011b).
The taxation of couples is similar in the United States and Germany. In 
both countries, couple’s incomes are assessed jointly. This form of taxation 
is often regarded as a disincentive for the partner with lower earnings to 
increase earnings, because any additional income may shift total household 
income into a higher tax bracket in a progressive tax system. Thus, the 
marginal tax rate on additional income is much higher than in countries 
with individual taxation where the additional income would be taxed 
in a lower bracket according to the individual amount (Dingeldey 2001). 
Therefore, we can expect that there are disincentives for women to enter 
the labor market in both countries when their husbands work full-time.
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However, simulations by the OECD (2001) show that these disincentive 
effects only appear in the German system. The simulations compare male-
breadwinner couples with full-time/ part-time combinations and double 
full-time households and f ind that the German system taxes additional in-
come to a greater extent than the American system. This is due to additional 
regulations for married couples in the US tax code that countervail the 
disincentives. Married couples in the United States have a higher standard 
deduction and larger tax brackets (Johnson and Rohaly 2009).
The availability and the organization of public childcare also differ 
between the two countries. There are no statutory entitlements to childcare 
for pre-school children in the United States. Germans, on the other hand, 
have a legal claim to childcare for 3- to 6-year-old children since 1996. How-
ever, childcare is usually only provided on a half-day basis. The American 
childcare system is very diverse and consists of a variety of arrangements 
in the individual states, which are too numerous to be covered here. The 
scope of childcare in Germany also differs within the country, albeit in 
clear-cut regions. In the former GDR, full-day childcare is widely available, 
because the former socialist regime promoted female employment. In West 
Germany, by contrast, the prevailing male-breadwinner model led to fewer 
facilities, which provide mainly half-day childcare.
Overall, about 56 per cent of American children between 3-6 years are 
enrolled in childcare. In West Germany, by comparison, there are places for 
about 90 per cent of the children between 3 and 6, of which only 24 per cent 
are full-day places. In East Germany, however, childcare facilities provide 
full-day places for almost all children of this age (OECD 2006). After age 6, 
when compulsory school starts in both countries, children in the United 
States generally have a longer school day than in Germany. While school 
ends around noon in Germany, American children stay until the afternoon. 
In East Germany, there are afternoon-care facilities for about 70 per cent 
of the schoolchildren, whereas such facilities are rare in West Germany.
Hence, East Germany provides the most encompassing childcare and 
the United States provide more than West Germany. However, childcare 
in the United States is often expensive. Parents have to pay much more for 
the services than in Germany, especially for younger children. Therefore, 
childcare provision facilitates the formation of dual-earner couples with 
children in East Germany to a greater degree than in the United States and 
in West Germany. Thus, I expect that the initial family buffer for couples 
with children is greatest in East Germany. In the United States, this buffer 
should be greater than in West Germany where childcare is much less 
available.
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3.3 Labor market regulation and labor market structure
The labor markets in the United States and Germany differ to a great extent. 
The German labor market is much more regulated than the American 
labor market (DiPrete et al. 1997). This leads to much greater labor market 
dynamics in the United States compared to Germany: Job changes and 
unemployment are much more common in the United States compared 
to Germany (Gangl 2003). The regulations that influence these dynamics 
operate on different levels. First, employment protection legislation is much 
stronger in Germany than in the United States making it harder to dismiss 
workers in Germany. Second, the educational systems in the two countries 
lead to different occupational structures. The German vocational training 
system creates occupation-specif ic skills and credentials. Described in 
the terms introduced in the previous chapter, the German labor market 
is characterized by occupational labor markets (OLM) where workers can 
apply their skills in different f irms within an occupation. Consequently, 
changes of occupations in the middle of the life course are rare. Education in 
the United States, on the other hand, is based on general skills and workers 
learn occupational skills “on the job”. Hence, the labor market is based on 
internal labor markets (ILM) where occupational barriers are low since 
skills are f irm-specif ic and changing a job implies new training on the job, 
regardless of the previously learned skills (Althauser and Kalleberg 1981; 
Eyraud et al. 1990; Marsden 1990). Hence, according to this distinction, job 
changes across occupations are easier in the United States than in Germany.
The characterization of labor markets using the concepts of OLM and 
ILM suggests cross-national differences in job quality and wages after 
unemployment as indicated in the previous chapter. Occupation specif ic 
skills in Germany enable employees to move between f irms within the 
same sector. For example, if one company closes down, the employees can 
move to another f irm and use their credentials to enter into a job that is 
comparable to their previous one. In the ILM dominated United States, on 
the other hand, employees cannot use their skills in other f irms and have 
to take up a job that is much lower within a f irm’s hierarchy than their 
previous position. Thus, according to this reasoning, high-wage workers’ 
incomes in the United States should be more affected by unemployment 
than in Germany. For them, unemployment should leave much larger scars 
in their earning trajectories.
Yet, this characterization of the two labor markets is not suff icient, 
because it neglects the influence of social policy and educational systems 
on labor market structure (DiPrete et al. 1997). Following the idea of 
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occupational labor markets, job changes in Germany should be common 
within occupations. However, the German educational system, in combina-
tion with strong employment protection, generated a labor market where 
both f irms and workers have incentives to invest in f irm-specif ic skills as 
well (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001). Because workers do not have to fear dismissal, 
it is a rational strategy for them to invest in skills that cannot be applied in 
other f irms. In the United States, on the other hand, workers rather invest 
in skills that ensure re-employment after job loss. Likewise, employers in 
Germany cannot simply hire new workers and therefore invest in their 
current staff, while American employers may easily replace their employees 
with more skilled individuals instead of training them.
Overall, this suggests country-specif ic patterns for both the probabilities 
of re-employment and of partners’ increases in hours to offset income losses 
(i.e. the AWE). First, the German labor market provides fewer opportunities 
for re-employment than its American counterpart. Hence, beyond the effect 
of longer-lasting unemployment benef it, job search durations should be 
longer in Germany. Second, and connected to the f irst point, there should 
also be fewer opportunities in Germany for those who want to take up a 
job in the case of their partner’s unemployment. The same applies to those 
who are already working and want to increase their hours: Because of “hours 
constraints” (Altonji and Paxson 1992) the only possibility to do so is a 
change in jobs, which is more diff icult in Germany. However, credentialism 
in Germany could help those women who re-enter the labor market from 
a position of inactivity: if they hold a vocational training certif icate, they 
may have better chances of re-entering than American women, whose skills 
are less transferable and more prone to depreciation.
3.4 Labor market trends
Over time, the labor markets in the two countries changed considerably due 
to the business cycle, changes in the economic structure, and institutional 
changes. First, between 1980 and the end of the 2000s, both countries saw 
several recessions and upswings. This is reflected in the unemployment 
rate presented in Figure 3.1. It is often overlooked that the United States’ 
unemployment rate surpassed German figures at the beginning of the 1980s. 
The recession at this time hit the American labor market harder than its 
German counterpart. Until 1990, unemployment rates decreased simultane-
ously in the two countries and increased again during the next recession. 
Subsequently, however, the trends diverged. German unemployment soared 
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continuously after 1990, whereas the unemployment rate in the United 
States trended downward. The main reason for the German trend is the 
reunif ication in 1990 and the restructuring of the East German economy. 
Following the move from a planned economy to a market economy, East 
Germany saw a massive de-industrialization leading to mass layoffs. 
However, unemployment rates also grew in West Germany indicating a 
larger structural problem that affected the whole German labor market. 
By the end of the 2000s, however, the German labor market recovered. In 
the United States, by contrast, the Great Recession caused by the f inancial 
crisis after 2008 sent unemployment rates to levels not observed since the 
beginning of the 1980s.
Beyond changes in unemployment, both countries also experienced 
changes in job characteristics. Here, the most important change regards 
the rise of precarious work in both countries (Kalleberg 2009). In the United 
States, many results suggest that employment stability has declined since 
the 1970s (Hollister 2011). Average job tenure has decreased, especially 
among men in the private sector (Farber 2008a). At the same time, transi-
tions from one job to another increased (Stewart 2002). Hence, the high 
turnover labor market in the United States, described above, trends toward 
even greater labor market dynamics.
Figure 3.1  Unemployment rates in the United States and Germany 1980 to 2011
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In Germany, there is also a trend toward more f lexible employment 
arrangements. During the last decades, the number of f ixed-term and 
contingent jobs increased (Leschke 2008). In 2010, about 15 per cent of the 
employees in Germany held a temporary job (OECD 2011a). Yet, on average, 
this trend does not seem to decrease employment stability in Germany 
(Mayer et al. 2010). One possible reason for this could be that temporary 
employment is a stepping stone into permanent contracts (Gash 2008). This 
view, however, has not been uncontested. Other studies show that holding 
a f ixed-term contract increases the probability of becoming unemployed 
or moving into the next temporary job (Giesecke and Groß 2003). A closer 
look at the workers holding temporary contracts reveals an overrepresenta-
tion of low-educated individuals among them. A study analyzing trends in 
employment stability for the low-educated consequently found that they 
experience more employer changes and transitions to unemployment over 
time (Giesecke and Heisig 2010). Hence, the German labor market became 
more flexible at the lower margin over time.
The increase of temporary employment and the increasing labor turnover 
for low-educated individuals in Germany is likely to be caused by changes 
in employment protection legislation for temporary contracts. Figure 3.2 
shows that there has been almost no change in the protection of permanent 
employment contracts in Germany. If anything, employment protection 
for this segment of the labor market has increased. Regulations regard-
ing temporary contracts, on the other hand, have been liberalized over 
time. This is in line with the observation that employment relationships 
in Germany have become more unstable in the lower strata. In the United 
States, employment protection legislation is constantly at a low level. Thus, 
it is likely that the observed change in employment stability in the United 
States is not rooted in institutional change but in changing f irm policies 
(Hollister 2011).
Another important change on the labor market is the steady increase in 
female labor force participation, as Figure 3.3 depicts. In the United States, 
the percentage of working women increased from around 60 per cent at the 
beginning of the 1980s to over 70 per cent at the end of the 2000s. German 
women’s labor force participation was even lower during the 1980s. It started 
from around 50 per cent and grew at a faster pace and reached the share 
measured in the United States by the 2000s. The trend in Germany has been 
fueled by reunif ication. In the former GDR, female employment was the 
norm and many women continued to be in employment after 1990.
Although the aggregate female employment rates are similar since the 
2000s, important differences between female employment in the United 
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States and West Germany persist. In West Germany, many more women 
than in the United States work part-time (OECD 2007a). This is especially 
prevalent among West German mothers, who often take up part-time jobs 
as their children become older (Drobnič et al. 1999). Thus, West German 
women’s incomes in couple households are often supplementary, whereas 
American women often provide a larger share of total household income. 
The reason for this pattern is, presumably, a complex interaction of gender 
norms and economic constraints (Steiber and Haas 2012). For example, 
tax laws in Germany privilege couples with full-time/part-time combina-
tions (Dingeldey 2001). Also, the male-breadwinner model remains more 
prevalent in West Germany than in the United States (Grunow et al. 2006). 
In East Germany, on the other hand, the legacy of the GDR continues to 
have an influence on female employment. Employment rates are higher, 
especially among mothers, and more households are dual-earner couples 
(Rosenfeld et al. 2004). Also, working women are more accepted in East 
Germany than in West Germany (Lee et al. 2007).
The cross-national comparison of female labor force participation suggests 
that family income support directly after job loss is lower among men in West 
Figure 3.2  Employment protection legislation strictness in the United States and 
Germany 1985 to 2008
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Germany than in the United States. In West Germany, more households rely 
mainly on men’s wages. Consequently, if a single-earner’s job is lost, market 
income in the household drops to zero. In the United States, by contrast, 
there is often still another earner in the household when the man loses his 
job. At the same time, this implies that women’s job losses affect household 
income much more in the United States than in West Germany. Over time, 
losses in household income should become similar among men and women in 
both countries as dual-earner couples become more prevalent. However, this 
trend is presumably stronger in the United States, where a greater share of the 
increase in female labor force participation has been due to full-time jobs.
Summing up, this chapter provided insights into differences between 
the United States and Germany that, presumably, shape economic insecu-
rity due to job loss. Generally, this comprises the well-known distinction 
between the “liberal” welfare state regime in the United States, where 
the government interferes little in the economy, and the “conservative” 
welfare state regime in Germany where the government has much more 
influence (Esping-Andersen 1990). Yet, beyond this, the labor market and 
family structure also differ to a large extent. Following the discussion in the 
previous chapter, these differences are also of importance for the extent of 
Figure 3.3  Labor force participation rate of women and men aged 15-64 in the 
United States and Germany 1980-2011
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economic insecurity. The high-turnover labor market in the United States is 
characterized by internal labor markets and general skills. In Germany, on 
the other hand, labor market turnover is lower and there are occupational 
labor markets where f irm-specif ic skills are more important. Finally, work-
ing women, and especially working mothers, are much more prevalent in 
the United States. Together, all of these cross-national differences should 
lead to country-specif ic patterns of economic insecurity due to job loss. In 
the empirical chapters (5, 6, and 7), I formulate hypotheses about country 
differences that build on the theoretical considerations in the previous 
chapter and the institutional synopsis in this chapter. Yet, before I turn 
to the analyses, I will describe my empirical strategy and the data in the 
following chapter.

4 Data and Methods
The aim of this study is to analyze economic insecurity caused by job loss. 
As indicated in the previous chapters, I apply three steps of analysis to fully 
explore this issue: f irst, analyses of the incidence of job loss and unemploy-
ment; second the analysis of consequences and buffering effects; and third 
the analysis of household strategies to offset the consequences. While the 
f irst step is of a descriptive nature, the other two steps aim to isolate the 
effect of job loss on economic well-being and other household members’ 
employment behavior under different circumstances. Thus, for the f irst 
step I need no special method beyond summary statistics.12 However, for 
the second two steps, I need an empirical strategy that isolates the impact 
of displacements from other possible influences. One aim of this chapter 
is to describe this method. I rely on the counterfactual model of causal 
inference (Gangl 2010). Specif ically, I use Difference-in-Difference (DiD) 
estimation with a matched control group. The matching of cases is achieved 
through Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM). I discuss the merits of this 
approach below.
To be able to test the implications of my theoretical considerations about 
economic insecurity caused by job loss in the previous chapters, I need data 
that span all three levels of my analysis: the individual, the household, and 
the welfare state. The latter level of analysis requires data from different 
countries, in this case the United States and Germany. Also, the data has to 
be longitudinal so that I can estimate changes due to job loss. Therefore, I 
use two long-running household panel data sets for my analysis: the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the United States and the German 
Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP). However, these two data sets cannot be 
easily compared due to differences in operationalization and nation-
specif ic categories such as education. To compare the analyses, the data 
must be harmonized. As a f irst step, I use the Cross National Equivalence 
File (CNEF), which contains a subset of harmonized variables from both 
panel studies. However, the CNEF does not include all the data needed for 
my analyses. Therefore, I conduct further harmonization, which I describe 
below, together with further operationalizations of my theoretical concepts.
This chapter is structured as follows: f irst, I detail the statistical methods 
used to estimate the effects of job loss. Then, I describe the data sets used 
12 I will, however, use some further methods to test hypotheses about differences in incidences 
between groups that will be described in the chapter on incidences.
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in the analyses. Finally, I turn to the operationalization and harmonization 
of key concepts in this study and describe the composition of the data set 
used in the analyses.
4.1 Empirical strategy to estimate the consequences of job 
loss
My theoretical expectations are about group differences in the effects of 
job loss on two main outcomes. The f irst outcome is changes in economic 
well-being and the second outcome is changes in partners’ employment 
participation (the added worker effect). I want to f ind out how the effects 
of job loss differ among individuals, families, and welfare states. To be able 
to compare the effects along these dimensions, I need to ensure that they 
are due to job loss and not due to another factor. In other words, I want to 
extract the causal effect of job loss, i.e. the effect that is only due to the fact 
that someone becomes unemployed.
To isolate the effects of job loss, I apply the counterfactual model of causal 
inference (for an overview, see: Winship and Morgan 1999; Gangl 2010). This 
model borrows its vocabulary from medical research. The event or condition 
that a person is exposed to is called “treatment”. In my case, the treatment 
is job loss. At its core, this model has a simple idea: If a researcher could 
observe the same person with and without the treatment, the causal effect 
of the treatment on an outcome is the difference in outcomes between the 
two states. Expressed formally, the Treatment Effect (TE) for one unit i is
 TEi 𐄒 (Yi|Di = 1) – (Yi|Di = 0) (4.1)
with D = 1 indicating that the event occurred and D = 0 that it did not. Of 
course, one of the states is hypothetical: The same person cannot simultane-
ously be employed and unemployed. Therefore, the individual treatment 
effect TEi cannot be observed. Nevertheless, it is possible to estimate treat-
ment effects using this framework under certain circumstances.
The f irst step to identify treatment effects in the counterfactual frame-
work is to move away from unit treatment effects to treatment effects in 
a population. The most straightforward way is to estimate the Average 
Treatment Effect (ATE), which is simply def ined as the expected values, 
i.e. the average, of unit treatment effects:
 ATE 𐄒 (E(TE) = E[(Y|D = 1) – (Y|D = 0)] (4.2)
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The ATE includes both the treatment effect among the treated and the 
untreated. For my study, this would mean that I obtain the effects of job loss 
among those who lose their jobs and the effects of job loss among those who 
do not lose their jobs. However, it is not informative for a study of economic 
well-being after job loss to f ind out about the effects of job losses that do 
not occur. Instead, I want to f ind the effects of job loss among those who 
are affected by it. Therefore, I only estimate the Average Treatment Effect 
on the Treated (ATT):
 ATT 𐄒 E(TE|D = 1) = E[(Y|D = 1) – (Y|D = 0)|D = 1] (4.3)
Compared to the ATE, the only difference is that I now estimate the treat-
ment effect given that the treatment D is present. The ATT is not only 
more interesting with regard to my research question, but also easier to 
identify using the observed data. Still, the ATT as presented above, includes 
hypothetical counterfactual observations and thus cannot be estimated.
An identif ication strategy for the ATT has to estimate values for the 
hypothetical cases that are not observed. This is done using existing cases 
that have the required state. Thus, I compare observations with the treat-
ment to those without the treatment. Such a comparison yields the ATT if 
the process of treatment assignment is known. For example, if the treat-
ment is randomly distributed, as in Randomized Controlled Trials (RCT) 
in pharmaceutical research, the ATT is def ined as the difference between 
outcomes in the treatment (i) an in the control group ( j):
 ATTRCT = E[(Yi|Di = 1) – (Yj|Dj = 0)] (4.4)
This is because under random assignment, the only thing that differs 
between the treatment and the control group is the treatment. Thus, the 
difference is due to the treatment. Clearly, random assignment of job loss 
is not possible for many reasons. In the observational data I use, job loss is 
likely to be selectively distributed, which biases the measured effect. For 
example, if job loss occurs more often among low-skilled workers and this 
group also has lower wages on average, then the comparison of income 
between the groups with and without job loss is presumably overestimated.
To estimate a causal effect using observational data where I cannot 
manipulate the selection myself, I have to account for selection. If I can 
render the assignment of the treatment as good as random conditional 
on covariates, I can identify the ATT. This idea, called the Conditional 
Independence Assumption (CIA), is the key to estimating treatment effects 
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using observational data. The CIA holds if the treatment and the control 
group become similar in aspects that influence the outcome other than 
the treatment. Thus, in the example above, if I can render the occurrence 
of job loss independent of skills and other factors that influence both its 
occurrence and income, the CIA would hold and I could estimate the ATT 
of job loss on income.13
There are two possible ways of identifying the ATT using observational 
data. First, I could compare the same individual at different points in time 
(“within approach”). Second, I could compare individuals with and without 
the treatment (“between approach”). Both approaches have their strengths 
and weaknesses. The within approach is the most obvious implementation 
of the counterfactual model if panel data is available: If I can observe the 
same persons before and after the occurrence of job loss, the treatment and 
the control group consist of the same individuals at different points in time 
and are therefore very similar. In the same stylized notation as before, the 
ATT in the within approach is def ined as follows:
 ATTFD = E[(Yt|Dt = 1) – (Yt–1|Dt–1 = 0)] (4.5)
where t is the time at which the treatment occurs and t – 1 is before the 
treatment. The only elements that differ between the groups are factors that 
change over time. This estimation strategy is also known as First-Differences 
(FD). The FD model is a simple form of a Fixed-Effects (FE) model. In these 
kinds of models, all individual-specif ic time-constant factors are controlled 
for, because they do not affect changes within the individuals by definition 
(Halaby 2004). The FD approach is nicely illustrated on the basis of linear 
regression. Consider a model of yit with a vector of explanatory variables x 
that vary between individuals and over time and the corresponding vector 
of coeff icients ß1. Also, there is a vector of time-invariant covariates z and 
coeff icients ß2. Finally, there is a time-constant error term ai and a time-
varying error term uit:
 yit = ß1 (xit) + ß2 (zi) + ai + uit  (4.6)
13 Also, the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) has to be met. It states that there 
should be no effects of the treatment assignment process on the outcome. There should also 
be no interactions between the units under study that influences the outcome. An example 
would be that workers in a randomized experiment who do not receive a treatment that boosts 
productivity (maybe a special tool) organize themselves to work harder in order to make up for 
the disadvantage. Obviously, this is of greater relevance in randomized trials than in my case.
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If I now take the f irst difference of every covariate, this yields
 (yit – yit–1) = β1 (xit – xit–1) + β2 (zi – zi) + (ai – ai) + (uit – uit–1) (4.7)
where the vectors zi and ai drop out because they have the same values at 
both points in time. As a result, the FD model implicitly controls for all 
measured and unmeasured individual-specif ic and time-constant covari-
ates. At the same time, the effect of measured time-constant variables ( ß2) 
cannot be estimated using a FD model.14
Since many individual-specif ic confounding factors, such as gender or 
education, among adults do not change over time, the CIA is often plau-
sible in FD and FE models. Clearly, FD and FE can only assess changes in 
outcomes. Yet, because I am interested in changes in economic well-being 
through job loss, this is not an issue. However, there are trends over time 
that these types of models do not control for, such as maturation effects and 
common shocks. Maturation effects may be, for example, the seniority effect 
in wage settings that assigns higher wages to people with higher job tenure. 
Common shocks, on the other hand, are events that reduce all incomes, for 
example because of a recession. Thus, in both cases, the situation before 
the event is not an adequate estimation of the counterfactual situation that 
job loss did not occur. The two examples illustrate that trends over time 
are important factors when analyzing economic well-being. To control for 
trends over time, I need observations of individuals’ trends that are not 
affected by job loss.
As an extension of FE or FD models, Difference-in-Difference (DiD) 
estimation controls for time-varying factors and common shocks. DiD 
estimation also includes individuals that do not experience the treatment 
to estimate the outcome that would have happened between the two points 
in time if the treatment had not occurred. To achieve this, the change in 
the outcome among the treated is compared to the change in the outcome 
among the control group. In other words, I calculate the difference between 
the differences within the cases. In the notation above this yields:
ATTDiD = E[((Yit|Dit = 1) – (Yit–1|Dit–1 = 0)) – ((Yjt|Djt = 0) – (Yjt–1|Djt–1 = 0))] (4.8)
14 FE models have the same properties. However, they can also be applied to situations with 
more than two time points. FE achieves the elimination of individual specif ic heterogeneity 
by subtracting the individual specif ic means from each variable. Again, individual-specif ic 
time-constant variables drop out of the equation.
88 THE IMPAC T OF LOSING YOUR JOB 
where i signif ies the treatment group and j signif ies the control group 
again. However, since DiD uses control cases, the issue of selection between 
individuals resurfaces. Clearly, the outcome in the control group is also in 
differences, and thus individual-specific time-constant differences between 
the treatment and control group are still controlled for. Still, trends over 
time may differ. For example, if job loss occurs more often among the low-
skilled and wage growth is also lower in this group, a control group with 
many high-skilled workers has different trends and therefore biases the 
results. Therefore, I also need techniques for the estimation of causal effects 
between individuals.
The between approach in the counterfactual model compares different 
individuals at the same point in time. In this case, the treatment and the 
control group differ greatly if the treatment is selective. To comply with the 
CIA, I have to estimate the counterfactual situation in the control group 
using other observed covariates; or, put differently, I have to render the 
control group similar to the treatment group. There are several techniques 
to achieve this. One strategy is to control for the relevant covariates using 
multiple regression. If variance due to variables that influence both the 
selection and the outcome is removed through regression, the CIA may 
hold. However, regression based analyses have the weakness that they are 
parametric, i.e. that they assume certain functional relationships between 
variables. If the functional forms are mis-specif ied, the factors are not 
properly controlled for and the CIA does not hold.
Therefore, researchers applying the counterfactual model mostly rely 
on non-parametric methods. The most commonly used non-parametric 
method is statistical matching. The basic idea behind statistical matching is 
to f ind statistical twins of observations, i.e. observations that are identical, 
based on several relevant observed variables. If there is a statistical twin for 
each treatment observation in the control group, the two groups are similar 
given the covariates and the CIA holds. This basic approach is called “exact 
matching”. However, it is quite obvious that exact matching is often not 
feasible because it is unlikely to f ind enough individuals with exactly the 
same values on several variables. Therefore, researchers calculate a measure 
of similarity between cases. There are different methods to f ind out which 
individuals are similar. The most commonly used measure is the propensity 
score. The propensity score is the predicted probability of being in the 
treatment group given the covariates. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show 
that the propensity score is a suff icient one-dimensional summary statistic 
for the multi-dimensional similarity between cases. Usually, researchers 
use predicted probabilities from a logistic regression or a similar technique. 
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Then, weights are constructed from the propensity scores for the control 
group that render it similar to the treatment group. The similarity between 
the two groups is often called balance. In the simplest case, control cases 
that are very unlikely to be in the treatment group are weighted down, 
whereas control cases that are likely to be in the treatment group receive 
a larger weight. There are many different ways to construct the weights. 
For example, the researcher may set cut-off values (“calipers”) that remove 
control cases that have a very low propensity to be in the treatment group 
or def ine strata where weights are constructed for different subgroups 
(Gangl and DiPrete 2004; Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). At the end, the 
researcher must always check whether the constructed weights balance 
the treatment and the control group on all relevant variables. If not, the 
matching model has to be re-specif ied. Also, the researcher always has 
to identify the area of common support between the treatment and the 
control group at some point in the matching process. The area of common 
support is the range of values on all considered matching variables that 
appear both in the treatment and in the control group. If a treatment case 
is outside the common support, it either cannot be used in the analysis or 
a control case has to be modeled. The f irst option yields a local ATT that 
only applies to the treatment cases with valid controls. The second option 
makes the ATT model dependent. In this case, the researcher has to decide 
what is less severe.
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and related methods have several 
weaknesses. Firstly, they disconnect the calculation of the similarity of 
cases from balance checking between treatment and control group. The 
researcher always has to define a model that predicts the propensity scores, 
and then calculate the balance in the weighted data. Often, changes in the 
model to increase balance on one variable worsens balance on another. This 
often leads to many iterations of matching and checking until the groups 
are balanced on the most important variables. Checking balance not only 
includes means in variables, but also, for example, variances or higher order 
interactions. This makes the process of f inding a suitable control group 
cumbersome. Likewise, f inding the area of common support is an extra 
step in the matching process that is not achieved through calculating the 
propensity score. Instead, the researcher has to check that the cases are 
within the common support in further analyses. Furthermore, King et al. 
(2011) show that propensity score matching often does not perform better 
than randomly matching cases. According to the authors, this is due to 
the reduction of the data to one propensity score. This one-dimensional 
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metric is insuff icient to balance treatment and control group given the 
multi-dimensional distribution of the covariates.
To overcome the shortcomings of propensity score matching, Iacus et 
al. (2012) propose a different matching technique called Coarsened Exact 
Matching (CEM). The basic idea behind CEM is to f ind exact matches 
for treatment units in the control group on coarsened variables. In this 
technique, the researcher sets the balance between treatment and control 
group before the matching by deciding about categories of values in the 
variables. For example, if individuals within quartiles of household income 
are regarded as reasonably similar, the researcher coarsens household 
income to quartiles and matches people within these categories. If more 
coarsened variables are used for matching, individuals are always matched 
to cases with the same combination of categories. Thus, the method also 
considers all types of interactions between the variables. The combinations 
of categories are called “strata”. To generate weights that balance the data, 
CEM takes the number of treatment and control cases in each stratum 
and weights the control cases so that their number equals the number of 
treatment cases. To restore the original proportions of control and treatment 
cases, the weight in each stratum is multiplied by this proportion. The 
weight is def ined as follows:
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where  m  C  s  is the number of control cases in stratum s,  m  s  T is the number 
of treatment cases in stratum s. mC and mT are the number of treatment 
and control cases, respectively. Finally, Ts and Cs are all treatment and 
control units, respectively, in a stratum. Strata that contain none or only 
one group of cases are not incorporated in the construction of the weight. 
Thus, observations that have no match in the other group are dropped from 
the data set. As a result, CEM also automatically restricts the analysis to the 
area of common support given the coarsening of the data. Therefore, the 
ATT calculated using CEM is always a local effect among the treatment units 
for which a matching control case is present. Iacus et al. (2012) call this the 
Feasible Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (FATT). Because not all 
treatment cases are used to estimate the FATT, I present descriptive statistics 
for the treatment cases with and without a match in the later chapters to 
assess the selectiveness of the used sub-sample of the treatment cases.
CEM has several desirable properties that justify my decision to use it 
in this study. First, according to King et al. (2011), CEM outperforms other 
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matching solutions in generating balance between the treatment and the 
control group. Second, CEM is able to balance the data based on theoretical 
considerations and a priori knowledge about the variables. For example, 
if the researcher knows that certain educational degrees are very similar, 
they can be summarized in one category without loss of much information. 
Thus, instead of technical measures of the similarity of cases, I use existing 
information to match the cases.
To estimate the effect of job loss on economic well-being and partners’ 
employment participation I therefore use DiD with a matched control group 
obtained through CEM in the following chapters. Through this estimation 
strategy, I obtain effects that contain both the changes within the individual 
and also changes that would have happened in the counterfactual situation 
should job loss have not occurred. The latter part of the effects is estimated 
through the matched control group. Presumably, the selection mechanism is 
different in both outcomes that I consider. Therefore, I present the variables 
on which I match and their coarsenings in the respective chapters.
So far, I have not examined the issue of sampling and population level 
effects. The (feasible) ATT I described was always the Sample Average 
Treatment Effect on the Treated (SATT). Yet, since this study also wants 
to describe the situation of those affected by job loss in the United States 
and Germany, I am actually interested in a Population Average Treatment 
Effect on the Treated (PATT). In a random sample of the population, the 
PATT is the expected value of the SATT. However, the two data sets I use are 
not pure random samples of the respective population in the United States 
and Germany (see below for details). First, both contain oversamplings of 
certain groups. Second, they are panel surveys and, consequently, subject to 
selective drop-outs. Both issues can be corrected using appropriate survey 
weights. In order to estimate the PATT, I have to apply these weights as well.
The use of survey weights in matching estimators is an underdeveloped 
issue. Usually, the literature recommends only weighting the treatment 
cases (Bryson et al. 2002). The reason for this is that the control cases are 
weighted to resemble the treatment cases through the matching procedure. 
Thus, if the treatment cases are weighted correctly, so are the control cases 
(Heisig 2015: Chapter 4.2). Therefore, I include the survey weights into the 
CEM weights according to the following formula to generate the individual 
weights that contain both the matching weight and the survey weight:
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The weights for the treatment cases are therefore simply the survey weights. 
For the control group, the weights are the proportion of the weighted num-
ber of treatment cases and the number of control cases in each stratum. This 
is the weight that I use in the analyses of the effects of job loss in Chapters 
6 and 7.15 Note that the weights no longer include the overall proportion of 
treatment and control cases. This is not needed, however, in my analyses, 
because I am only interested in the sizes of the effects and not in the relative 
occurrence of the treatment. I analyze this aspect separately in Chapter 5.
To conduct the analyses using the method proposed in this section, I need 
data with repeated observations (panel data) covering the United States and 
Germany. From these data sets, I need to construct a treatment and a control 
group. The treatment group consists of individuals who are employed at 
one point in time and who subsequently lose their jobs. The control group, 
on the other hand, consists of individuals who are also employed – and 
thus at risk of becoming unemployed – and stay employed afterward. In 
the following section, I describe the data used, the operationalizations, and 
the construction of the treatment and the control group.
4.2 Data sets
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
Launched in 1968, the PSID is the longest running household panel study in 
the world.16 At its core, the PSID consists of two samples of non-institution-
alized households. The f irst sample originates from an earlier study called 
the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO). In the SEO, a representative 
sample of the population in the United States of about 30,000 households 
was surveyed with regard to income and poverty in 1966 and again in 1967. 
Subsequently, the Off ice of Economic Opportunity, which launched the 
study, asked the Survey Research Center (SRC) at the University of Michigan 
to continue the study with a sub-sample of 2,000 low-income households. 
The SRC, however, proposed adding a second nationally representative 
sample of 3,000 households so that the study also comprises non-poor 
households. The latter sample is known as the SRC sample. Together, the 
5,000 households from the SEO and the SRC samples have been the basis 
15 I am grateful to Jan Paul Heisig for pointing out this solution to me.
16 The following overview builds on the introductions to the PSID by Hill (1992) and McGonagle 
et al. (2012).
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for the PSID. Over the course of time, two more samples have been added to 
keep the PSID representative of the population, which has changed because 
of immigration. In 1990, a sample of about 2,000 Latino households was 
added. However, in 1995, the PSID dropped this sample again because of 
funding issues and because this sample did not cover all of the post-1968 
immigrants. In 1997, a part of the original SEO sample had to be dropped 
because the PSID faced problems funding the study. At the same time, 
the study added about 500 families who immigrated to the United States 
after 1968. The PSID provides weights that adjust for the different sampling 
probabilities in the sub-samples. In 2009, the PSID consisted of about 8,500 
households with about 23,000 household members.
Initially, the families were surveyed every year in the PSID. From 1997 on, 
however, the interviews have been conducted bi-annually due to the above 
mentioned budget issues. This leads to a serious diff iculty for my analyses: 
I can only analyze two-year changes in income after job loss in the United 
States from 1997 on. The PSID conducts an interview with one person in the 
household per wave. This person is called the “head” of the household. In 
couple households, this is usually the man. The “head” also gives informa-
tion on other household members. Most of the interviews are conducted 
by telephone. The PSID follows initial sample members even if they leave 
a household, for example as a result of leaving the parental household or 
divorce. Newborn and adopted household members also become part of the 
sample and are followed throughout their lives. Persons who move in with 
a sample member are followed as long as they live with the original sample 
member. However, they are not considered as sample members and have a 
weight of zero. Thus, they drop out in weighted analyses. If they move out 
again, they are not followed.
Through extensive tracking and monetary incentives, the PSID reaches 
re-interview rates of more than 95 per cent in most years, which is among 
the highest response rates found among panel studies worldwide (Schoeni 
et al. 2013). Still, as in every panel survey, selective panel attrition is an 
issue. Analyses showed that low-income households are especially likely 
to drop out of the sample (Fitzgerald et al. 1998). The PSID provides weights 
that counteract this tendency. Compared to the March Current Population 
Survey (CPS), Gouskova et al. (2010) f ind slightly higher average incomes 
in the weighted PSID. However, this difference does not change over time 
and overall trends in the distribution of income are similar in the two data 
sets. Hence, the weighted results from the PSID are still representative of 
the population in the United States.
94 THE IMPAC T OF LOSING YOUR JOB 
Taken together, the PSID is well suited for my research because it covers 
all levels of analysis and provides internationally comparative information 
through the CNEF, as described below. Also, the long panel duration and 
high response rates are well suited to assessing long trajectories after job 
loss. This justif ies use of the PSID instead of the Survey of Income and 
Programme Participation (SIPP). The SIPP provides the employment status 
on a monthly basis, which is better suited to analyzing the dynamics of 
unemployment. However, data on household income is less detailed and 
there is no harmonized data for international comparisons.
German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP)
The GSOEP started in 1984 and its design has been strongly influenced by 
the PSID.17 Like the PSID, the GSOEP follows households over the years 
and surveys the non-institutionalized household members with regard to 
income and a multitude of other aspects of their lives. The study started with 
a representative sample of about 4,000 households living in West Germany 
and an additional sample of about 1,400 households with a non-German 
household head. After German reunif ication in 1990 an additional sample 
of about 2,000 residents of East Germany was added. After 1990, the GSOEP 
added several other new samples, some as refreshments of the original sam-
ple to keep it representative of the population, some to oversample groups 
that are of special interest such as immigrants and high-income households. 
Weights are provided in the GSOEP to adjust for the different sampling 
strategies. In 2009, the GSOEP consisted of about 11,000 households with 
about 20,000 household members.
Interviews in the GSOEP are conducted annually. Different from the 
practice in the PSID, the GSOEP interviews every household member older 
than 16 individually. The interviewers conduct most of the interviews 
face-to-face; telephone interviewing is rarely used. The following rules 
for participants deviate a little from the PSID. In the GSOEP, not only the 
original sample members and their offspring are followed after they leave 
a household, but also people who moved into a sample household. Thus, 
they become sample members as well. Response rates are usually between 
90 per cent and 95 per cent per wave and thus similar to the PSID. Yet, like 
the PSID, there are selective panel drop-outs, mainly in the extremes of the 
social stratif ication. To adjust for selective attrition, the GSOEP provides 
17 The overview in this section is based on Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005) and Wagner et 
al. (2007).
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staying weights (Kroh 2012). The GSOEP also adjusts its weights so that 
the sample matches the marginal distributions of certain key variables in 
the population. The population parameters for this post-stratif ication are 
taken from the German Mikrozensus survey, which is similar to the CPS 
in the United States. Thus, it is not surprising that the results from the 
GSOEP and the Mikrozensus are very similar (Hauser 2007). Compared 
to the Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS), another important 
survey of income in Germany, incomes in the GSOEP are slightly higher 
on average. This is presumably due to differences in survey methods. The 
secular trends in incomes in Germany in recent years appear in both stud-
ies (Becker et al. 2003). Overall, the weighted results of the GSOEP are 
representative of the German population.
In sum, the GSOEP is well suited for my analysis because it incorporates 
all levels of analysis and is part of the CNEF. In Germany, there is no data 
set that provides comparable information. The Mikrozensus offers a large 
sample size and information on households but is only a cross-sectional 
survey. The process generated register data by the Institut für Arbeitsmarkt 
und Berufsforschung (IAB), by contrast, provides detailed information 
about employment status and wages but does not include the household 
level. This overview reveals some minor differences in sampling, follow-
ing rules, and interviewing procedures between the PSID and the GSOEP. 
However, it is unlikely that this will bias the results. The most important 
factors when comparing different surveys are harmonized variables. A large 
part of the variables needed for my study are already in the CNEF, which I 
will describe below. Further harmonizations, which I implemented myself, 
are described in the following section.
Cross National Equivalence File (CNEF)
The CNEF is a collection of harmonized variables from panel studies 
throughout the world maintained at Cornell University (Frick et al. 2007). 
Starting with only the PSID and the GSOEP in 1991, at the time of writing, 
the CNEF has added six more panel surveys. Together with the Luxembourg 
Income Study (LIS) it is one of the largest attempts at international data 
harmonization in the social sciences. However, while the LIS focuses on 
cross-sectional data, the CNEF only includes household panel studies.
The main topics in the CNEF are income, demographics, and employment. 
The involved researchers put special effort into harmonizing income vari-
ables. As a result, the CNEF features generated variables that go beyond the 
variables provided by the individual surveys. For example, the CNEF includes 
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yearly household income before and after taxes, which is not available in 
the GSOEP. Also, the CNEF staff imputed annual work hours in the GSOEP 
using work hours at the time of the interview and the activity calendar for 
the previous year. Also, the CNEF includes harmonized education variables.
A major advantage of the CNEF is that it also includes the identif ier 
variables used in the original surveys. Thus, I can easily merge CNEF vari-
ables with either data from the PSID or the GSOEP. This is important since 
the CNEF does not cover all the variables needed in order to conduct my 
analyses. In the following, I describe the composition of my data set from 
the PSID, the GSOEP, and the CNEF.
4.3 Operationalization
The largest issue in terms of comparability is the switch to two year intervals 
in the PSID after 1997. The PSID collected data for the years in between, 
but it is not very reliable since they changed the methods several times. 
Therefore, the PSID staff advises against using this “off-year” data. The 
CNEF does not include this data either. Thus, for the most recent periods 
in the United States, I only have every second year. Since I want to use data 
before 1997 and have comparable data within the United States, I decided 
to use two-year changes throughout the PSID. Also, I consider two-year 
changes in the GSOEP to achieve cross-national comparability. Clearly, 
this leads to a loss of information. However, in this study, comparability 
is more important than a f ine grained analysis. Also, two-year changes in 
income are still informative about the consequences of job loss. Although 
I only consider every second year, I do not discard information about job 
losses because I construct episodes around every event I f ind in my data. I 
explicate this approach at the end of this section.
In the following, I f irst introduce the operationalizations of my key 
concepts. This includes the dependent variable household income, the 
concept of income buffering, the independent variable job loss, and the two 
main dimensions on which I expect differences within the two countries: 
household types and social strata. Then, I introduce further variables that 
I generate and the preparation of my data set.
Income and income buffers
The main dependent variable in this study is annual disposable (post-
government) household income adjusted for household size. This is a 
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good proxy for a household’s standard of living since it measures its total 
resources (DiPrete 2003). Thus, it enables me to assess the question of how 
individuals’ life situations change after job loss. Additionally, I analyze 
annual household income before taxes and transfers (pre-government) and 
individual labor earnings to f ind out more about the importance of different 
income sources after job loss. I use labor earnings and pre-government 
household income to assess the buffering of income losses through the 
family and the welfare state.
The income variables used are from the CNEF. They contain informa-
tion about annual income in the year prior to the interview. There is no 
comparable measurement of household income with smaller intervals than 
one year in the CNEF. The income variables for Germany in the CNEF are 
constructed using the GSOEP’s income calendar. Here, each person over 
the age of 15 in a household states the number of months a certain income 
or public transfer was received and its monthly amount in the previous 
calendar year. The product of both values yields the annual amount. The 
variables on the household level were then calculated using information 
from each household member (Grabka 2008). In contrast, the PSID directly 
asks the household head about annual incomes in the previous year. Dynan 
et al. (2012) found that some individuals’ earnings in the PSID drop to zero 
despite continuously high work hours. I removed these cases because they 
are likely to be due to measurement error and may bias my estimates about 
income changes. Consistent information on paid taxes, however, is missing 
in both surveys. Therefore, national experts wrote tax simulation programs 
for each country that estimate the households’ tax burdens (see Butrica and 
Burkhauser (1997) for the United States and Schwarze (1995) for Germany).
To ensure comparability over time, I deflated the incomes using the 
consumer price index provided in the CNEF. I then adjusted both pre- and 
post-government household income for household size using the new OECD 
equivalence scale. To account for the economies of scale of a household, the 
head is weighted with 1, other adults with 0.5, and children with 0.3. The 
retrospective collection of household income is conducted for the household 
as it stands at the time of the interview. Thus, if someone who has been 
present throughout the previous year moved out of the household before 
the interview, his or her income is not recorded in annual income. This leads 
to bias in the case of marital break-ups: If, for example, an inactive woman 
moves out and forms a single adult household in which she is surveyed, her 
annual household income in the previous year is essentially zero, because 
she did not earn anything. However, her actual situation was different since 
she lived in a household in which her former husband’s earnings existed 
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(Debels and Vandecasteele 2008). However, since I study job loss, this should 
be a minor issue for my analyses.
Clearly, annual household income is a coarse measure of a household’s 
well-being, especially given the dynamic nature of unemployment. For 
example, if unemployment occurs in the second half of the year, annual 
income is the average of both the income before and after job loss. If the 
spell of unemployment is short and a person is re-employed before the year 
ends, annual income also includes earnings from the new job. This has to 
be kept in mind when interpreting the results. Yet, besides data availability, 
there are also reasons in favor of annual household income. First, taxes are 
assessed on a yearly basis. Therefore, it is easier to calculate the tax burden 
using annual income. Second, annual income also includes less regularly 
received incomes such as bonuses or dividends. Therefore, it better captures 
a household’s economic well-being than monthly income.
I measure income changes in percentages of income prior to job loss. 
This operationalization assumes that the severity of changes depends on 
prior standard of living. Put differently, I argue that the actual amount of 
income that is lost matters less than the relative reduction compared to 
what individuals have. For example, a reduction of $ 10,000 is a different 
event for those earning $ 30,000 a year (Ž -33 per cent) compared to those
earning $ 100,000 a year (=- ten per cent). Yet, a 50 per cent reduction is 
severe for both groups. Hence, with this operationalization I can better 
compare the losses between individuals who are at different points of the 
income distribution. Because changes in percentages can have huge positive 
outliers, I top-coded all changes above +100 per cent.
Table 4.1  Composition of pre- and post-government household income in the CNEF
Pre-Government Income Post-Government Income 
= = 
Household Labor Earnings Household Labor Earnings 
+ + 
Household Asset Income Household Asset Income 
+ + 
Household Private Transfers Household Private Transfers 
+ + 
Household Private Retirement Income Household Private Retirement Income 
+ 
Household Public Transfers 
+ 
Household Social Security Pensions 
- 
Total Household Taxes 
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Table 4.1 shows the income components used to generate pre- and post-
government household income in the CNEF. In addition to the household 
members’ labor earnings, there are many other sources of incomes covered. 
Retirement income should not play a large role in my analysis because I 
focus on prime-age workers (see below for details). Yet, the list shows that 
there are many other income sources a household has if unemployment 
takes away one person’s labor earnings. This insight is key to the notion 
of income buffering that plays a large role in my explanation of economic 
well-being after job loss.
The notion of income buffering describes the relationship between labor 
earnings, household income before taxes and transfers (“pre-government”), 
and household income after taxes and transfers (“post-government”). Gener-
ally, each percentage point of income lost through job loss often does not 
translate into the same losses in post-government household income. This 
is because other sources of income within the household, such as transfers 
or additional incomes, are still there after job loss or even replace the lost 
wage like unemployment benef its. Building on the work of DiPrete and 
McManus (2000a) and the theoretical considerations in Chapter 2, I propose 
to decompose income buffering into buffering through the family and 
buffering through the welfare state.
The family income buffer comprises all other components of pre-
government household income apart from the lost labor earnings through 
displacement. To measure it, I compare the losses in labor earnings with the 
losses in pre-government household income. If, for example, a person loses 
100 per cent of former labor earnings but only 80 per cent of pre-government 
household income, the difference of 20 percentage points is due to other 
private incomes in the household. The welfare state income buffer, on the 
other hand, comprises all transfers and taxes that affect household income. 
To gauge this, I need to compare losses in household income before and 
after taxes and transfers.
Formally expressed, the buffering effects are def ined as follows:
  Welfare s  ˆ  t ate buffer =   ˆ  δ  PrG  −   ˆ  δ  PoG 
  Famil ˆ  y buffer =   ˆ  δ  LE  −    ˆ  δ  PrG 
Where   ˆ  δ  X signif ies the estimated changes in labor earnings (LE), pre-
government household income (PrG), and post-government household 
income (PoG) due to job loss. This resembles the approach introduced by 
DiPrete and McManus (2000a). However, I use the simple difference in 
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changes while they standardized the buffering effect as a percentage of 
pre-government losses. However, this yields implausible values as income 
changes before taxes and transfers become small.
Job loss
Job loss is defined as moving from work to unemployment after involuntary 
displacement. In both the PSID and the GSOEP there is a similar ques-
tion about changes in employment between the current and the previous 
interview. If the respondents state that there has been a change, they are 
asked, among other things, about the reason for this change. I considered 
all displacements as involuntary if they happened either because someone 
got f ired, a company closed down, or a contract expired. It is question-
able whether the expiration of a contract is really a trigger event, because 
the displaced person saw the end of the temporary contract coming and 
could have prepared. Still, I argue that a spell of unemployment after the 
termination of a contract is likely to be involuntary. When someone knows 
that their contract is ending, they are likely to pursue a seamless transition 
into another job. Also, with the recent growth of f ixed-term employment, 
omitting this reason for becoming unemployed would presumably bias 
my results.
In order to add the occurrence of unemployment after involuntary job 
loss, I need information about labor force status in the year the displacement 
occurred. The most detailed and longitudinally consistent information 
about labor force status in the PSID is the time in work and unemployment 
in the previous year. Respondents were asked how many weeks of the previ-
ous year they were working or not working and actively looking for a job. 
Unfortunately, there is no information about the timing of employment 
and unemployment in the data. To construct a comparable measure in the 
GSOEP, I use data from the activity calendar. This calendar is presented in 
the questionnaire and the respondents are asked to mark the months and 
the corresponding labor market activity. Because it is possible to report 
more than one status in a single month, I applied a state space proposed 
by Gangl (2003: 56) and deleted months of unemployment in which the 
respondent also marked some form of employment. Then, so as to render 
the data comparable with the question in the PSID, I added up the number 
of months each year. This obviously removes the information about the 
timing of job loss. Yet, because this information is not available in the PSID 
either, the comparable measure I propose seems the best compromise. Thus, 
I cannot ascertain whether the spell of unemployment occurred directly 
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after the displacement. Unfortunately, employment data is only available 
for household heads and their partners (“wives”) in the PSID, but not for 
other household members. To ensure comparability, I removed all other 
household members besides head and partner in the GSOEP.
Using the variables described above, I record a job loss event if a person 
is displaced from a job and experiences more than one month of unemploy-
ment in the same year. I deliberately excluded shorter spells of unemploy-
ment because they are likely to be labor market churning. To ensure that 
the individuals recorded are only those employed two years before job loss, I 
include only those who worked more than six months prior to job loss. I also 
discarded all cases in which individuals are self-employed, in education, 
retired, permanently disabled, or in military service two years before job 
loss. Table 4.2 summarizes the definition of the job loss event. Because of 
the above-mentioned data limitations, I cannot ensure that the months in 
work or unemployment are consecutive. Also, I cannot detect the year in 
which the spell began. Thus, my operationalization might lead to a detection 
of events in consecutive years since the conditions for months worked and 
months in unemployment could both be met in adjacent years. I deleted 
the second event in such cases. However, since the income data are only 
available for whole years, the coarseness of the indicator is presumably not 
of great signif icance.
Table 4.2  Denition of job loss event and re-employment
Two years before job 
loss 
Year of job loss Two years after job 
loss 
Job loss event Employed >6 months Displacement & 
unemployed ≥1 month 
- 
Job loss & 
re-employment 
Employed >6 months Displacement & 
unemployed ≥1 month 
Employed >6 months 
This operationalization leads to the treatment of job loss with subsequent 
unemployment as a singular event regardless of what happens thereafter. 
Thus, I do not differentiate between spells of unemployment that end 
quickly with re-employment and long-term unemployment. While there 
are good reasons to run separate analyses of different pathways after job 
loss, I chose to remain with the analysis of the consequences of trigger 
events as introduced in Chapter 2. The reason for this is that I want to 
disentangle the impact of job loss and the mechanisms that subsequently 
lead to different trajectories. The probability of re-employment is thus 
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included in the estimates of incomes after job loss. In the following 
chapter, I present data on re-employment to gauge the influence of this 
factor in the analyses of income after job loss. I record re-employment if 
someone works seven months or more two years after job loss, as indicated 
in Table 4.2.
Families and households
Families are an important aspect of my analyses, not only because they 
are a level in which life courses proceed, but also because they link the 
spheres of work and family within life courses. As elaborated in Chapter 
2, I focus on families that live together in one household. I distinguish 
between different types of households: Single adult; single adult with 
children; couples without children; and couples with children. In both 
countries, I take the information about the size of the household and 
the age of the household members from the CNEF. To distinguish single 
adult households from couple households, I use variables from the original 
surveys. The PSID provides a “married pairs indicator” that indicates 
whether a person is married to or permanently cohabiting with someone 
in the household. Likewise, a variable in the GSOEP (“Partnerzeiger”) 
gives the same information. I do not distinguish between married and 
cohabiting couples.
I only consider children under the age of 16 in the household. The main 
idea is to identify households with children that need to be cared for as this 
changes the amount of housework that has to be done. Clearly, housework 
reduces as children become older and by the time they reach age 15, the 
additional effort is presumably low. Still, I argue that it structures intra-
familial processes and especially women’s labor market behavior. Even 
though many women return to work by the time their children reach 
age six and enter primary school, they usually work fewer hours than 
before and earn less (Budig and England 2001; Gangl and Zief le 2009). 
Furthermore, at least in Germany, employment rates among mothers 
with children aged six to 16 are still below average among women (OECD 
2007a). Above 16 however, children in the household are likely to be mostly 
self-reliant. They could even have a job or an apprenticeship themselves, 
because compulsory schooling may already have ended for them. Table 4.3 
summarizes the household types I use and their operationalization. The 
category “Other HH” mainly includes single adults living with children 
older than 16.
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Table 4.3  Denition of household types
HH Type Composition
Single adult HH No partner in household and household size of one
Single parent HH No partner and children under 16 in the household
Couple without children Partner and no children under 16 in the household
Couple with children Partner and children under 16 in the household
Other HH All other combinations
For my analysis, I also have to make sure that the households are stable 
over time while I study them. This is important for two reasons: First, 
changes in household composition due to marital break-ups have severe 
consequences for household income (Radenacker 2011). In order to esti-
mate the effect of job loss on household income, these disturbances have 
to be removed. Second, I want to gauge the influence of the household 
composition on household income trajectories after job loss. To do this, 
the composition has to be roughly the same throughout the trajectory. 
Therefore, I consider only households where the partnership status of the 
adult members did not change for four years. In other words, I discarded 
all couple households that experienced marital break-up and all single 
households where a new partner moves in. To show the scope of this 
restriction, I analyze the incidence of these kinds of household dynamics 
and the selectivity of the events in the following chapter. The birth or 
departure of children, on the other hand, may still occur in these house-
holds. I control for this event in the models by including the number of 
children under 16 in the household.
Social strata
Another key dimension in my analysis are social strata. As elaborated in 
Chapter 2, I expect differences in income trajectories after job loss depend-
ing on the previous position within social stratif ication. The reason for 
this is unequal access to sources of income buffering after job loss. There 
are many possible ways of measuring an individual’s position within the 
social stratif ication. Most approaches rely on occupations and relation-
ships of dominance and property rights that go along with it (e.g.: Erikson 
and Goldthorpe 1992; Weeden and Grusky 2005). While these approaches 
have their merits, they have diff iculties mapping individuals’ economic 
well-being as earnings arrangements in households become more com-
plex (DiPrete 2003). Thus, in dual-earner households it is no longer the 
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occupation of the male breadwinner that determines the social position of 
the whole household. Since I am mainly interested in economic well-being 
in this study, I measure stratif ication through the control over economic 
resources in a household; or, as Sørensen (2000) puts it: “class as life condi-
tions”. Clearly, this approach is closer to social strata than to classes since it 
omits important aspects of classes such as relationships of power. Therefore, 
Sørensen’s concept is not about classes in a strict sense.18 Yet, in this study, 
I am mainly interested in the economic well-being of individuals and thus 
use social strata as a descriptive tool.
To measure “life conditions”, I use quartiles of post-government 
household income adjusted for household size, as described above. This 
deviates from Sørensen’s suggestion to use wealth as a measurement for 
his concept. However, data on wealth is not continuously available in the 
data sets. Therefore, I decided to use post-government household income. 
As indicated above, this is a good measure of economic well-being and 
thus the situation a household is in. Additionally, this operationalization 
has the advantage of being measured on the same scale as my dependent 
variable.
Further harmonizations
Beyond the variables that are directly connected to my research questions 
and the theoretical expectations, I harmonize further variables needed for 
my estimations. First, concerning occupation, which is an important control 
variable in analyses of job loss and income. Second, concerning weights, 
which are not completely comparable between the PSID and the GSOEP. 
The CNEF does not produce its own weights.
Occupations in the CNEF for the United States are provided in a peculiar 
manner that does not seem to follow conventional codes. Thus, no grouping 
of the occupations is possible. Therefore, I use the variables from the PSID. 
Unfortunately, the PSID codes occupation in Census 1970 codes until 2001 
and subsequently in Census 2000 codes. There are no direct crosswalks 
available between these two coding schemes. Therefore, I use a crosswalk 
that converts the two codings into a consistent category system based on 
Census 1990 codes, developed by Meyer and Osborne (2005). Since I do not 
18 The German discourse seems to be stricter in separating between classes “Klassen” and strata 
“Schichten” than the American discourse. Yet, there are good reasons to distinguish between 
the relational concept of classes and the descriptive concept of strata (Goldthorpe 2010).
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compare occupations cross-nationally, I use the ISCO-88 coding that the 
GSOEP provides for all waves in Germany.
As mentioned above, the PSID and the GSOEP both provide weights 
that account for the different samples and the probability of staying in 
the panel. However, the methods used for obtaining the weights and the 
staying probabilities differ between the PSID and the GSOEP. The PSID 
uses a very basic model for staying probabilities that consists of only a few 
demographic characteristics (Gouskova et al. 2008). Furthermore, the PSID 
assigns zero weights to non-sample members who, for example, moved in 
with an original sample member. The GSOEP, on the other hand, uses a 
much broader set of variables for the calculation of staying probabilities 
(Spieß and Kroh 2008). Individuals who are not original sample members 
also receive weights. These differences in weighting strategies may lead to 
bias when comparing the estimates from the two countries. Therefore, I use 
“comparability optimized weights” constructed by Kohler (2009). In these 
weights, staying probabilities are calculated similarly in the two surveys. 
Also, weights are derived for non-sample members in the PSID.
Preparation of the data sets
Using the variables described above, I constructed a data set from the 
PSID, the GSOEP, and the CNEF. Generally, I restricted the data set to 
the time between the 1980s and the latest available wave of the data sets. 
Thus, in Germany I use data from 1984 to 2011 and in the United States 
I have data from 1980 to 2007. The American data only extends to 2007 
because the harmonized variables from the CNEF have not been made 
available for the later waves by the time of writing. Furthermore, I restrict 
the analysis to household heads and their partners in the GSOEP, in order 
to be comparable to the PSID in which data on other household members 
is not collected. In the PSID, I do not use the immigrant sample and the 
Latino sample to have the same population over time. In the GSOEP, I drop 
the high income sample. Also, I mainly use residents of West Germany, i.e. 
the pre-unif ication Federal Republic of Germany, because East Germany 
differs markedly on factors that may influence the results. Yet, in some 
analyses I include East Germans as well to test certain hypotheses. Be-
cause I focus on individuals of prime working age, I restrict the analyses 
to individuals between 25 and 55. Clearly, this may include some Germans 
who are still in education. Therefore, I remove individuals who are in 
education from the group that is at risk of becoming unemployed, as 
indicated above.
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Job loss is an event that can occur several times over the life course. 
Because the years around the events may overlap, it is not easy to ascertain 
which event led to which outcome. I therefore extract seven-year episodes 
centered around each the years in which the events happen (two before, 
four after). Thus, if I observe, for example, three job loss events, as described 
above, for a person in the data set, I generate three (possibly overlapping) 
episodes. Thus, the level of analysis is no longer individuals but instead 
an individuals’ unemployment episodes. The episodes always consist of 
two-year changes to be comparable to the later years in the PSID. Thus, 
for each year in which I observe a job loss event (t0), I additionally add the 
observation two years before the event (t-2) as well as two and four years 
after the event (t+2 and t+4). The episodes are balanced panels from t-2 to 
t+2. Data four years after job loss is only available in about 80 per cent of 
the episodes in both data sets.
To add a control group, I begin with all person-years that have the same 
characteristics as those who lose their jobs at t-2. As indicated above, this 
includes, among other things, being employed and not being in education. 
Then, I generate an episode if this person does not experience job loss, 
as def ined above, within the following six years. Thus, they may become 
displaced during that period but do not experience unemployment after 
displacement. The shift to biennial interviewing in the PSID in 1997, 
however, creates a diff iculty: I do not have information on job loss events 
two years before the interview. Therefore, I cannot assert that the control 
episodes do not contain job loss events in the years not surveyed. Although 
there is information on displacements, the PSID does not survey the months 
in unemployment for this year. Therefore, I impute the event for the gap-
years using the time with annual interviews and two-year changes in a 
large number of variables. Among them are all sub-categories of household 
income, job characteristics, and partner characteristics. The imputation 
model used is a logistic regression.19 Then, I removed control episodes with 
an imputed job loss event after 1997 in the PSID.20
The analyses in Chapter 7, in which I address changes in women’s employ-
ment behavior after men’s job losses, rely on a sub-set of the above described 
data set. In this sub-set are only men in couple households whose partners 
are not in education at t-2. Furthermore, I only use the balanced panel from 
19 The exact specif ication can be obtained from the author upon request. See Heisig (2015: 
143-145) for a similar approach.
20 I also ran the models without the imputations. The results remain basically unchanged.
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t-2 to t+2 for the analyses in this chapter. For the sake of clarity, I briefly 
describe this again in Chapter 7.
In the following three chapters, I analyze the data using the described 
strategy to f ind out whether the theoretical expectations generated in 
Chapters 2 and 3 are correct. I f irst turn to the incidence of job loss in the 
next chapter. Then, in Chapter 6, I analyze the consequences by considering 
income trajectories and buffering effects. Finally, in Chapter 7, I turn to the 
added worker effect.21
21 All of the Stata do-f iles for preparation and analysis of the data sets can be obtained from 
the author on request.

5 The Incidence of Job Loss and 
Unemployment
To understand economic insecurity generated by job loss it is crucial to 
analyze who is affected by this event. This is important for two reasons: 
f irst, such knowledge helps to understand the distribution of insecurity 
that job loss and unemployment generate. In other words, while displace-
ments almost certainly have negative consequences, some people may 
have lower chances of losing their jobs and hence a lower probability of 
economic instability. Second, understanding the selectivity of job loss and 
unemployment is important for estimating the consequences correctly. If 
the unemployed are selected on characteristics that also influence income 
trajectories after job loss, the difference-in-difference models are biased, 
as discussed in Chapter 4. The remedy for selection bias I use is statistical 
matching, as mentioned earlier. This, however, hinges on knowledge about 
the selection processes. Therefore, I use the results from this chapter to 
select the variables for matching.
The present chapter consists of two parts. In the f irst part, I provide 
descriptive evidence on the occurrence of job loss, unemployment, and 
re-employment. In the second part, I explore the influence of household 
composition on job security. The literature review in Chapter 1 showed that 
there has been very little research on household influences on the incidence 
of job loss to date. Most researchers focused on market and welfare state 
influences. Nevertheless, the impact of the household is an important issue 
for my study because I want to conduct an encompassing analysis of income 
insecurity through job loss that includes all parts of the market-family-state 
nexus. In Chapter 2, I developed several expectations about the influence of 
the household on the incidence of job loss. I argued that “marital premiums” 
for men and “maternal penalties” for women not only exist for wages, but 
may also exist for job security. In the second part of this chapter, I test 
whether these effects exist and carve out the mechanisms behind them.
Thus, the remainder of this chapter consists of three parts. First, I provide 
descriptive statistics about the occurrence of job loss and unemployment 
in the United States and Germany. Within this section, I depict trends 
in the incidence of job loss and unemployment in the United States and 
Germany over time. Then, I turn to individual and household level differ-
ences. This is followed by an analysis of the occurrence of re-employment 
after job loss and unemployment. In the second part of this Chapter, I test 
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explanations for differences in job security between different household 
types. The f inal part sums up the market, family, and state influences on 
job loss and unemployment.
5.1 Descriptive statistics on the incidence of job loss
Cross-national comparison of the incidence of job loss
To give an impression of the cross-national differences in the incidence of 
job loss, I f irst compare trends over time in the United States and Germany. 
Figure 5.1 depicts the incidence of my main indicator of job loss as described 
in Chapter 4: involuntary job loss succeeded by at least one month of un-
employment. The incidence is def ined as the percentage of the population 
in employment between 25 and 55 years of age who experience this event 
in the following year.22 As argued in Chapter 4, I focus on job losses that 
lead to unemployment in my analysis because I want to analyze buffering 
mechanisms that have an impact during times without labor earnings. 
Therefore, I only use this indicator in the following analyses. For the sake 
of brevity, I call this indicator “job loss” in the remainder of this study. 
However, for comparison, and to f ind out about the restrictiveness of this 
operationalization, in Figure 5.1 I also show the incidence of involuntary 
job loss regardless of unemployment.
The dashed lines in Figure 5.1 reveal that job loss regardless of unemploy-
ment used to be much more common in the United States than in Germany 
during the 1980s, but that subsequently the rates converged. Until the 
1990s, about f ive per cent of employed Americans became displaced each 
year. During the 1990s, the incidence of displacements reduced to around 
four per cent. Thus, American jobs became a little more stable between 
the 1980s and the 2000s. This f inding is at odds with literature claiming 
an increase in employment insecurity in the United States (Valletta 1999; 
Hollister 2011). However, these studies mostly compared the 1970s with 
the years afterward. Most of the growth in employment insecurity hap-
pened between the 1970s and 1980s. The late 1990s in the United States, on 
the other hand, saw favorable labor market conditions with a decreasing 
unemployment rate, as shown in Chapter 3. The decreasing incidence rate 
mirrors this trend.
22 Because of the switch to biennial interviewing in the PSID after 1997, it is the percentage 
that experiences such an event two years after.
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In Germany, Figure 5.1 shows a U-shaped trend in displacements with 
and without ensuing unemployment. The incidence of involuntary job 
loss increased from about two per cent in the 1980s to about f ive per cent 
during the 1990s. Then, the rate dropped again to about four per cent in the 
2000s. Overall, employment insecurity is higher in the 1990s and 2000s than 
during the 1980s in Germany. However, the German population changed 
considerably after 1990 when Germany was reunif ied and the former GDR 
joined the West German population. I analyze this in greater detail below.
The share of those who become unemployed after job loss is slightly 
higher in Germany than in the United States, as the difference between the 
dashed and the solid line in Figure 5.1 reveals. In the United States, around 
40 per cent of those who became displaced also experienced a month of 
unemployment or more. In Germany, by contrast, about 50 per cent of 
the displaced enter unemployment. Apart from some fluctuations, this is 
largely stable over time. This f inding is in line with other results stating that 
direct transitions from one job to the other after displacement are more 
common in the United States than in Germany (Gangl 2003). Thus, my job 
Figure 5.1  Incidence of job loss and subsequent unemployment over time in the 
United States and Germany
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loss indicator, which includes only those who also become unemployed, is 
a little more selective in the United States than in Germany where more 
people experience unemployment after job loss.
Figure 5.2 takes a closer look at the trend in my main event indicator – job 
loss followed by unemployment – by differentiating between men and 
women as well as East and West in Germany. This analysis shows that the 
surge in the incidence of job loss in Germany has been largely due to reuni-
f ication. Many East Germans lost their jobs during deindustrialization and 
restructuring of the former socialist economy. Observations from the early 
1990s in East Germany are thus unique cases that cannot be easily compared 
to the other cases in Germany. Therefore, I base my analyses mainly on West 
Germany. However, in some hypotheses I test the impact of the distinct East 
German institutional environment. In this case, I drop observations from 
the early 1990s because of the special economic circumstances. Overall, job 
loss and subsequent unemployment occurs slightly more often in the United 
States than in West Germany. However, the main differences in incidence 
rates exist during the 1980s. Subsequently, the rates converge at about two 
per cent among men and one per cent among women.
Figure 5.2  Incidence of job loss and subsequent unemployment over time in the 
United States and Germany by gender and region in Germany
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Individual level influences on the incidence of job loss
To examine the incidence of job loss more closely, I now compare individual 
characteristics of those who lose their jobs and become unemployed with 
those who stay employed. The expectation from the literature is that un-
employment hits those who are already less privileged more often, such 
as low-skilled workers and minorities (see literature review in Chapter 1). 
The comparison in this chapter of those who become unemployed and 
those who do not follows the analytical strategy proposed in Chapter 4. 
As elaborated there, I construct a data set consisting of episodes around 
job loss events (treatment group) and episodes without job losses (control 
group). Individuals in both groups are employed at the beginning of the 
episode, i.e. they are at risk of becoming unemployed. The following 
analyses reveal how much the two groups differ. The variables for the 
treatment group are measured two years before job loss, the variables in 
the control group in the f irst year of the control episode. In the terminology 
of statistical matching, the results show the balance of covariates between 
the two groups.
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show descriptive statistics for individual characteristics 
in the treatment and control group. The results always represent means or 
percentages within the group. For example, Table 5.1 shows that American 
men who are continuously employed over a period of four years are on 
average 36.7 years old. Also, 9.9 per cent of this group is black. On the other 
hand, American men who experience job loss and subsequent unemploy-
ment are, on average, slightly younger. Also, the share of blacks among them 
is higher than in the control group. Note that the f igures are calculated for 
episodes and not individuals. Consequently, a person may appear more 
than once in one group and also in both groups at different points in time 
(see Chapter 4 for details).
Overall, both Table 5.1 and 5.2 show that those who experience job loss 
are, on average, already disadvantaged in many respects: First, they are more 
likely to be low-educated than the continuously employed. Second, minority 
groups, which often face discrimination on the labor market (Pager et al. 
2009), are overrepresented among them. Finally, the jobs they hold before 
job loss are, on average, of lower quality than the jobs of those in the control 
group. For example, their average earnings are lower, and they are more 
often in low skill occupations. Also, their employment stability is lower, as 
indicated by lower average tenure in their previous jobs. All of these results 
confirm f indings of other studies (e.g. Giesecke and Heisig 2010; Keys and 
Danziger 2008). Job loss and subsequent unemployment is an event that 
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occurs for those who are already in a weak position on the labor market. It 
thus reproduces and deepens existing inequalities.23
Comparing those who lose their jobs between the United States and 
Germany in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 reveals that the populations differ massively. 
For example, about nine per cent of those with job loss in West Germany 
have higher education compared to 42 per cent in the United States. 
Clearly, this is caused by the overall higher rate of college attendance in 
the United States, which cannot easily be compared to higher education 
in Germany. Still, the unemployed in the United States clearly have a 
different educational background than the unemployed in Germany. This 
is also ref lected in the higher proportion of unemployed coming from 
the upper ranks of the occupational hierarchy in the United States. For 
example, among those who lose their jobs in the United States, more held 
managerial positions than in Germany. Again, this is partly driven by 
differences in the occupational structure between the United States and 
Germany, as the distribution in the control groups show. Nevertheless, 
when comparing the results in the following chapters, it has to be kept 
in mind that the risk of becoming unemployed is slightly more equally 
distributed with regards to socioeconomic circumstances in the United 
States than in Germany.
The inequality in the risk of becoming unemployed changes over time in 
both countries as Figure 5.3 reveals. In this analysis, I graphed the incidence 
of job loss and subsequent unemployment for households with the lowest 
(1st Quartile) to the highest (4th Quartile) post-government household 
incomes. The lower ranks of the household income distribution in West 
Germany face increased risks of losing a job compared to the middle and 
upper quartiles. This confirms the f inding of Giesecke and Heisig (2010), 
who show that the risk of losing a job increases especially among low-skilled 
workers in Germany. One reason for this trend may be the de-regulation of 
temporary employment in Germany, as depicted in Chapter 3. Temporary 
employment is most prevalent among low-skilled workers and therefore 
their careers became more unstable as the possibility to establish such 
employment relationships increased. Another reason might be worsening 
macro-economic conditions over time (Klein 2015). In the United States, 
on the other hand, the differences between the quartiles slightly decrease 
over time. As a result, the incidence rates in West Germany in the lowest 
quintile become similar to American rates in the lowest quintile. The higher 
23 Results for East Germany are shown in Table A.1 in the Appendix. The described patterns 
appear as well.
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inequality in the risk of job loss in West Germany is thus influenced by 
recent developments. During the 1980s, the incidence rates have been much 
more equally distributed. I must consider these trends when comparing 
income changes over time in the following chapter.
Household level influences on the incidence of job loss
The influence of the household on the incidence of job loss has not received 
much scholarly attention. However, as I argued in Chapter 2, there are 
reasons why the structure of the household may play a role. Couples may 
have advantages in job security over singles for different reasons. As with 
earnings, there may be a “marital premium” in job security among men. 
There may also be a “maternal penalty” among women. In this section, I f irst 
explore the connections between household structure and the incidence of 
job loss. This is important for understanding the distribution of economic 
insecurity in the United States and Germany. In the second part of this 
chapter, I test different explanations for the observed differences.
Figure 5.3  Incidence of job loss and subsequent unemployment over time in 
the United States and West Germany by post-government household 
income quartile in previous year
0
2
4
6
%
 o
f e
m
pl
oy
ed
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
United States
0
2
4
6
%
 o
f e
m
pl
oy
ed
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
West Germany
1st Quartile 2nd/3rd Quartile
4th Quartile
Smoothed using a span-2 running mean
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Table 5.3  Household characteristics of persons with and without job loss and 
subsequent unemployment in the United States
United States, Men 
Cont. employed Job loss & unempl.
Avg. household size 3.3 3.1 
Avg. no. of children 0-15 1.2 1.1 
Household types 
Single without children 11.9 19.4 
Single with children (%) 1.3 1.6 
Couple without children (%) 18.3 13.9 
Couple with children (%) 60 57.4 
Other (%) 8.5 7.8 
Household types total (%) 100 100 
Household dynamics 
Couples with separations in next 4 yrs. (%) 5.9 8.3 
Singles with new partner in next 4 yrs. (%) 39.4 39 
United States, Women 
Cont. employed Job loss & unempl. 
Avg. household size 3.1 3.2 
Avg. no. of children 0-15 1 1.2 
Household types 
Single without children 10.7 11.3 
Single with children (%) 10.2 19 
Couple without children (%) 18.7 15.9 
Couple with children (%) 47.9 44.1 
Other (%) 12.4 9.6 
Household types total (%) 100 100 
Household dynamics 
Couples with separations in next 4 yrs. (%) 7.7 13.1 
Singles with new partner in next 4 yrs. (%) 24.3 18.6 
All variables measured two years prior to job loss.
Sources: PSID, GSOEP, and CNEF, author’s calculations
Summarizing the household characteristics of the groups with and with-
out loss I f ind marked differences, which are similar in both countries. 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 reveal that these differences are not so much in actual 
household size, but rather in household type. Also, there are clear gender 
specif ic patterns. Men living in a single household are overrepresented 
among those who lose their jobs in both countries. Men in couples with 
and without children, on the other hand, occur much more frequently 
in the control group than in the group with job loss. The pattern among 
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women is slightly different: Here, single households appear in both groups 
almost equally. Instead, female single parents are much more affected 
by job loss. Clearly, male single parents are also overrepresented among 
those with job loss; however, their number is too small to draw clear 
conclusions.
As argued in Chapter 2, families are risk-pooling units because other 
adults may provide additional incomes that offset the losses after job loss. 
Accordingly, single households do not have access to this type of income 
buffer. In this regard, they are disadvantaged. Thus, job loss hits those 
Table 5.4  Household characteristics of persons with and without job loss and 
subsequent unemployment in West Germany
W. Germany, Men 
Cont. employed Job loss & unempl.
Avg. household size 3.1 3 
Avg. no. of children 0-15 .9 .9 
Household types 
Single without children 11.7 19.7 
Single with children (%) .6 .9 
Couple without children (%) 21.8 18.9 
Couple with children (%) 54.2 49.7 
Household types total (%) 100 100 
Household dynamics 
Couples with separations in next 4 yrs. (%) 4.6 9.7 
Singles with new partner in next 4 yrs. (%) 34.6 41.1 
W. Germany, Women 
Cont. employed Job loss & unempl.
Avg. household size 2.9 2.8 
Avg. no. of children 0-15 .7 .7 
Household types 
Single without children 11.2 14 
Single with children (%) 5.1 6 
Couple without children (%) 26.7 26 
Couple with children (%) 39.2 38.7 
Other (%) 17.8 15.3 
Household types total (%) 100 100 
Household dynamics 
Couples with separations in next 4 yrs. (%) 6.5 11.1 
Singles with new partner in next 4 yrs. (%) 28.5 28.1 
All variables measured two years prior to job loss.
Sources: PSID, GSOEP, and CNEF, author’s calculations
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without the resources for coping inside the household more frequently. 
For single parents, the situation is even more diff icult. They not only lack 
possible additional incomes, but are also constrained by domestic duties 
because of their children, which they cannot share with a partner. As in 
the case of individual characteristics, job loss is concentrated in certain 
household types that are already disadvantaged before displacement.
Comparing household composition of those affected by job loss 
between the United States and West Germany in Figures 5.3 and 5.4, I 
f ind marked differences among women but no differences among men. 
There are many more single mothers among unemployed women in the 
United States than in West Germany. On the other hand, I f ind many 
more women living in couples without children among the unemployed 
in Germany. Both results originate from a higher prevalence of these 
household types in the population as the comparison to the control 
group shows: in the United States, single mothers are a much more 
common household type than in West Germany. On the other hand, in 
West Germany more women live in couples without children than in 
the United States.24
For some people, household composition is not stable over time and 
hence there are some episodes in my data set where singles move in with 
someone or couples break up. So far my analyses considered household 
composition two years before job loss. To depict household dynamics, I 
added the percentage of single adult and couple households who experience 
a change in household type within four years to Tables 5.3 and 5.4. The 
results show that these changes affect a substantial number of singles and 
couples. However, changes are more common among singles than among 
couples in both countries.
The most striking result regarding household dynamics in Tables 5.3 
and 5.4 is that break-up is more common among those who lose a job 
than among those who are continuously employed. This is visible in 
both countries as well as for both women and men. Thus, for about ten 
per cent of men and women in couple households who lose their jobs, 
the possibility of benef iting from the family buffer disappears after job 
loss. Since this happens more often than in the control group, this is 
a further accumulation of disadvantages for those who lose their jobs. 
However, it is unclear from this analysis whether the difference to the 
control group is due to job loss or selection. Clearly, both job loss and 
marital dissolution happen more frequently at young ages (South and 
24 Results for East Germany are in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
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Spitze 1986; Rapp 2008). Also, low-educated couples have a higher risk of 
divorce than those with high education in the United States (Härkönen 
and Dronkers 2006), which further drives selection because job loss is 
also more concentrated among the low-educated. In Germany, however, 
most studies found no educational gradient or even a slightly positive 
correlation between education and risk of divorce (Wagner and Weiß 
2003). Studies that directly analyzed the effect of job loss on divorce 
are only available for the United States. They concluded that men’s job 
losses increase the risk of divorce (Charles and Stephens 2004). Women’s 
job losses, on the other hand, had no effect (Sayer et al. 2011). My results 
suggest that job losses among both genders are connected with separa-
tions. Yet, my descriptive results are not directly comparable to the other 
studies, because I do not control for selection at this point. This will be 
done in the following section.
Singles’ rates of moving in with a partner, however, differ less between 
those who lose their jobs and those who do not. Only German single 
men seem to move in with a partner more frequently after job loss than 
without. Again, this could be an effect of the lower average age among 
those who lose their jobs. German and American single women move 
in with a partner even less frequently if they become unemployed than 
without unemployment. This is especially pronounced in the United States. 
Overall, these results seem to ref lect the lower attractiveness of those 
with low career prospects on the marriage market (Oppenheimer 2003). 
Still, a substantial number of singles gain access to family income support 
after job loss.
In my theoretical considerations in Chapter 2, I speculated that mobility 
regimes could also influence family formation. In a country with high labor 
market turnover and high risks of job loss, forming a family could be a 
strategy to pool risks and avoid economic instability. However, the present 
analysis does not support this notion. Although the risks of losing a job are 
higher on average in the United States than in Germany, I f ind no higher 
prevalence of couple households in either those who become unemployed 
and those who do not. Also, the depicted family dynamics do not point in 
this direction. However, it may be that the negative selection of those who 
become unemployed masks this effect. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope 
of this study to fully look into this issue.
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Table 5.5  Characteristics of cases with and without changes in household 
composition
United States 
Singles Couples 
Stay single Form couple 
hh
Stay with 
partner
Separate from 
partner 
Avg. age 35.1 33 36.5 34.4 
Men (%) 43.8 68.5 62.6 50.2 
Black (%) 32.1 12.9 9.9 22.4 
Less than High 
School (%) 
17.4 10.5 14 14.5 
High School (%) 36.8 39.3 43.3 55 
Greater than High 
School (%) 
45.9 50.2 42.7 30.5 
Avg. yearly labor 
income ($) 
23568 26993 28539 23221 
N Episodes 411 125 949 140 
W. Germany 
Singles Couples 
Stay single Form couple 
hh
Stay with 
partner 
Separate from 
partner 
Avg. age 36.2 33.3 37.7 36.4 
Men (%) 51.9 65.8 59 55.2 
Migrants (%) 17.6 23.9 33.6 14.7 
Without voc. 
training (%) 
26.4 22.4 31.1 28.4 
Voc. training (%) 60 65.6 59.8 59.7 
Higher edu. (%) 13.5 12 9.1 11.9 
Avg. yearly labor 
income (€) 
15935 19203 18418 18738 
N Episodes 110 59 622 61 
All variables measured two years prior to job loss.
Sources: PSID, GSOEP, and CNEF, author’s calculations
In the analyses of income trajectories after job loss in the following chapter, 
I keep only cases with the same partnership status within the observed 
period of time. This is important to measure the effect of being in a couple 
or being in a single household on household income after job loss. To assess 
the selectivity of this restriction, I show the difference between people with 
and without a change in partnership status in Table 5.5. The analyses show 
that singles who move in with someone after job loss are younger on average 
and earn slightly more than those who remain single in both countries. 
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Thus, those who remain single after job loss are more disadvantaged than 
those who f ind a partner. Regarding divorce, I f ind almost no difference in 
Germany between those who leave a couple after job loss and those who do 
not. The only thing that stands out is that migrants leave couples less often 
after job loss. In the United States, on the other hand, the social gradient in 
divorce rates mentioned above is visible. Those who become single after job 
loss have lower education and incomes than those who remain married. 
Thus, disadvantages cumulate further for Americans who lose their jobs.
Summing up, there is ample evidence that household composition is 
connected to the incidence of job loss. Especially single men and single 
mothers are more often affected than men and women living in couple 
households. Since the reasons for this are largely unexplored, I provide 
further analyses of the mechanisms behind this correlation in the second 
part of this chapter after the descriptive account of re-employment. The 
connection between job loss and household dynamics that I also depicted 
further supports the notion that disadvantages cumulate over the life 
course: A considerable share of those who lose their jobs also experience 
partnership dissolutions.
The incidence of re-employment
As mentioned before, the risk of staying unemployed is connected to 
individual labor market opportunities and choice. Labor market opportu-
nities are generally governed by the same mechanisms that are connected 
to job loss. In contrast, choice depends on preferences regarding the new 
job and f inancial constraints, such as the duration of unemployment 
benef its. A large body of literature analyzed these connections (e.g. Heck-
man and Borjas 1980; Van den Berg and Van Ours 1996; Bover et al. 2002; 
Gangl 2003). It is beyond the scope of this study to add to this literature. 
Yet, I show some results on unemployment duration from my data sets 
in this section to provide background information for the analyses of 
income trajectories in the following chapter. Unfortunately, data on spells 
of unemployment is only available for a few years in the PSID. Also, after 
1997 it offers only two-year data intervals. To allow a comparison between 
the two countries, I show the probabilities of being employed two years 
after job loss. Note that being unemployed two years after job loss is not 
equal to an unemployment duration of two years. Some of those who 
are not working two years after job loss may have been employed in the 
previous year. That said, this analysis provides some information on 
unemployment duration.
124 THE IMPAC T OF LOSING YOUR JOB 
Figure 5.4  Incidence of re-employment after job loss over time in the United 
States and Germany
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Sources: PSID, GSOEP, and CNEF, author’s calculations
Figure 5.4 shows that German re-employment rates fluctuate much more 
over time than American rates. Between the 1980s and the 1990s, German re-
employment rates initially drop from around 80 per cent to around 60 per cent. 
Then, in the 2000s, the trend is reversed and re-employment rates climb back 
to 80 per cent. The trend is essentially the same in East Germany. In the United 
States, on the other hand, about 80 per cent of those who become unemployed 
return to a job within two years throughout the period of observation. Thus, 
during the 1980s and the late 2000s, Germany had similar re-employment 
probabilities two years after job loss. However, it has to be kept in mind that 
the average duration of unemployment spells is generally lower in the United 
States (Gangl 2003). During the 1990s, many Germans became long-term 
unemployed. This trend led to a steady build-up of unemployment rates (see 
Chapter 3). In the United States, by contrast, changes over time in unemploy-
ment rates do not show up in two-year reemployment rates because even in 
economic downturns, unemployment durations rarely reached two years.25
25 This changed during the f inancial crisis and the ensuing recession after 2008, which, 
unfortunately, is not covered by my data.
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Figure 5.5  Incidence of re-employment after job loss by previous post-
government household income quartiles in the United States and West 
Germany
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Sources: PSID, GSOEP, and CNEF, author’s calculations
The individual level determinants of unemployment duration have already 
been depicted in previous studies (see literature review in Chapter 1): low-
educated workers, older workers, and minority groups face higher risks 
of becoming long-term unemployed. Thus, the lower strata are less likely 
to f ind a new job. Figure 5.5 summarizes this by showing the percentage 
in employment two years after job loss for quartiles of post-government 
household income previous to job loss. Generally, in both countries and 
for both genders, those with the lowest incomes prior to job loss have the 
lowest rates of re-employment. The gradient is especially strong among 
women in West Germany. In the f irst quintile, only 40 per cent return to 
the labor market after job loss. A reason for this may be that they take on 
the “alternative role” of the homemaker after experiencing disappointments 
on the labor market (Friedman et al. 1994; Kreyenfeld 2010). Since this is a 
normatively accepted role for women, especially in West Germany, such a 
reorientation reduces the pressure to search for a new job. In combination 
with the diff iculties of f inding a new job in the lowest quartile, this presum-
ably explains the low re-employment rate among West German women in 
low-income households.
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Household level influences on the incidence of re-employment are less 
well studied in the literature so far. In this study, these differences are 
important because I compare incomes after job loss between different 
household types. Figure 5.6 graphs the percentage of men and women in a 
certain household type who are re-employed two years after job loss. The 
f igure shows that re-employment rates differ by household composition. 
Male singles without children have a lower re-employment rate than men 
in couple households with children in both countries. The difference is 
even more pronounced in the United States. Thus, single men not only 
become unemployed more often, they also face diff iculties returning to 
the labor market. This f inding is in line with results by Jacob and Kleinert 
(2014), who show that married men have higher re-employment rates than 
single men. Thus, this is another disadvantage single men have to face. 
Interestingly, German men in couples without children have much lower 
re-employment rates. This may be rooted in the higher average age in this 
group. In Germany, re-employment rates are especially low among older 
workers (Mauer and Mosley 2009).
Women living in couples with children have lower re-employment rates 
than women in other households in both countries, as Figure 5.6 reveals. 
This is especially pronounced in Germany. Again, this confirms f indings 
by Jacob and Kleinert (2014). Single mothers’ re-employment rates, on the 
other hand, are much higher. Thus, low re-employment among women 
in couples with children does not seem to be caused by a “motherhood 
penalty”. Instead, it is more likely that some women in couple households 
adopt the role of the homemaker after job loss. The f inding that the re-
employment rates among German mothers living in couple households 
are especially low supports this: In Germany, gender role expectations of 
“the good mother” who stays at home are still more prevalent than in the 
United States (Fortin 2005; Grunow et al. 2006).
In sum, the analysis of re-employment rates provides insights that are 
important for interpreting income trends after job loss. Between the two 
countries, I have to take into account that Germany experienced a large 
increase in the share of those who do not return to the labor market after 
job loss during the 1990s. Between households, two groups had lower 
re-employment rates: single men and mothers living in couple house-
holds. For the f irst group, this is accompanied by higher rates of job loss. 
Thus, male singles’ lives are characterized by high economic instability. 
Mothers living in couple households, on the other hand, do not become 
unemployed more often than other groups. Their lower re-employment 
presumably does not lead to economic instability because they are 
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secured by their partner’s incomes. Interestingly, single mothers, who face 
above average unemployment risks, have much higher re-employment 
rates. Hence, although their careers are often interrupted, they are able 
to secure new employment. However, whether this new employment 
cushions their losses is an open question that will be addressed in the 
following chapter.
5.2 What causes higher rates of job loss among singles and 
single mothers?
The previous results show that single men and single mothers face high risks 
of job loss and subsequent unemployment. However, it remains unclear 
whether this is an effect of their household arrangement or due to selection. 
Clearly, there are compositional differences between singles and couples. 
For example, male singles are often low-educated. Yet, as I elaborated in 
Chapter 2, some theoretical perspectives suggest an effect of household 
composition on job loss beyond selection. Following Rusconi and Solga 
Figure 5.6  Incidence of re-employment after job loss in dierent household types 
in the United States and West Germany
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(2008), I argue that being in a couple influences labor market outcomes. 
Likewise, children in a household constrain behavior on the labor market. 
In the following, I f irst sum up the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 and 
then test them.
Hypotheses
In Chapter 2, I derived expectations about the inf luence of household 
characteristics on the risk of job loss from two strands of literature: First, 
research on the “marital premium” (e.g. Korenman and Neumark 1991; 
Pollmann-Schult 2011); and second, research on the “motherhood penalty” 
(e.g. Budig and England 2001; Gash 2009; Gangl and Ziefle 2009). Following 
this literature, family formation influences earnings. Yet, the processes 
and the outcomes differ by gender. For men, there is a connection between 
becoming married and higher wages. For women, childbirth is connected 
to lower wages. Both literatures have surprisingly similar explanations 
for lower wages of single men and mothers. These can be summarized in 
three categories: First, hypotheses based on preferences for certain kinds 
of jobs; second, hypotheses based on employer discrimination; and third, 
hypotheses based on regional differences. In all three cases, norms about 
gender roles play a decisive role.
Part of the differences in unemployment risk could be due to changes 
in attitudes toward paid work after marriage for men and childbirth for 
women. The literature shows that men put more effort into work after 
marriage (Pollmann-Schult 2011). Consequently, I expect that men who 
start families choose more stable jobs to support them in the long run and 
hence have lower risk of becoming unemployed. Women, on the other hand, 
often move to part-time or marginal jobs after childbirth to be able to care 
for their children (Gangl and Ziefle 2009). This is especially true for single 
mothers and for mothers without access to childcare. These jobs often 
provide less employment security and hence present higher unemployment 
risks. Thus, family formation often leads to more traditional roles in the 
household. Among men, this is apparently induced by gender role expecta-
tions, whereas women’s transitions to traditional roles are often driven by 
structural barriers. This leads to several hypotheses, which are denoted 
with an “I” in this chapter, signifying that they are about incidences of job 
loss. First, if singles and mothers self-select into certain jobs, controlling 
for sector, occupation, and job characteristics should reduce the difference 
in unemployment risks (Hypothesis I.1).
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However, the stability of a job not only captures attitudes, but also dis-
crimination in the hiring process. Mothers may be regarded as less flexible 
and productive by employers because they have to care for children. In an 
audit study, Correll et al. (2007) found that employers indeed regard mothers 
as less competent and would hire them less often than women without 
children. Likewise, employers may believe that singles are less productive 
because they do not f ind a partner (Pollmann-Schult 2011). Both forms of 
discrimination should lead to fewer and worse job offers for singles and 
mothers. This could also lead to the outcomes predicted in Hypotheses 
I.1. It is diff icult to disentangle whether attitudes or discrimination in the 
hiring process drive the results. To explore this, I conduct some further 
analyses using data on attitudes. For men, if the attitude explanation is 
true, the willingness to accept risks should decrease as men form a family 
(Hypothesis I.2a). For women, if attitudes drive selection into jobs, the 
self-reported importance of work should reduce after childbirth (Hypothesis 
I.2b). If the hypotheses about attitudes are not confirmed, this might suggest 
discrimination in the hiring process.
There could also be differences in layoff practices at the f irm level. It 
is possible that employers discriminate against singles and dismiss them 
f irst if they have to reduce their staff because they do not have to support 
a family. For single mothers, on the other hand, it may be that they are 
discriminated against because they are less f lexible and are considered 
less productive, as argued above. Unfortunately, this is diff icult to test 
empirically because there is little information on employers in the data set. 
Therefore, this explanation is likely if the testable hypotheses are not true.
In a cross-national perspective, differences in the availability of childcare 
between the United States and Germany may influence the impact of house-
hold composition on the incidence of job loss. As indicated in Chapter 3, 
in West Germany the availability of childcare is lower than in the United 
States. In East Germany, however, childcare provision is higher than in the 
United States. Comparative literature showed that the motherhood penalty 
in wages is higher in countries where childcare is uncommon (Gash 2009). 
Childcare enables mothers and especially single mothers to be more flexible 
in the job. This should enable them to take up standard jobs. Also, it could 
decrease discrimination because employers no longer consider them less 
productive. Consequently, I expect that childcare provision leads to more 
stable jobs for mothers. Following the institutional data in Chapter 3, job 
loss among mothers should be highest in West Germany and lowest in East 
Germany with the United States in between (Hypothesis I.3).
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Analysis
To test the hypotheses, I model the probability of job loss using linear prob-
ability models. The incidence of job loss is a binary variable and hence a 
logistic regression or a similar non-linear technique would be most suit-
able to model the distribution of the dependent variable. However, the 
method has drawbacks that complicate the test of my hypotheses. The 
coeff icients of a logistic regression cannot easily be compared between 
different samples and across models for the same sample as in a linear 
regression (Allison 1999; Mood 2010; Breen et al. 2011; Karlson et al. 2012). 
Since my hypotheses require both the comparison between models and 
samples, standard logistic regression would lead to biased estimates. There 
are several suggestions of how to solve this problem within the framework 
of logistic regression in the literature. The most straightforward solution 
is to use ordinary least squares regression on binary outcomes, which is 
often called linear probability model. The main weakness of this approach 
is that it does not take the non-linear relationship between the dependent 
variable and the independent variables into account. However, since I am 
mainly interested in the comparison of effects and not in the functional 
form of the relationships, I use linear probability models in the following. 
To tackle the problem of heteroscedasticity of the error term in this type 
of model, I use robust standard errors.26
Compared to the descriptive statistics, I now also consider marital status 
in the analyses. This leads to a more f ine-grained depiction of a person’s 
stage within the life course. I compare never married singles and single 
parents to those who became single or single parents after divorce. Also, I 
compare cohabiting couples with married couples. The reference category 
in the models consists of married couples with children. I use two sets of 
control variables. First, in the reduced models, I control for the following 
individual characteristics: age; education; work experience; number of 
children in the household; and minority status (black/white in the United 
States and migrant/non-migrant in Germany).27 I also include year effects 
to adjust for the economic cycle. Second, the full set of control variables 
additionally includes the following job characteristics: labor earnings; 
26 I also tried the method proposed by Karlson et al. (2012) to compare effects across models 
and the results are similar.
27 I also control for age and work experience squared. Education is included in categories 
indicating less than high school, high school, and college education in the United States. In 
Germany, I use school without vocational training, vocational training, and university degree 
as categories.
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household income; work hours; tenure (also squared); sector; occupation; 
and months employed in the focal year. I do not show the coeff icients for 
the control variables in the following tables.
Note that modeling the incidence of job loss includes a change in 
perspective compared to the descriptive statistics of the incidence 
in the previous sections. In the descriptive statistics, I compared the 
composition of the groups with and without job loss. Thus, I compared 
the probabilities of being in a certain type of household given job loss or 
continuous employment. This perspective is important for learning about 
the composition of my data sets. The linear probability model, on the other 
hand, yields the probability of job loss given different household types. 
Thus, the results are the difference in the probability of job loss between 
household types. In this perspective, the differences between households 
no longer depend on their relative occurrence. Therefore, the magnitudes 
of the differences are not comparable between the descriptive statistics 
and the models. Yet, the direction of the differences is the same in both 
perspectives.
In the reduced models in Table 5. 6 (Models 1, 3, 5, and 7), which only 
control for individual characteristics, the descriptive results presented 
in the previous chapter reappear: Men living in single households and 
single mothers are more likely to experience job loss than men and 
women living in couple households with children. The coeff icients from 
the linear probability model are percentage point differences in incidence 
rates compared to married couples with children. Thus, the coeff icients 
indicate a difference in the probability of becoming displaced of zero to 
three percentage points between the household types, once I control for 
individual characteristics. As mentioned before, this is not directly com-
parable to the descriptive results in the previous sections. Yet, compared 
to the large differences found in the descriptive statistics, the effects are 
small. This indicates that the observed difference is partly due to selection 
into certain households. The effect for single mothers in West Germany 
is below even the f ive per cent signif icance level. Beyond single adult 
households, other household compositions differ less in the risk of job loss. 
Especially, the “motherhood penalty” in the risk of job loss solely appears 
among single mothers. Women in couples without children do not have a 
higher incidence of displacements. Interestingly, unmarried men in couple 
households with children in the United States have signif icantly higher 
displacement probabilities than married men with children. Apparently, 
being married directly influences job stability in the United States. This 
is not the case in West Germany.
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Comparing the full models with reduced models in Table 5.6 shows that 
the effects for singles and single mothers become smaller. The reduction is 
largest among never married single men in the United States and divorced 
single mothers in Germany. Among never married single men in Germany, 
on the other hand, the coeff icients remain almost equal. Thus, except for 
German single men, Hypothesis I.1 is supported: Job characteristics explain 
some of the differences between singles and couples. Apparently, singles in 
the United States and single mothers in both countries select into unstable 
jobs. This may be interpreted in two ways: First, this may reflect the prefer-
ences of singles and single mothers. Singles may be less risk averse when 
choosing a job. Single mothers, on the other hand, may prefer flexible jobs 
over secure jobs in order to have time for their children. The second inter-
pretation would be that employers discriminate against singles and single 
mothers when hiring employees and therefore they are more likely to have 
low-quality jobs. I explore this issue further below when I analyze attitudes.
Comparing between the two countries, the difference between household 
types in the occurrence of job loss is generally higher in the United States 
than in Germany, both before and after controlling for job characteristics. 
Only unmarried single men in Germany have a signif icantly higher risk 
of job loss that comes close to the effects observed in the United States. 
In the United States, on the other hand, the higher risk of job loss among 
singles and single mothers remains even after controlling for selection. 
This could be interpreted as a sign of greater discrimination toward singles 
and single mothers in lay-off decisions in the United States. Clearly, in the 
American system, the employer has greater leeway in this respect because 
employment protection legislation is lower than in Germany.
Table 5.7  Average willingness to take risks among men in dierent household 
types in Germany
Household type Avg. willingness to take risks 
Single w/o children 4.95 
Single w/ children 4.99 
Couple w/ children 4.9 
Couple w/o children 4.99 
Other 4.67 
Higher values denote higher willingness.
Sources: GSOEP and CNEF, author’s calculations
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To analyze whether attitudes or discriminatory hiring influence singles’ 
and single mothers’ risks of becoming unemployed, I analyze self-reported 
willingness to take risks and the importance of work for individuals. Unfor-
tunately, such variables are only available for Germany. First, I want to test 
the hypothesis that single men are more willing to take risks. Willingness to 
take risks is measured on a ten-point scale in the GSOEP where higher values 
denote higher willingness to take risks.28 This item is available in the years 
2004, 2006, and on a yearly basis from 2008 on. To ensure a homogenous 
population, I only include men who currently work.
Taking a first look at the data, Table 5.7 shows average willingness to take 
risks for German men in different household types. Casual inspection reveals 
that the willingness to take risks among men does not differ between house-
hold types. From this point of view, higher rates of job loss among single men do 
not seem to be caused by a preference for risky jobs. Yet, the averages presented 
in Table 5.7 could also be influenced by the compositional differences between 
the groups. Therefore, I control for composition in the next step of analysis.
Hypothesis I.2a states that family formation increases risk aversion among 
men. Since the GSOEP provides multiple observations of risk attitudes within 
a person, I can test this directly using fixed-effects regression. By taking out 
all individual specific and time constant differences between the individuals, 
f ixed-effects regression yields largely unbiased estimates of changes within 
a person. Table 5.8 presents the f ixed-effects estimates for changes in the 
willingness to take risks within a person controlled for age. The first coef-
ficient states that the willingness to take risks decreases by 0.159 scale points 
if a person moves in with a partner. Thus, the coefficient has the expected 
sign. However, the estimate is slightly below the five per cent significance 
threshold. The number of children has a much smaller negative effect. Overall, 
Hypothesis I.2a is not supported. Although people seem to be slightly more risk 
averse after family formation, the effect is small compared to the scale and not 
significant. This finding fits the observation that job characteristics explain 
only a little of the disadvantage of West German single men in employment 
security. This suggests discriminatory lay-off practices. Unfortunately, I do not 
have similar data for the United States, where sorting into unstable jobs among 
single men seems to be more prevalent as the regression analysis suggests.
For women, I test the attitude explanation using the self-reported 
importance of work. If the selection into risky jobs is due to a preference 
for family-friendly jobs among mothers, the importance of work should 
28 The actual wording is: “Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do 
you try to avoid taking risks?”
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be lower among them. Clearly, this is not a perfect test since the question 
involves no trade-off between work and family. Women could answer that 
both are important. Therefore, this is a conservative test of the hypoth-
esis. If there are differences despite this weakness, they are likely to be 
substantial. This item is measured in the GSOEP on a 4-point scale from 
“very important” to “totally unimportant”.29 I dichotomized the variable 
by combining “very important” and “important”, on the one hand, and “not 
very important” and “totally unimportant”, on the other hand. The item 
is available in 1994, 1998, and 1999. As with men, I consider only women 
who currently work.
Table 5.9  Importance of job/work among women in dierent household types in 
Germany
Household type % regarding job/work less important or unimportant
Single w/o children 6.47 
Single w/ children 9.43 
Couple w/ children 15.35 
Couple w/o children 9.2 
Other 11.38 
Sources: GSOEP and CNEF, author’s calculations
29 The wording of the question is: “How important for your well-being and satisfaction is work?”
Table 5.8  Eect of change in household structure on willingness to take risks 
among men in Germany
(1) 
Living with a partner -0.159 
(-1.50) 
No. of children in HH -0.0258 
(-0.56) 
Age -0.132*
(-14.51) 
Observations 11645 
Fixed-eects model
Cluster robust t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Sources: GSOEP and CNEF, author’s calculations
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Table 5.9 shows that both partnership status and having children influ-
ences the self-reported importance of work. Compared to singles without 
children, single mothers consider work less important. In comparison to 
mothers in couple households, however, single mothers consider work more 
important. Thus, according to these results, it is unlikely that attitudes influ-
ence sorting into unstable jobs: Although single mothers f ind work more 
important, they are more likely to lose their jobs than women in couples 
with children. However, again it is unclear whether the results in Table 5.9 
are due to selection. Also, it is diff icult to derive causal explanations from 
attitudes. As much as attitudes influence behavior, they are also shaped 
by circumstances. For example, since single mothers are the sole earners 
they think that work is more important than women in couples who are 
often secondary earners.
In Table 5.10, I analyze whether changes in household composition 
influence changes in the self-reported importance of work among women. 
Again, I apply f ixed-effects regression to rule out the influence of person-
specif ic and time-constant heterogeneity. Additionally, I control for age 
and age squared. Since the dependent variable is dichotomized, this is a 
linear probability model.30 In the model, I control for the interaction of 
having a partner and children. Thus, the main effect for having children 
includes only single mothers. The results in Table 5.10 show that becoming 
a single mother does not signif icantly change the attitude toward work. 
Moving in with a partner, on the other hand, clearly increases the prob-
ability of stating that work is less important. A possible interpretation of 
this f inding is that the change in attitudes does not follow childbirth but 
instead starting a couple household. In these households, women often 
adopt the role of the traditional housewife and, consequently, consider 
paid work less important. Interestingly, their risk of job loss is lower than 
the one found among single mothers. These f indings suggest a rejection of 
Hypothesis I.2b. Attitudes toward work do not seem to explain the higher 
incidence of displacements among single mothers. It is more likely that 
discrimination in the hiring process or in displacement decisions lead to 
more unstable jobs for them.
30 A conditional effects logistic regression yields similar results.
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Table 5.10  Eect of change in household structure on the probability of regarding 
job/work less important or unimportant among women in Germany
(1) 
No. of children in HH 0.0120 
(0.59) 
Living with a partner 0.0478*
(2.24) 
No. of children * Partner 0.0142 
(0.67) 
Age -0.0262*
(-2.73) 
Age2 0.000324*
(2.91) 
Observations 6948 
Fixed-eects model
Cluster robust t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Sources: GSOEP and CNEF, author’s calculations
Table 5.11  Selected linear probability model coecients for the incidence of job 
loss among women in single parent households
(1) (2) (3) 
US W. Ger. E. Ger. 
Single Parent, never married 0.0169 0.00755 0.0998 
(1.95) (0.62) (1.68) 
Single Parent, divorced 0.0110* 0.00970 0.0136 
(2.25) (1.11) (0.44) 
Observations 28778 21337 4344 
Ref. category: Couple households with children, married
Controlled for individual characteristics and year dummies
Cluster robust t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Sources: PSID, GSOEP, and CNEF, author’s calculations
Finally, I explore the inf luence of institutions on the occurrence of job 
loss among single mothers. Hypothesis I.3 stated that job loss among 
single mothers should be lower if childcare provision is higher. In Table 
5.11, I show the coeff icients for single mothers from the reduced models 
in Table 5.6 again. Thus, I only control for individual characteristics 
and not for job characteristics, because childcare provision could also 
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influence sorting into jobs. To have more variance in childcare provision, 
I also consider East Germany, where childcare provision is much more 
widespread than in West Germany. Table 5.11 shows that the disad-
vantages for single mothers in terms of displacement risk are highest 
in the United States. This is despite the fact that childcare provision is 
more widespread in the United States than in West Germany. Yet, since 
most childcare is privately organized and expensive, single mothers 
may not be able to afford it. The intra-German comparison shows no 
large differences. Thus, the risk of job loss among single mothers is not 
reduced by more encompassing childcare. Therefore, Hypothesis I.3 has 
to be rejected.
In sum, the data suggest that discrimination by employers is the main 
source of differences in the risk of job loss between singles and couples. 
Self-selection because of changes in attitudes toward work does not seem 
to explain the differences. Discrimination occurs in the hiring process and 
in lay-off decisions. Presumably, it stems from employers’ expectations 
about singles’ lower productivity. In the United States, I found evidence 
for both sorting into unstable jobs and discrimination in lay-off decisions. 
In West Germany, on the other hand, single men seem to be more affected 
by discriminatory lay-offs whereas single mothers’ employment insecurity 
seems to result from sorting into unstable jobs.
5.3 Summary: Market, family, and state influences on job loss 
and unemployment
The goal of this chapter was twofold: f irst, I wanted to provide a descriptive 
overview of the occurrence of job loss and unemployment in the United 
States and Germany to put the analyses of income mobility after job loss 
into context. Second, I aimed at carving out reasons for differences in the 
incidence of job loss between household types. The results in this chapter 
show that analyses of incidences are important for understanding the influ-
ence of job loss over the life course. This is because there are considerable 
differences in the incidence of the event between individuals, families, and 
the two countries in this study. In this summary, I recapitulate the most 
important f indings and highlight their importance for the interpretation 
of the results about income losses after job loss that I cover in the following 
chapter. Also, I highlight the influence of the market-family-state nexus on 
employment insecurity.
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The results in this chapter conf irm the expectation that displacements 
hit the lower strata more often than the higher strata in both countries. 
Thus, those who are already disadvantaged on the labor market addition-
ally suffer more often from employment insecurity. The analyses also 
show that the same disadvantaged groups have diff iculties f inding a 
new job after unemployment. Concerning the household level, I found 
that single adult households are more affected by job loss than couple 
households. Among women, this is especially apparent for single moth-
ers. Thus, households that cannot offset the income loss after job loss 
through other household members’ incomes are more often affected by 
displacements. Still, within this group, only single men are also disad-
vantaged in terms of reemployment. Single mothers, on the other hand, 
have comparatively good chances of returning to employment within 
two years. In my analyses in the following chapter, I account for these 
differences through statistical matching on the variables that I identif ied 
in the analyses.
This chapter also showed that the group of those who are affected 
by job loss differs between the United States and Germany. Generally, 
job loss is more concentrated in the lower strata in Germany than in 
the United States. In terms of household composition, single mother 
households are generally much more prevalent in the United States than 
in Germany. This also shows up in high numbers of single mothers enter-
ing unemployment in the United States. These country differences are 
diff icult to account for statistically. Clearly, some form of weighting could 
adjust the marginal distributions of the samples. Yet, for some variables, 
such as education, this is not possible since the country specif ic categories 
cannot easily be transformed. Therefore, I use the information about the 
differences between the two countries in the qualitative interpretations 
of the effects.
Over historical time, the incidence rates of job loss are not constant 
in both countries. The diff icult labor market conditions in Germany 
during the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s resulted in higher 
incidence rates of job loss and lower re-employment probabilities. The 
trend toward higher employment insecurity was especially pronounced 
among the lower strata, presumably because of the partial de-regulation 
of the German labor market. In the United States, on the other hand, 
improving labor market conditions led to a slight decrease of employ-
ment insecurity between the 1980s and the mid-2000s. Re-employment 
probabilities, by contrast, remained high throughout this period in the 
United States.
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Table 5.12  Summary of hypotheses and results about the incidence of job loss
Hypothesis Result 
I.1 Dierences in rates of job loss between 
singles and couples are due to sorting 
into certain jobs 
Conrmed for single mothers and men 
in the US, not conrmed for single men 
in W. Germany 
I.2a Single men are less risk averse than men 
in couples 
Not conrmed 
I.2b Single mothers regard employment as 
less important than other women 
Not conrmed 
I.3 Single mothers have the lowest 
incidence of job loss in East Germany 
because of high availability of childcare 
Not conrmed 
Besides these labor market and welfare state influences, a main focus of 
this chapter was to add the household dimension to the analysis of the 
incidence of job loss. In the descriptive analyses, I identif ied two groups 
with especially high risks of displacements: single men and single mothers. 
To carve out the reasons for this, I conducted further analyses. Table 5.3 
summarizes the hypotheses and results. The analyses revealed that single 
men have considerable disadvantages in employment security even after 
selection into this type of household is controlled for. This is partly due to 
sorting into certain jobs, as my analysis showed, especially in the United 
States. However, sorting does not seem to be due to workers’ preferences 
for risky jobs, but rather because of employer discrimination in the hiring 
process. Yet, even after job characteristics are controlled for, differences 
between single men and men in couple households remain. I interpret this 
as discrimination in lay-off decisions. Thus, because of employer behavior, 
single men have less stable careers than men in couple households.
The results are similar for single mothers. However, the differences 
in incidence rates between single mothers and mothers in couples that 
I observed in the descriptive statistics disappear, to some extent, after I 
control for individual characteristics. This is especially the case in Germany. 
Also, job characteristics explain more of the difference than in the case of 
single men. Hence, the main drivers of higher incidence rates of job loss 
among women seem to be their individual characteristics and the jobs they 
hold. Further analyses show that sorting into unstable jobs among single 
mothers does not seem to be a matter of preferences: Most single moth-
ers do not regard their job as unimportant. Therefore, the most plausible 
reasons for employment insecurity among single mothers are structural 
barriers that prevent them from taking up stable jobs. Such barriers may 
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be a lack of affordable childcare or inflexible work arrangements on the 
part of employers.
Concluding this chapter, I f ind evidence for a joint importance of the 
market, the family, and the state for the incidence of job loss and unem-
ployment. Clearly, family influences are smaller than market and state 
influences. Labor market and welfare state institutions, the economic cycle 
and individual characteristics that are related to productivity or perceived 
productivity (discrimination) are the largest determinants of employment 
insecurity. Nevertheless, the type of household a person lives in is connected 
to displacements as well. Thus, economic insecurity through job loss is also 
determined by household level influences. In this chapter, I could only 
analyze the effects of the household on the incidence of job loss. However, 
there are further channels through which the household influences income 
insecurity after job loss, as my analyses of unemployment duration and 
household dynamics showed. Confirming earlier results, I found that male 
singles have longer unemployment durations (Jacob and Kleinert 2014). 
Also, job loss seems to be connected to marital break-ups (Sayer et al. 2011). 
Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this study to analyze these connec-
tions between the household and the labor market further. Instead, this 
study focuses mainly on the economic consequences of job loss in order to 
estimate the actual economic insecurity that job loss causes. This will be 
analyzed in the following chapter.

6 Income Trajectories After Job Loss
In this chapter, I analyze the impact of job loss on economic well-being.31 
To do so, I consider relative losses in post-government household income 
after job loss. The main aim is to test expectations about factors that buffer 
losses in labor earnings derived in Chapter 2. Thus, the goal of this chapter 
is twofold: First, I want to show who is most and who is least affected by 
declines in economic well-being after job loss. Second, I aim to explain 
differences in the impact of displacements by showing how different ad-
ditional incomes in a household buffer earnings losses. In doing so, I shed 
light on the mechanisms that shape economic well-being after job loss over 
the life course.
As the theoretical considerations in Chapter 2 suggested, there are 
numerous factors on the individual, household, and welfare state level 
that buffer the impact of unemployment on post-government household 
income. In this chapter, I am especially interested in the buffering of 
income losses through the family and the welfare state;32 but, I also con-
sider individual earnings to examine the influence of the labor market. 
In the following, I f irst restate the hypotheses derived from the theory 
in Chapter 2 and the institutional synopsis in Chapter 3. The hypotheses 
are labeled with a “T” in the following because they pertain to trajectories 
after job loss. Then I follow the empirical strategy described in Chapter 
4 and analyze relative changes in income after job loss. As in the other 
analyses, I mainly focus on West Germany in this chapter. For the sake of 
brevity, I use “Germany” throughout the text, meaning West Germany if 
not stated otherwise.
6.1 Theoretical expectations and hypotheses
In the previous chapter, I showed that re-employment within two years 
after job loss occurs more often in the United States than in Germany. This 
implies that income buffering through re-employment should be stronger 
in the United States. Yet, Gangl (2004) found that job loss in the United 
States creates much greater “scars” in income trajectories than in Germany. 
31 This chapter builds on concepts and analyses I developed in two articles (Ehlert 2012, 2013). 
I expand and advance them in the following to f it them into the broader context of the book.
32 The concept of income buffering has been introduced in Chapter 4.
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That is to say, Germans more often return to a job with little or no earnings 
losses compared to their old job. This is presumably due to longer durations 
of job search made possible by longer durations of unemployment benefits. 
From this perspective, buffering through re-employment should be larger in 
Germany, especially in the long run. However, research on scarring effects 
in individual earnings usually neglects those who stay unemployed. In this 
study, I consider income trajectories regardless of the employment status 
after job loss (see Chapter 4 for details and justif ication). Thus, my analyses 
also include those with zero earnings after job loss. As a result, my results 
provide a broader description of economic well-being after job loss. Whether 
the occurrence of re-employment or scars in earnings are more important 
for economic well-being after job loss remains an empirical question that 
will be assessed in the analyses below.
Comparing welfare state programs directed at the unemployed in 
the United States and Germany in Chapter 3 revealed two differences: 
Welfare state benefits in Germany are higher and last longer than in the 
United States. In addition, the German welfare state provides an almost 
universal minimum income scheme, whereas the American welfare state 
only provides very limited support once Unemployment Insurance (UI) 
benefits are depleted. Also, taxes on labor income are higher in Germany. 
Consequently, a smaller proportion of total labor income is actually avail-
able in post-government household income. Thus, a larger part of the losses 
in labor income does not affect post-government household income because 
it was never part of household income after taxes. Therefore, I expect to 
f ind larger income buffering effects through the welfare state on household 
income in all years after job loss in Germany (Hypothesis T.1).
In both countries, I expect that family income support in the year of job 
loss differs by gender. This is because men are often the main breadwin-
ners whereas women are mostly earners. Therefore, women’s job losses 
should influence total household income less than men’s on average. From 
an income buffering perspective, this results in a larger family buffer 
for women: Their losses in earnings are mostly offset by their partner’s 
existing earnings (Hypothesis T.2). However, the higher prevalence of 
dual-earner households in the United States where women work full-time 
should lead to higher household income losses after women’s job losses 
than in Germany, because American women contribute relatively more to 
household income (Hypothesis T.3). Consequently, in Germany, the gender 
difference in household income losses after job loss should be larger than 
in the United States.
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Beyond cross-national differences, I expect to f ind variation in house-
hold income losses and income buffers between household types within 
the countries. Most obviously, single households do not have income 
support from other household members. Therefore, singles’ and single 
mothers’ household income losses after job loss should be higher than 
those found among couples (Hypothesis T.4). These differences should 
be even more pronounced in the United States than in Germany, because 
single adult households solely rely on welfare state benef its after job 
loss, which are lower in the United States. Thus, single adult households 
should fare much worse after job loss in the United States than in Germany 
(Hypothesis T.4a).
However, my theoretical framework in Chapter 2 suggests that not only 
adult household members, but also children in the household influence 
the possibility and extent of income buffering. Mothers in couples often 
work less than women in couples without children because of structural 
pressures and gender role expectations. Therefore, household income losses 
among men in couple households should be larger if they live with children 
(Hypothesis T.5). This is because their partners are less likely to be employed 
or earn less on average than women without children. This also implies 
higher losses in the case of women’s unemployment in couples without 
children. In the United States, labor force participation among mothers is 
higher than in West Germany (OECD 2007a). Therefore, American men’s 
losses in households with and without children are more likely to be on a 
par than in West Germany because employment rates are similar between 
mothers and women without children (Hypothesis T.5a).
Single mothers face even greater diff iculties after losing a job. First, they 
are not secured by a second income in the household. Second, they have 
to f ind a new job that allows them to reconcile their roles as caretaker 
and breadwinner. In Chapter 5, I showed that single mothers regain a job 
as quickly as other groups. Yet, they may end up in low-paid jobs because 
they have fewer employment options that allow them to pursue both 
roles. Consequently, I expect that single mothers have the highest losses 
in household income after job loss among all household configurations in 
both countries (Hypothesis T.6). This should be especially visible in West 
Germany with its low acceptance of working mothers and low availability 
of childcare. In East Germany, on the other hand, working mothers are 
much more common than in West Germany, as described in Chapter 3. 
Although I mainly focus on the comparison between West Germany and 
the United States, I use this difference to test the influence of higher rates 
of maternal employment. If my expectations are correct, single mothers in 
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East Germany should fare better after job loss than in West Germany while 
the United States should take the position in between (Hypothesis T.6a).
In addition to differences between household types, I also argue that 
the impact of job loss on household income depends on a person’s origin 
within social stratif ication. The reasons for these differences are rooted 
in the nation-specif ic life course regime. As described in Chapter 4, I use 
quartiles of post-government household income to divide individuals into 
strata. Thus, I compare relative income changes between different income 
levels and can therefore derive origin and destination within the household 
income distribution.
The labor market has an influence on the outcomes for different strata 
because it influences re-employment opportunities. As argued in Chapter 2, 
the distribution of these opportunities depends on the educational system 
and resulting labor market structures. The labor market in the United States 
is dominated by firms with internal labor markets (ILM) where people make 
a career within a f irm using f irm-specific skills (Marsden 1990; Estevez-Abe 
et al. 2001). If they lose a job, they cannot use their specif ic skills in other 
f irms and hence have to start again in entry level jobs. Germany, on the 
other hand, is dominated by occupational labor markets (OLM). Here, skills 
are occupation specif ic and hence portable across companies. Thus, if a 
high-skilled professional loses a job, she can apply her skills in another 
company and hence secure a comparable position. Clearly, this distinction 
is oversimplif ied and may mainly apply to jobs in production.33 Still, even 
if they do not conform to the ideal types, the labor markets in Germany 
and the United States tend to be mainly organized around OLMs and ILMs, 
respectively. Consequently, I expect that in the United States, relative earn-
ings losses after job loss are larger in the upper household income quartiles, 
because high-earning individuals often have to start in lower positions in 
the new job. In Germany, on the other hand, relative earnings losses should 
be highest in the lower strata, because credentials and portable skills allow 
the higher strata to f ind equally paid jobs while the lower strata often lack 
the needed credentials (Hypothesis T.7).
Concerning differences in the family buffer between strata, I expect a 
similar pattern in the two countries. Previous research showed that edu-
cational homogamy influences the formation of couples (Blossfeld 2009). 
Men and women with high education and status usually marry partners 
with similar characteristics. Since education influences earning potential, 
33 For example, in other occupations, such as research or management, f irm-specif ic skills 
may even be wanted by new employers.
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there is a greater chance that two people with high earning potential will 
form a couple. Similarly, those with low earnings are likely to have a similar 
partner. Clearly, high earning potential because of high education does not 
translate to actual higher earnings. In Germany, high-educated women 
living in couples leave the labor market more often than low-educated 
women, as Drobnič et al. (1999) show. In the United States, on the other 
hand, education has no such effect. Apparently, men’s high earnings make 
the role of the homemaker affordable for German women and thus foster 
the emergence of traditional couples. Nevertheless, Drobnič et al. (1999) also 
f ind that re-entry into the labor market is more likely among high-educated 
women. Therefore, even if they do not work at the time their husbands 
become unemployed, high-educated women in Germany are more likely to 
provide additional incomes through labor market entry than low-educated 
women. Thus, I expect a higher family buffer among the upper strata in 
both countries (Hypothesis T.8). In other words, in the upper strata, more 
of the losses in individual earnings are offset in pre-government household 
income.
The institutional setup of the tax and transfer system also leads to dif-
ferent income buffers among the social strata. As Esping-Andersen (1990) 
put it, welfare states not only decommodify, but also stratify. They do so 
by giving benefits to certain groups or limiting benefit payout to certain 
amounts. The unemployment benef it systems in both countries feature 
benefit ceilings in the sense that earnings are only replaced up to a certain 
threshold. This should lead to a lower impact of the welfare state after job 
loss among the upper strata (Hypothesis T.9). Thus, in the upper quartiles, 
the difference between losses in pre- and post-government household 
income should be smaller than in the lower quartiles. Yet, American un-
employment benefit systems also often have earnings requirements and 
there is no minimum income scheme that accommodates those who do not 
qualify for benefits. Thus, the advantage of the lower strata is presumably 
lower in the United States. In Germany, on the other hand, there is a means 
tested minimum income scheme. Therefore, the impact of the welfare 
state should be much higher for the lower strata than for the higher strata 
because the unemployed cannot fall below the minimum income. If their 
earnings are close to the minimum before job loss, almost everything is 
buffered. Thus, the difference in welfare state buffers among the strata is 
presumably larger in Germany (Hypothesis T.9a). Compared to the upper 
strata, much more of the losses in the lower strata are buffered in Germany 
than in the United States.
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However, in Chapter 3 I also described differences in the tax systems 
between the United States and Germany that may counteract the stratifying 
effect of welfare state benefits. The steeper progression in Germany implies 
that high-income households fall into lower tax brackets quicker than in 
the United States once they lose income after job loss. The reduction in 
taxes buffers the loss in pre-government household income because the 
households keep more of their income than before. Thus, high-income 
households in Germany should have a higher income buffer because of 
taxes than in the United States. This may counteract the expectations in 
Hypothesis T.9a. Additionally, the United States have a negative income tax 
that supports low-wage earners, called Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). 
If households fall below a certain income after job loss, they no longer have 
to pay income taxes and even receive refunds because of the EITC. This 
may increase the welfare state buffer in the United States for the lowest 
quartiles given that they have labor income after job loss because they are 
more likely to fall below the EITC threshold. Thus, the tax systems suggest 
the opposite of Hypothesis T.9a: In Germany, the high progression should 
make income buffering through the welfare state more equal, whereas in 
the United States the EITC should lead to higher welfare state buffers among 
the poorest quartile relative to the others. Whether the tax or the benefit 
system has a greater influence is thus an empirical question that will be 
assessed in the empirical analysis.
Chapter 3 also discussed several changes in the two countries over time 
since 1980, which may have an influence on income trajectories after job 
loss. First, both countries decreased their support for long-term unem-
ployed and implemented reforms directed at activating the unemployed 
to return to the labor market more rapidly. In Germany, the Hartz Reforms 
in 2004 cut benefits for unemployment durations of more than one year. 
Also, the pressure on the unemployed to take up jobs has been increased 
and atypical employment relationships like temporary work have been 
promoted. In the United States, Welfare Reform in 1996 cut the already low 
and selective benefits for the long-term unemployed with children as Aid 
for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) was replaced by Temporary 
Aid for Needy Families (TANF). Also, the government expanded the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC). Thus, a greater share of welfare state benefits 
became conditional on taking up a job. Moreover, in the United States, 
unemployment benefits became subject to income tax during the 1980s, 
which reduced their buffering capacity. In sum, both countries trend in 
the same direction but the large difference in welfare state support for 
the unemployed presumably remains. Consequently, I expect that welfare 
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state impact on household income after job loss decreases in both countries 
between the 1980s and the 2000s and, consequently, household income 
losses after job loss should increase. In Germany, this should only affect 
the long-run consequences from two years on after job loss. In the United 
States, both the year of job loss and the long-term consequences should be 
affected (Hypothesis T.10).
Since the 1980s, female labor force participation has grown in both 
countries. Following the hypotheses above, this should lead to decreasing 
household income losses after men’s job losses and increasing losses after 
women’s job losses. Presumably, this trend is more pronounced in the United 
States where more of the growth in female labor force participation was due 
to full-time employment than in Germany (Hypothesis T.11).
6.2 Comparing individuals with and without job loss
To estimate income losses after job loss, I use a difference-in-difference 
regression design as described in Chapter 4. The Difference-in-Difference 
(DiD) estimator is def ined as the difference between income changes due 
to unemployment and income changes in a control group that did not 
experience the event. Thus, the estimates also reflect “foregone earnings” 
(Farber 2001) that would have been realized if job loss had not occurred. 
This is closer to the effect of loss on income than differences within a 
person. However, since job loss is not randomly distributed, as Chapter 5 
demonstrated, a simple comparison between those with job loss (“treat-
ment group”) and those without (“control group”) would be biased. Clearly, 
analyzing income changes already controls for time constant unobserved 
heterogeneity. However, treatment and control group may differ in terms 
of income trends. For example, if higher education leads to higher growth 
in earnings, the trends in the two groups cannot be compared since those 
with job loss usually have lower education.
To identify the effect of job loss correctly, the control group and the treat-
ment group have to become more similar. This can be achieved by statistical 
matching. As mentioned earlier, I use Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) 
(Iacus et al. 2012) to f ind matching observations without job loss for the 
treatment group. Table 6.1 shows the variables and their coarsenings used 
for matching. Generally, I use the individual and household level variables 
that proved to be associated with job loss in Chapter 5. Unfortunately, I 
could not include previous occupation because the number of matching 
observations in the control group is insuff icient in this case.
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Table 6.1  Coarsenings of variables used for CEM analyzing the consequences of 
job loss
Variable Coarsening 
Age 25-40, 41-55 
Household composition Single-adult, single-parent, couple with children <16, couple 
without children <16 
Sex Women vs. men 
Education US: Less than High School, High School, Greater than High 
School 
Ger.: School without voc. training, Vocational training, Higher 
education 
Prev. individual earnings Terciles 
Prev. household income Quartiles 
Prev. weekly work hours <10, <30, >30 
Tenure in prev. job Below and above 5 years 
Sector Industrial sector and other 
Year of job loss US: 1982-1986, 1987-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2006 
Ger.: 1986-1990, 1991-1996, 1997-2002, 2003-2008 
Minority US: Black and non-black 
Ger.: Migration background and no migration background 
Region Ger.: East and West 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show descriptive statistics of the treatment and control 
group after CEM is applied. I also added details on treatment cases for 
which no matching control case was found. The tables thus depict the group 
for which I draw inferences about the treatment effect in the following 
analyses. As described in Chapter 4, I estimate the Feasible Average Treat-
ment Effect on the Treated (FATT) in this study. Consequently, I draw no 
conclusions about the effect of job loss on persons without observed job 
loss using this method. Thus, the selectivity of the group who experience 
job loss depicted in Chapter 5 has to be kept in mind when interpreting the 
results. Also, the effect is only def ined for the group for which a matching 
observation in the control group could be obtained.
The results in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show how well CEM balanced the treat-
ment and the control group. This is especially interesting for the coarsened 
metric variables. If the average is similar in the two groups, the cut-off 
points are well chosen. This seems to be the case in both countries. Also, 
variables that have not been used for matching such as occupation, f irm 
size (in Germany), and unionization of the f irm (in the United States) show 
reasonable balance. Therefore, the matching solution performs well in 
generating a control group that can be used for my difference-in-difference 
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estimations. Furthermore, in the column titled “not matched”, I show 
descriptive statistics for individuals who could not be matched to control 
cases. The f igures show that there are more extreme cases in this group 
than in those for which I could obtain matches. In particular, characteristics 
that are connected to the incidence of job loss and re-employment, such as 
belonging to an ethnic minority or being low-educated, occur more often 
among them. Also, there are more single-adult and single-parent households 
in this group. Thus, they are likely to have even larger income losses after 
job loss. The estimates in the following analyses therefore presumably 
underestimate the effect of job loss.
The bottom rows of the tables also show the number of cases that I use 
in the following analyses and the number of cases that I discarded because 
there are no matching control observations. In both countries, I have to 
prune about 20 per cent of the episodes with job loss. In Germany, the 
percentage is slightly higher than in the United States, indicating a stronger 
concentration of job loss among lower strata than in the United States that 
was already visible in Chapter 5. Clearly, given my estimation strategy, the 
ATT for observations without matched control observations cannot be 
obtained. Instead, the reported effects are the feasible ATT (FATT) given 
these restrictions.
In the following f igures, I show averages in the year of job loss and there-
after for the dependent variables used in this chapter: changes in yearly 
individual earnings as well as yearly pre- and post-government household 
income. The changes are expressed as percentage changes compared to a 
base year. For those who lose a job, the base year is two years before job loss. 
For the control group, the base year is a year in which they are employed 
and thus also at risk of becoming unemployed (see Chapter 4 for details). 
To illustrate the DiD approach, I show income trends for those with job loss 
and the matched control group separately. The following graphs are not 
meant to test my hypotheses, but to give an impression of the data. In the 
following sections, I turn to the difference between treatment and control 
group, to estimate the effect of job loss on income trajectories.
Figure 6.1 shows that both the treatment and the control group exhibit 
different trends in the two countries. Income gains among men in the 
control group are much larger in the United States than in Germany. This 
is presumably due to two factors: First, the more dynamic and unrestricted 
labor market in the United States offers greater wage growth for those who 
stay in a job. At the same time, the risk of losing a job is higher. Second, Chap-
ter 3 indicated that the conditions on the American labor market were good 
during the larger part of the period of observation from the mid-1990s to 
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Figure 6.1  Average income changes in percent compared to the base year for men 
in the United States and West Germany
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2007. Germany, on the other hand, experienced high rates of unemployment 
and very little or no wage growth between the 1990s and the 2000s (Brenke 
and Grabka 2011). In the group with job loss, there are also cross-national 
differences. Men in the United States lose less in individual earnings and 
recover faster than German men. This ref lects shorter unemployment 
durations in the United States. Income losses in pre- and post-government 
household income are lower than losses in earnings in both countries 
indicating income buffering through the family and the welfare state. I 
will measure the exact impact of these buffers in the following section. In 
both countries, men offset the losses in post-government household income 
compared to their previous incomes on average by reaching zero losses. 
However, German men who experience unemployment come closer to the 
control group than American men after four years.
Among women in Figure 6.2, the most striking cross-national differ-
ence is in individual earnings. Here, American women show the same 
upward pattern as men, whereas German women show persistent losses 
if they lose a job and declining incomes in the control group. Apparently, 
some women in the control group reduce their labor force participation 
over time. A possible explanation for this is that some women leave the 
labor market or reduce their work hours after childbirth. The literature 
shows that this happens more often in Germany than in the United States 
(Drobnič et al. 1999). Pre-government household income losses show that 
women’s job losses affect total household income much less than men’s in 
both countries. However, in Germany, losses in household income persist 
whereas American women recover without reaching the control group. 
This mirrors the lower re-employment probabilities among German women 
depicted in Chapter 5.
The observed income growth in the control group in the f irst two years 
suggests the question whether the control group has a similar trend in the 
two years between the reference year (t-2) and the occurrence of job loss. The 
DiD estimator assumes such a common trend. Looking at incomes one year 
before the event (t-1), the common trends assumption holds for Germany. 
In the United States, on the other hand, for which I only have data until 
1997, the trends in the treatment and the control group differ. While the 
control group trends upward, the treatment group stagnates between t-2 
and t-1. Thus, some of the difference between the two groups is due to this 
difference in trends. Consequently, the Difference-in-Difference estimates 
for the United States are somewhat overestimated. Unfortunately, I am not 
able to control for this because of the missing data in the year before job 
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Figure 6.2  Average income changes in percent compared to the base year for 
women in the United States and West Germany
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loss after 1997.34 However, this also reveals a peculiarity of the American 
labor market: those who eventually become unemployed are excepted from 
wage growth even before the event occurs. This foreshadowing can also be 
interpreted as a part of the treatment effect.
6.3 Country specific income trajectories
In this section, I turn to the DiD estimates of relative income changes 
after job loss and the buffering effects by the family and the welfare state. 
Compared to Figures 6.1 and 6.2, I now use the difference between the 
trajectories in the treatment and the control group, the Difference-in-
Difference. To estimate income buffering through the welfare state and 
the family, I use the difference between the different income categories, 
as introduced in Chapter 4:
 Welfare s  ˆ  t ate buffer =   ˆ  δ  PrG  −   ˆ  δ  PoG 
 Famil ˆ  y buffer =   ˆ  δ  LE  −   ˆ  δ  PrG 
where   ˆ  δ  X signif ies the estimated changes from the models of labor earn-
ings (LE), pre-government household income (PrG), and post-government 
household income (PoG). Expressed verbally, the welfare state effect is the 
difference between losses in household income before and after taxes and 
transfers. The family effect is the difference between losses in individual 
earnings and household income before taxes and transfers.
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show the income losses due to job loss in the year of 
the event, two years after and four years after. In the upper panels, these 
trajectories are graphed for three income categories: post-government 
household income (solid), pre-government household income (dashed), and 
individual earnings (dotted). In the lower panels, I display the family buffer 
and the welfare state buffer for the respective years after job loss. Thus, the 
lower panels simply show the difference between losses in the upper panel. 
For example, consider the year of job loss (year 0) for men in the United 
States in Figure 6.3. The effect of job loss on pre-government household 
income is a 25 percentage point reduction compared to the counterfactual 
situation without job loss. Yet, post-government household income is only 
reduced by 15 percentage points. Thus, the welfare state buffered about ten 
34 Using imputed incomes in the missing years as control variables decreased the effects 
slightly, as expected, but did not change the results substantially.
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percentage points of the loss in household income. This is depicted by the 
bar in the lowest panel in the year of job loss.
Figure 6.3 shows that the estimates for post-government household 
income losses after job loss among men differ substantively between 
Germany and the United States. In the year of job loss, American men 
experience deeper drops in post-government household income on aver-
age than their German counterparts. In the years after job loss, American 
men’s losses in post-government household income remain on the same 
level at about -15 percentage points. In Germany, on the other hand, men 
experience their greatest losses two years after job loss (-10 percentage 
points) and then recover slightly. Thus, throughout the observed trajec-
tories, German men have less severe losses after job loss than American 
men. Four years after job loss, American men still have about 15 percentage 
points less post-government household income than they would have had 
without job loss. In Germany, this scar in the household income trajectory 
Figure 6.3  Dierence-in-Dierence estimates of post-government household 
income, pre-government household income, and individual earnings 
after job loss among men in the United States and West Germany
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amounts to about -8 percentage points. This difference is partly due to 
high post-government household income growth of those without job 
loss in the United States as depicted in Figure 6.1. Despite high rates of 
re-employment, American men often become disconnected from this 
trend whereas German men come closer to the counterfactual situation 
than they would have had without job loss. Thus, job loss alters the liv-
ing conditions of men to a greater extent in the United States than in 
Germany.
How are these trends connected to earnings and household income 
before taxes and transfers? Figure 6.3 shows that the three income cat-
egories are much further apart in Germany than in the United States. In 
particular, the gap between pre and post-government household income 
is much larger in Germany. This gap is graphed in the lowest panel below 
the trajectories. The welfare state buffers about 22 percentage points of the 
losses in household income in the year of job loss, compared to about ten 
percentage points in the United States. This confirms Hypothesis T.1 for 
men: The welfare state buffers more of the losses due to displacements in 
Germany than in the United States. Yet, contrary to my expectations, the 
family buffer in Germany (11 percentage points) exceeds the one found in 
the United States (7 percentage points) as well. However, relative to the small 
welfare state buffer, the family buffer is important in the United States. 
This becomes obvious once I consider total buffering between earnings and 
post-government household income. In the United States the total buffer 
(welfare state buffer + family buffer) is about 17 percentage points in the 
year of job loss. Thus, the seven percentage points family buffer is about 
40 percent of total buffering. In Germany, total buffering is 33 percentage 
points; consequently, the share of family buffering is only a third of total 
buffering. Two years after job loss the family buffer is even larger than the 
welfare state buffer in the United States. Thus, men’s household incomes 
in the United States depend much more on individual earnings and other 
household member’s incomes than in Germany.
The small impact of income buffers in the United States in absolute 
terms also emerges from the large importance of foregone earnings after 
job loss. As shown in the previous section, earnings of men with similar 
characteristics who do not experience job loss grow strongly. Part of 
the losses due to unemployment in the United States exist because the 
affected men become disconnected from this trend. Income buffers, 
however, usually do not compensate foregone earnings. Welfare state 
benef its are determined by previous income and do not consider the 
overall trends in earnings. Family income support may compensate 
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foregone earnings but many families are perhaps content with reaching 
the same income they had before. Again, this stresses the importance of 
earnings for household income after job loss among men in the United 
States.
The trajectories of individual earnings in Figure 6.3 mirror the duration of 
job loss and the incidence of re-employment in the two countries depicted 
in Chapter 5. In the United States, more rapid re-employment leads to lower 
losses in the year of job loss because more people already hold a new job 
within a short time after unemployment. Thus, their yearly labor income 
already includes earnings from the new job. Likewise, recovery between 
the year of job loss and two years after job loss is stronger than in Germany. 
Four years after job loss, Americans earn about 25 percentage points less 
than they would have without job loss. In Germany, these scars in the earn-
ings trajectories amount to 30 percentage points on average. This f inding, 
however, cannot easily be compared to other research on wage scarring, 
because this average also includes those who do not return to employment 
and, consequently, have no earnings. Looking only at those who returned, 
Gangl (2004) showed that scars in wages are larger in the United States than 
in Germany. However, it is likely that part of this difference derives from the 
selection of the sample in Germany: those who return are positively selected 
on characteristics that also influence wages.35 My approach, by contrast, 
takes a more descriptive perspective by not distinguishing between the 
unemployed and the re-employed. The estimates therefore capture both 
the earnings in the new job and the probability of not returning to a job. 
Using this approach, scars in earnings trajectories are larger in Germany 
on average. Despite this, German men fare better on average after job loss 
once I look at household income, as shown above, because of the large family 
and welfare state buffers.
Income trajectories for women in Figure 6.4 show a different cross-
national variation compared to men’s. While American women have 
trajectories that are similar to American men’s, German women show a 
downward trend after job loss. In both countries, women’s post-government 
income losses in the year of job loss are lower than men’s. Thus, initially, 
women’s job losses affect a household’s economic well-being less than 
men’s job losses, as expected in Hypothesis T.2. The lower share of house-
hold income that they provide on average leads to this gender gap. In the 
35 Clearly, Gangl was aware of this issue and modeled this selection in his analyses. Yet, such 
selection models only include observable characteristics and we can therefore assume that they 
are unable to capture the whole selection.
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years after job loss, however, women in West Germany show unexpected 
trends: losses in post-government household income grow to more than 
ten percentage points until four years after job loss. American women, on 
the other hand, show a slight upward trend and end up a little under ten 
percentage points less post-government household income four years after 
job loss on average.
A look at pre-government income and individual earnings in Figure 
6.4 reveals the sources of these trends. First, as expected in Hypothesis 
T.2, lower household income losses after job loss for women derive from 
a greater influence of the family in both countries. Because, on average, 
women earn less than men in households, their losses are mostly offset 
by their partner’s earnings. Comparing losses before taxes and transfers 
in the two countries however, women’s job losses have the same impact 
in the year of job loss: pre-government household income falls by about 15 
percentage points and the family effects are about equal. This contradicts 
Figure 6.4  Dierence-in-Dierence estimates of post-government household 
income, pre-government household income, and individual earnings 
after job loss among women in the United States and West Germany
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Hypothesis T.3, which states that American women’s job losses should 
have a greater impact on pre-government household income because they 
usually work more hours. However, this result may be influenced by the 
greater number of single adult households among women in the United 
States who have no family buffer through partner’s earnings (see Tables 6.2 
and 6.3). To explore this, I conduct separate analyses by household type in 
the following section.
The downward trend observable among German women in Figure 6.4 
stems from stagnating earnings and a reduction of the welfare state buffer. 
The welfare state buffer reduces because of limited benefit duration. The 
stagnating earnings, on the other hand, reflect the low incidence of re-
employment among German women (see Chapter 5). A possible reason for 
this may be that some women take up the role of the homemaker after job 
loss. This “exit strategy” following a perceived failure on the labor market 
seems to be especially prevalent among low-educated women in Germany 
(Kreyenfeld 2010).
This f irst impression of income trajectories after job loss clearly shows 
that job loss leaves scars both in earnings as well as in post-government 
household incomes. Four years after job loss, the affected group is still 
below the incomes of comparable individuals on average. In Germany, 
the welfare state counteracts this trend more than in the United States. 
However, the roots of the scars in income trajectories are quite different: 
In the United States, income scars derive mainly from foregone earnings 
that would have been realized if the affected individuals had remained 
employed. In Germany, on the other hand, low rates of re-employment and a 
strong welfare state are the most important factors influencing trajectories 
after job loss.
6.4 Differences between households
The family proved to be an important stabilizer for income trajectories 
after job loss, as the previous section showed. In this section, I take a 
closer look at different types of households to learn more about the family 
income buffer. I compare single and couple households to f ind out about 
the consequences of not having the family buffer. Also, I examine the role of 
children within households. The figures in this section display the estimates 
in a different fashion than in the previous section. Here, I only present 
changes in post-government household income to show how individuals 
in different household types fare after job loss and the family buffer, as 
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introduced above. The columns in the f igures show the estimates in year 
of job loss (t0) and two years after job loss (t+2). In the rows, I grouped the 
panels by country. In addition to the previous analyses, I also show results 
for East Germany, because I want to gauge the impact of the differences in 
female labor force participation in the two parts of Germany. Generally, East 
Germany has higher female labor force participation, a higher prevalence of 
childcare facilities, and greater normative acceptance of working mothers 
than West Germany (see Chapter 3 for details). In all of the analyses, I 
omit the estimates for single fathers because their number in my data set 
is very low.
The estimates in Figure 6.5 show higher losses among male singles 
compared to men living in couple households in both countries. This is 
visible both in the year of job loss as well as two years later. This conf irms 
Hypothesis T.4: The lack of family income support increases downward 
income mobility after job loss. Furthermore, as expected by Hypothesis 
T.4a, the disadvantages of single men are greater in the United States 
Figure 6.5  Dierence-in-Dierence estimates of post-government household 
income after job loss among men in dierent household types in the 
United States and West Germany
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because unemployment benef its are lower. This difference is especially 
apparent two years after job loss. Single men in the United States lose 
about 20 percentage points more than men in couples without small 
children on average. In Germany, this difference only amounts to about 
ten percentage points. The severe long-term losses for singles may ad-
ditionally be explained by search theory (Mortensen and Pissarides 
1999): Because single men are not supported by additional incomes in 
the household, they are under greater pressure to f ind a new job. Thus, 
the time they have to search for a new job decreases; consequently, the 
chances of obtaining job offers below their former wage level rise. This 
process may also be influenced by discrimination toward singles in hiring 
decisions (see Chapter 5).
Next, I consider men in couple households in Figure 6.5. In both 
countries, men in couple households with children aged 15 or younger 
have higher losses in post-government household income than men 
in couples without children. This supports Hypothesis T.5: Mothers in 
couples are less able to help their partners f inancially because they en-
counter diff iculties on the labor market, such as the motherhood penalty 
in wages or institutions and gender norms that hamper reconciliation 
of employment and domestic work. However, the difference between 
the two types of couple households is small in West Germany. Thus, my 
expectation in Hypothesis T.5a, that the difference between households 
with and without children is larger in West Germany, is not supported 
by the data. Even though mothers are more likely to be employed in the 
United States than in West Germany, they are not able to support their 
partners as much as Germans. Still, this difference may be due to the 
larger impact of the welfare state in Germany. Therefore, I consider the 
income package after job loss more closely in the following by analyzing 
buffering effects again.
In Figure 6.6, I graphed the family buffer, as introduced above, for men in 
couple households with and without children. The family buffer measures 
how much of the relative loss in earnings is offset by other incomes within 
the household. Figure 6.6 reveals that even when only couple households 
are considered, the family buffer is larger in Germany. Thus, despite a more 
encompassing welfare state, German households also prof it from larger 
family income support after job loss. Therefore, Hypothesis T.3, which states 
that family influence on men’s household incomes after job loss is larger 
in the United States, has to be rejected. It may be that this is due to the 
measurement of family income support in this chapter. Income losses in 
the United States are strongly influenced by foregone earnings, as discussed 
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above. Family income support, presumably, cannot make up for this and is 
consequently small compared to the losses. In the following chapter, I take 
a closer look at the mechanisms behind family income support to f ind out 
more about its occurrence and impact.
Figure 6.6 again conf irms the expectation that family income sup-
port is lower in households with children. Compared to the results for 
post-government household income losses, the difference is now also 
clear in West Germany. Apparently, the German welfare state is able to 
compensate this difference and to produce equal outcomes in terms of 
post-government household income losses among couples with and without 
children. In comparison between the two countries, the gaps in the family 
buffer between couples with and without children are almost equal. Thus, 
the mechanisms that decrease income support by mothers formulated 
in Hypothesis T.5 seem to have a similar impact in both countries. Still, 
there is a slightly smaller gap in the family buffer between couples with 
and without children in the United States. Subtracting the two bars in 
each panel of Figure 6.6 yields about eight percentage points in the United 
States, compared to more than ten percentage points in West Germany. 
Figure 6.6  Family buers among men after job loss in dierent household types 
in the United States and West Germany
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This supports Hypothesis T.5a, which states that family income support for 
men in couple households with children should be closer to that of couple 
households without children than in West Germany. Yet, the difference 
is not large. Thus, the higher acceptance and occurrence of employment 
among mothers in the United States only alters the buffering effects to a 
small extent.
For women, Figure 6.7 reveals that singles and single mothers have 
country-specif ic income trajectories after job loss. Additionally, I now 
also show results for East Germany in order to gauge the influence of the 
institutional differences between the two parts of Germany. In the United 
States, singles and single mothers experience high losses, both initially 
and two years after job loss. However, the long-term losses are similar to 
the other household types. Thus, Hypothesis T.4, which states that singles 
fare worse after job loss than couples, only applies to the year of job loss 
among American women. This, however, is not because single women 
recover faster, but because the losses in the other groups increase. In West 
Germany, on the other hand, apparently the welfare state inhibits large 
losses among singles and single mothers in the year of job loss. Still, at 
least single mothers’ losses are larger than couples’ losses. Two years after 
job loss, losses increase in West Germany and even surpass those found 
in the United States. Thus, in West Germany, Hypothesis T.4 is supported, 
especially in the long run. In Chapter 5, I demonstrated that re-employment 
rates among women in single adult households two years after job loss 
do not differ compared to other household types. This suggests that they 
often take up low-paid jobs. This could be due to discrimination on the 
labor market toward single women. The comparison of single women and 
single mothers between the two countries does not confirm Hypothesis 
T.4a, which states that they should have larger losses in the United States. 
Instead, the results are quite similar, with the exception of single mothers 
in West Germany who fare much worse in the long run than American 
single mothers.
Taking a closer look at income changes among single mothers, I f ind 
considerable cross-national differences. In the United States, single women 
and single mothers face almost similar decreases in economic well-being 
after displacements. This contradicts Hypothesis T.6 in the United States, 
which states that single mothers should experience the highest household 
income losses after job loss because they have no income support through 
partners and are constrained in their job search by their children. Ap-
parently, children do not have the expected impact in the United States. 
Single mothers seem to be able to maintain their incomes as well as singles 
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without children. In West Germany, on the other hand, single mothers 
fare much worse than any other household type. This supports Hypothesis 
T.6a, which states that the West German system of female employment 
and childcare should be worst for single mothers’ income trajectories after 
job loss. Looking at the results for East Germany, in the lowest panels in 
Figure 6.7, Hypothesis T.6a is also supported: single mothers fare better in 
East Germany than in the United States. The estimates for income changes 
Figure 6.7  Dierence-in-Dierence estimates of post-government household 
income after job loss among women in dierent household types in 
the United States, West Germany, and East Germany
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are positive, yet not signif icantly different from zero. The conf idence 
intervals are larger than the scale of this panel. It has to be noted that the 
estimations in East Germany rely on a very small number of cases and have 
to be handled with care. That said, West Germany leaves single mothers 
with statistically signif icant post-government household income losses 
of more than 20 percentage points after job loss, whereas much smaller 
losses are found in East Germany. This suggests a positive impact of the 
availability of childcare on the incomes of single mothers who lose their 
jobs.
Turning to couple households again, the data in Figure 6.7 conf irm the 
hypothesis that women’s unemployment is more severe in American couple 
households. Since women contribute much more to total household income 
in the United States than in West Germany, their job losses are a much 
larger source of instability. In the long run, in particular, post-government 
household income scars after women’s job losses in the United States are 
as large as men’s in couple households. Thus, while working women in 
couple households stabilize household income after men’s job losses, the 
downside is an increased vulnerability in the case of women’s job losses. 
If rates of job loss are the same among men and women, the risk of a drop 
in household income is twice as high in couple households if both work 
full-time.
6.5 Differences between social strata
The analysis so far only considered changes in incomes within individual 
life courses. While this is an important perspective on changes in living 
situations over the life course, it disregards existing income inequality 
between individuals and households. The within perspective treats all 
individuals equally, regardless of where they originated in the social 
stratif ication. In this section, I broaden the analysis of income changes 
by analyzing income changes after job loss in different social strata. As 
mentioned above, I measure the strata using quartiles of post-government 
household income. In Chapter 2, I argued that there are good reasons to 
expect differing income trajectories after job loss depending on the previous 
position within the social stratif ication. This is because income buffers 
that offset income losses are not distributed equally within a society. In 
this chapter, I test Hypotheses T.7 to T.9a developed from this notion. The 
analysis provides new insights at the intersection of cross-sectional and 
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longitudinal inequality research, which has often been disregarded in 
previous research (see Whelan and Maître 2008; Vandecasteele 2011, 2015; 
Manzoni et al. 2014 for important exceptions).
Figure 6.8 presents DiD estimates of the effect of job loss on income by 
previous post-government household income quartiles. Again, I consider in-
dividual earnings, pre-government household income, and post-government 
household income to learn more about the sources of income buffering. 
Inside the panels, I group the estimates for each quartile by year relative to 
job loss. Since I use relative income losses, a ten percentage point loss for the 
upper quartiles is a higher amount of money than in the lower quartiles. I 
argue that the relative perspective comes closer to the reality of the affected 
households than the absolute perspective. A high-income household may 
lose more after job loss in absolute terms because it simply has more to 
lose. A relative perspective rather highlights where the household went 
relative to its initial position. In order to compare income buffers between 
quartiles however, this has to be kept in mind: In the upper quartiles a ten 
percentage point loss requires much more additional income to be offset 
than in the lower quartiles.
First, I take a look at the panels in Figure 6.8 containing the results for 
individual earnings among men. In the United States, the lowest and the 
highest stratum lose least in terms of earnings at t0, the year of job loss. 
Four years after job loss, however, the third quartile loses most. This is some 
evidence in the direction of Hypothesis T.7, which states that the upper 
quartiles should lose most in the United States because of the prevalence 
of internal labor markets. In West Germany, on the other hand, the middle 
quartiles have the lowest losses in earnings after job loss. This contradicts 
the expectation formulated in Hypothesis T.7 that the occupationally 
segregated labor market in Germany produces similar losses in the strata. 
It could be, however, that the advantages due to occupational labor markets 
mainly affect the middle classes where many have occupational credentials 
obtained from the vocational training system. These credentials enable 
them to f ind a well-paid job after unemployment. In the lowest stratum, 
on the other hand, the persistent earnings losses may be caused by a high 
number of individuals without such credentials who face difficulties finding 
a new or a well-paid job. In the upper stratum, many hold higher education 
degrees. Such degrees are less connected to occupations and hence skills 
may be more f irm specif ic. Therefore, in the highest stratum internal labor 
markets are more prevalent, which cause higher losses as individuals change 
their jobs.
170 THE IMPAC T OF LOSING YOUR JOB 
Figure 6.8  Dierence-in-Dierence estimates of income after job loss among 
men by previous post-government household income quartiles in the 
United States and West Germany
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How do these differences in earnings losses translate into losses in economic 
well-being of men affected by job loss? Figure 6.8 shows that American 
men’s post-government household income losses in the quartiles resemble 
the pattern observed for earnings: the highest and the lowest strata lose 
least. However, in the f irst two years after job loss, the highest stratum 
has especially small losses. Thus, job loss initially causes the least instabil-
ity among high-income households in the United States. In the long-run, 
however, all quartiles have similar losses relative to their previous incomes. 
Also in Germany, losses in earnings in the quartiles generally seem to 
govern losses in post-government household income. However, the variance 
in the losses between the quartiles is lower than observed for earnings. 
In the long-run, high-income men in Germany fare worst with respect to 
their previous incomes. Thus, in both countries there are quartile specif ic 
buffering mechanisms that change the extent of losses between earnings 
and post-government household income. Hence, as expected, the quartiles 
differ with regard to loss reduction through taxes and transfer as well as loss 
reduction through existing and additional private incomes in the household.
To explain the causes of differences in economic well-being after job 
loss between the strata, I graphed the quartile specif ic welfare state 
buffers and the family buffers for men in Figure 6.9. The data presented 
confirm Hypothesis T.8 about the distribution of the family buffer among 
the quartiles. In both countries, the family buffer is highest in the richest 
households, indicating that the upper quartiles are most secured through 
additional incomes in the household after job loss. This is most pronounced 
in the year of job loss indicating a high influence of existing additional 
earnings or immediate increases in partner’s incomes in the upper quartiles. 
Thus, high-income men’s losses in both countries are cushioned to a great 
extent, because their partners already earn much or are able to quickly 
increase their earnings. In the following chapter about household strategies, 
I provide more detail on the relative importance of these mechanisms. The 
differences in the family buffer between the quartiles level off in the years 
after job loss in the United States. In Germany, however, the highest quartile 
continues to have a huge family buffer. Thus, as expected, the family buffer 
mainly helps men in higher strata after job loss because assortative mating 
leads to couples where both have good labor market prospects.
The welfare state buffer among men is also distributed as expected in 
Hypothesis T.9. Lower quartiles profit most from the welfare state. That is 
to say, poorer men’s income losses become cushioned most by the tax and 
transfer system. This is due to ceilings in unemployment benefits: they are 
only paid out up to a maximum even though the replacement rate would 
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imply higher benef its for high-earning individuals. Comparing the two 
countries, I also f ind that the difference between the f irst and the fourth 
quartile is much larger in Germany than in the United States. This confirms 
my expectation expressed in Hypothesis T.9a. In the German welfare state, 
there is a minimum income that no one can fall below after job loss. If 
income previous to unemployment is close to this minimum income, almost 
all of the losses are replaced as individuals move into unemployment. This 
“floor effect” increases the welfare state buffer in the lowest quartile relative 
to the higher quartiles. In the United States, on the other hand, there is no 
universal minimum income and some states even have earnings require-
ments for UI benefits. Thus, some of the poorest receive no benefits after job 
loss, which draws the welfare state effect in this quartile downward. In sum, 
the German welfare state is much more successful at leveling the differences 
in income losses after job loss generated by the unequal distribution of the 
family buffer and re-employment outcomes.
Figure 6.9  Family and welfare state buers after job loss among men by previous 
post-government household income quartiles in the United States and 
West Germany
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Figure 6.10  Dierence-in-Dierence estimates of income after job loss among 
women by previous post-government household income quartiles in 
the United States and West Germany
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American women’s earnings trajectories in Figure 6.10 more closely resem-
ble the pattern expected in Hypothesis T.7: The upper income quartiles lose 
more than the lower quartiles. Women with low previous income have fewer 
problems offsetting their losses than women with high previous income, 
presumably because the ILMs on the American labor market mainly provide 
entry level positions for reentrants. In Germany, losses in earnings are 
initially similar for all women. In the long-run, however, the lowest quartile 
loses most earnings. As shown in Chapter 5 many German women in the 
lowest quartile leave the labor market after job loss. Therefore, high losses 
in the lowest quartile reflect the high number of women without earnings 
after displacements. The pattern four years after job loss resembles that 
of German men: Presumably, only the middle quartiles can prof it from 
the OLMs whereas both extremes of income distribution have diff iculties 
returning to their previous earnings.
Post-government income losses among women in Figure 6.10 show 
higher long-term losses in the upper quartiles in both countries. Thus, 
for women from the upper strata, job loss often implies a much greater 
reduction in economic well-being than in the lower strata. One reason 
for this may be that women contribute more to total household income in 
high-income households than in low-income households. Therefore, their 
earnings losses influence household income losses much more. The losses 
in pre-government household income in the United States support this 
interpretation because they are larger in the upper quartiles. In Germany, 
on the other hand, pre-government household income losses are more 
similar among the quartiles. Thus, the difference is due to the welfare state. 
I illustrate this by showing the family buffer and the welfare state buffer 
in the following.
Figure 6.11 shows income buffers for women in different strata to explain 
how earnings losses translated into post-government losses. The two pat-
terns observed for men appear again, albeit less clearly. In the year of job 
loss, the family buffer is lowest in the f irst quartile in both countries. Yet, 
four years afterward, German women in the lowest quartile benefit from 
the largest family buffer. This contradicts Hypothesis T.8, which states that 
the upper strata have a higher family buffer. The reason for this is unclear. 
Maybe this is due to single women moving in with someone after job loss.36 
In the United States, on the other hand, Hypothesis T.8 is supported. The 
36 As described in Chapter 4, I only f ixed partnership status between t-2 and t+2. Therefore, 
there could be a new partner at t+4. The analysis in Chapter 5  reveals that this occurs quite 
often: about 30 per cent of German single women move in with someone after displacements.
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welfare state buffer is even less stratif ied among women in the United 
States than among men. In Germany, on the other hand, the differences 
between the quartiles are even larger. Thus, Hypotheses T.9 and T.9a are 
also supported among women.
Regarding the question whether the tax or the transfer system is more 
decisive in shaping differences between the quartiles, the data clearly 
show the superior importance of the transfer system. The calculated 
welfare state buffering effects that include both the tax and the transfer 
system support the expectations that have been made based on function-
ing of the transfer system. The universal minimum income in Germany 
and the resulting high buffering in the lowest quartile seem to be more 
important than the comparatively high buffering of losses in the upper 
quartiles through the tax system. Also in the United States, the EITC could 
not offset the low buffering capacity of the UI system among low-income 
households.
Summing up, I f ind that the household generates inequalities in in-
come losses after job loss. High-income households are much more able 
Figure 6.11  Family and welfare state buers after job loss among women by 
previous post-government household income quartiles in the United 
States and West Germany
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to maintain their pre-government household incomes after job loss than 
low-income households. In Germany, the welfare state counteracts this 
by providing benefits especially to low-income households. In the United 
States, on the other hand, the lack of such a system leads to higher losses in 
post-government household income among the lower quartiles compared 
to the highest quartile.
6.6 Trends over time
The review of institutional changes in Chapter 3 suggested that income 
losses after job loss also vary over historical time in the two countries. 
To test this, I compare four periods between the 1980s and the 2000s. In 
Germany, I chose 1986 to 1990, 1991 to 1996, 1997 to 2002, and 2003 to 2008. 
The f irst period covers the time before unif ication, followed by two post-
unif ication periods and f inally the period after the Hartz Reforms, which 
cut benefits for the long-term unemployed. In the United States, I compare 
the periods 1982 to 1986, 1987 to 1990, 1991 to 1995, and 1996 to 2004. Between 
the f irst and the second periods in the United States, UI benefits became 
lower and more restrictive. Between the third and the fourth periods, the 
government enacted the so-called Welfare Reform, which cut benefits for 
long-term unemployed families. The latest period is longer than the earlier 
ones because the PSID reduced its sample size in 1997 and I had to expand 
the period to obtain a suff icient number of cases. The f igures in this section 
show changes in percent of the previous income in the year of job loss and 
two years thereafter for different incomes in different years.
The estimates in Figure 6.12 reflect the trends on the labor market de-
picted in Chapters 3 and 5. The economic circumstances generally improved 
in the United States between 1980 and 2007 with decreasing incidence 
of unemployment and persistently high re-employment rates. For men 
in the year of job loss in the United States, this led to a decrease in post-
government household income losses from around 20 percentage points to 
ten percentage points. The trends in changes in pre-government household 
income and earnings after job loss confirm that this improvement originates 
from smaller income losses before taxes and transfers. Earnings losses in 
the year of job loss decreased by about eight percentage points, losses in 
pre-government household income by about ten percentage points between 
the 1980s and the 2000s. Thus, men in the United States have increasingly 
been able to offset losses due to job loss by f inding new, well-paid jobs 
and through having a working partner. Interestingly, despite the upward 
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Figure 6.12  Income losses after job loss at dierent points in historical time in the 
United States and West Germany. Men
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trend before taxes and transfers, post-government household income losses 
increase between the f irst two periods. This confirms the expectation in 
Hypothesis T.10 that cutbacks in UI had an impact on life conditions of 
American men during the 1980s. Also, Hypothesis T.11 receives support: 
The growth in female labor force participation leads to a decrease in men’s 
losses after job loss because more men have partners who contribute to 
household income.
Two years after job loss in the United States, post-government household 
income losses in Figure 6.12 show no trend while losses in pre-government 
household income and earnings decrease. In the last period, there is almost 
no difference between the estimates for pre- and post-government house-
hold income. Thus, there is almost no income support through the welfare 
state in the latest period for men two years after job loss. This is in line with 
my expectations in Hypothesis T.10: The already low welfare state impact on 
incomes after job loss decreased even further because of cutbacks in social 
policy. Apparently, the extension of the EITC did not counteract this trend. 
Yet, economic well-being of men affected by job loss did not deteriorate on 
average because of the positive trend on the labor market and increased 
support by their partners.
For men in West Germany, Figure 6.12 demonstrates that there are little 
post-government household income losses in all of the periods directly 
after displacement. Yet, for pre-government household income and earn-
ings, I f ind a clear downward trend: losses in private incomes before taxes 
and transfers increased over time. Until the beginning of the 2000s, this 
mirrors the growth in long-term unemployment: a decreasing number of 
the unemployed f ind rapid re-employment. After 2003, however, when re-
employment rates began to increase again as depicted in Chapter 5, losses in 
earnings remain high. This may be caused by an increase in “wage scarring” 
over time: More unemployed return to jobs that pay below their previous 
wages. Nevertheless, the downward trend in incomes before taxes and 
transfers did not affect post-government household income. Apparently, 
the welfare state is still able to buffer losses in the year of job loss. The slight 
upward trend between the last two periods may be caused by the increasing 
concentration of job losses in the lower quartiles as depicted in Chapter 5. 
As shown above, the lower quartile has a higher welfare state buffer because 
of the above mentioned “floor effect” in the German welfare state.
Two years after job loss, men’s post-government household income 
changes in Germany f irst remain stable and then show a downward trend 
between the last two periods. This supports the expectation in Hypothesis 
T.10 that the Hartz Reforms increased income losses in the long run after 
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job loss because of the cut-backs in benefits for the long-term unemployed. 
However, a closer look at the lower right panel in Figure 6.12 reveals that 
changes in pre-government household income and individual earnings 
two years after job loss also trend downward in the last period. The differ-
ence between pre- and post-government household income – the welfare 
state buffer – however, remains unchanged. Thus, lower post-government 
household incomes derive from lower market incomes in the period after 
2003. Since re-employment rates increased in this period, as mentioned 
above, this is also a sign of increased “wage scarring”. Apparently, the Hartz 
Reforms had indirect effects on post- government household income: Acti-
vation measures and low benefits pushed the unemployed back to the labor 
market where they took up low-paid jobs. In line with this, Gießelmann 
(2009) found that the risk of in-work poverty increased among re-entrants 
to the labor market between the 1990s and the mid-2000s. The activating 
measures in connection with the lack of suitable jobs thus led to a deteriora-
tion of men’s life situations after job loss in Germany. Yet, the increase of 
scars in earnings after job loss has been observable since the 1970s (Protsch 
2008). Thus, beyond the effects of the Hartz Reforms, there is a secular trend 
on the German labor market that is, presumably, due to structural changes.
A closer look at Figure 6.12 reveals that the family buffer increased 
slightly over time for West German men. This is visible both in the year of 
job loss and two years later. Changes in pre-government household income 
are not as large as for earnings. This supports Hypothesis T.11, which states 
that growing female labor force participation increased the family buffer 
among men.
As depicted in the previous analyses, women’s income trajectories after 
job loss are more complex than men’s; hence, the analysis at different 
points in time in Figure 6.13 shows fewer clear trends. In the United States, 
I f ind that the losses in post-government household income f irst decrease 
and then increase again, both in the year of job loss and two years later. 
Contradicting Hypothesis T.10 for women in the United States, the impact of 
the welfare state does not change. Both in the year of job loss and two years 
after, the difference between losses in pre- and post-government household 
income follows no clear pattern. This calls into question the f indings for 
men that the American welfare state reduced its capacity to buffer losses 
over the years. One reason for this f inding may be that the signif icance of 
women’s job losses for household incomes differs much between household 
types, as depicted above. Therefore, the welfare state effect cannot be clearly 
identif ied. Unfortunately, the number of cases does not allow for a further 
breakdown of the trends.
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Figure 6.13  Income losses after job loss at dierent points in historical time in the 
United States and West Germany. Women
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My second hypothesis over time concerned women’s roles in households. 
Based on the growth in female labor force participation, I expected in 
Hypothesis T.11 that women’s job losses should have an increasing impact 
on total household income over the years. For American women, evidence 
in favor of this hypothesis in Figure 6.13 is scarce. Only two years after 
job loss do I f ind a small increase in household income losses between 
the f irst and the last period. Among West German women, I observe 
the expected increase in household income losses after displacements 
in Figure 6.13. Apparently, women’s job losses become more important 
because they more often contribute signif icantly to household incomes. 
This is also illustrated by the shrinking gap between losses in earnings and 
losses in pre-government household income: women’s losses in earnings 
increasingly influence total household income. Two years after job loss, 
however, there is a slight upward trend after the initial drop after 1990. 
Yet, the reason for this seems to be lower losses in earnings in the years 
following 1996. Interestingly, unlike for men in West Germany, the growing 
re-employment rates also decreased losses in earnings and, consequently, 
in household income. Apparently, women have been more likely than 
men to f ind well-paid jobs compared to their former wages. For them, the 
Hartz Reforms did not have the same impact on “wage scarring” as for 
men. Furthermore, I also could not f ind other effects of cut-backs in the 
welfare state. For women, the welfare state is as effective in cushioning 
losses as during the 1980s.
6.7 Summary: The impact of job loss embedded in the life 
course
The analyses in this chapter demonstrate the importance of considering the 
different levels and life domains in which the life course proceeds as well as 
its self-referentiality in order to understand economic well-being after job 
loss. While previous studies often only covered welfare state and labor mar-
ket influences, I additionally depict how the linkage of life courses within 
couples influences outcomes. I also show that the life course prior to job 
loss influences outcomes by differentiating between household composition 
and social strata. The f indings underscore the importance of interactions 
between the market, the family, and the welfare state. Also, gender plays 
an important role for economic well-being after job loss because of the 
gender specif ic employment patterns in households. While most men 
work full-time, regardless of their household composition, hours in paid 
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work differ greatly among women. This leads to gender-specif ic income 
trajectories after job loss. In the following, I summarize the main results 
of this chapter and discuss them in the light of my theoretical framework. 
Table 6.4 summarizes the hypotheses and corresponding results from this 
chapter.
In cross-national comparison, I f ind that job loss among men in the 
United States has a much more negative influence on economic well-being 
than in Germany. In both countries, post-government household income 
remains lower than among similar individuals who did not experience 
the event until four years after job loss. However, these scars in household 
incomes through displacement are larger on average in the United States. 
One of the reasons behind this difference is the larger growth in income 
among the otherwise equal group without job loss in the United States. 
Thus, in the United States a large part of the impact of displacements 
is that the affected individuals could not participate in income growth 
and have less income compared to similar individuals without job loss. 
In Germany, on the other hand, such foregone earnings play a lesser role 
and most of the losses are because individuals are below their previous 
income levels.
Taking a closer look at men’s income trajectories reveals that there are 
further important factors that lead to the observed differences between the 
two countries. In Germany, overall income buffering is much larger than 
in the United States: a much smaller portion of the losses in earnings after 
displacements are visible in post-government household income. Together, 
the tax and transfer system and family income support in Germany cushion 
more of the losses in earnings than in the United States. This is partly 
because income buffers usually do not affect foregone earnings. Beyond 
this, higher unemployment benefits in Germany clearly have an influence. 
Interestingly, the impact of family income support in Germany among men 
is larger than expected. Still, the relative importance of the family buffer 
in total buffering is higher in the United States.
Exploring the role of the family for men’s household income after job loss 
further, I found that family income support is lower if there are children 
in the household. Apparently, children often lead to a persistent gender-
specific division of paid and domestic work that continues to exist even after 
men lose their jobs. Thus, the existing boundaries between the sphere of 
work and the sphere of family in which the life courses proceed are stable, 
even as the circumstances change in the household. This also points to 
the self-referential nature of life courses. I explore this issue further when 
I analyze the employment behavior of women after men’s job losses more 
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Table 6.4  Summary of hypotheses and results about income trajectories after job 
loss
Hypothesis Result 
T.1 The welfare state buer is larger in Germany 
than in the United States 
Conrmed 
T.2 Women have a larger family buer than men Conrmed 
T.3 Women in the United States have higher 
household income losses after job loss than 
women in Germany 
Not Conrmed 
T.4 Singles’ and single mothers’ household 
income losses after job loss are higher than 
those found among couples 
Conrmed 
T.4a Single adult households have higher losses 
after job loss in the United States than in 
Germany 
Conrmed for men, not conrmed 
for women 
T.5 Household income losses among men in 
couple households are larger if they live 
with children 
Conrmed 
T.5a American men’s losses in households with 
and without children should be more similar 
to one another than in West Germany 
Conrmed but evidence weak 
T.6 Single mothers have the highest household 
income losses among all household 
congurations 
Not conrmed in the US, conrmed 
in in West Germany 
T.6a Single mothers in East Germany fare better 
after job loss than in West Germany, the 
United States are in between 
Conrmed 
T.7 In the United States, earnings losses are 
larger in the upper strata, in Germany, earn-
ings losses are highest in the lower strata 
Conrmed in the US (weak 
evidence), not conrmed in West 
Germany 
T.8 The family buer is higher among the upper 
strata in both countries 
Conrmed in the US, conrmed in 
West Germany only for men 
T.9 The welfare state buer is lower among the 
upper strata in both countries 
Conrmed 
T.9a The dierence in welfare state buers 
among the strata is larger in Germany 
Conrmed 
T.10 The welfare state buer decreases in both 
countries over historical time. In Germany, 
this only aects the long-run consequences. 
In the United States, both the year of job 
loss and the long-term consequences are 
aected 
Conrmed in the US, not conrmed 
in Germany 
T.11 Household income losses decrease after 
men’s job losses and increase after women’s 
job losses over historical time 
Conrmed for West Germany and for 
men in the US 
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closely in the following chapter. The comparison of single men and men in 
couple households further stressed the importance of the families. Single 
men are not only disadvantaged on the labor market, as Chapter 5 shows, 
but also suffer more from job loss because they lack family income support.
Separating income losses after job loss between social strata, I also f ind 
evidence of self-referentiality on different levels and in different spheres of 
the life course. On the level of the labor market, I found some evidence that 
men in the middle strata suffer the smallest earnings losses in Germany. 
This may be due to the portability of skills, which is especially pronounced 
in middle-class jobs. Thus, the middle strata lose less earnings on average 
because they f ind a comparable new job quickly. No such trend is visible 
in the United States. Regarding the spheres of work and family, men from 
the upper strata receive more family income support after job loss than the 
lower strata. The reason for this is presumably assortative mating. Their 
partners’ life courses proceed in similar ways through education and the 
labor market, forming couples where both have similar earning potential 
and, often, similar incomes. Thus, before taxes and transfers, household 
income losses are highest among men from the lower strata. However, 
the welfare state offsets this to some degree, since public support in both 
countries is more geared toward the lower strata. Yet, the German welfare 
state is more successful at buffering low-income households’ losses after job 
loss than its American counterpart. This is presumably due to the universal 
minimum income in Germany. The United States, on the other hand, lack 
such a system. In post-government household income, this leads to more 
similar outcomes among the strata in Germany compared to the United 
States.
The analysis at different points in historical time further revealed that 
the consequences of job loss did not remain the same among men between 
the 1980s and the mid-2000s. To carve out the drivers of these changes, the 
life course framework again proved well suited. In the United States, the 
synopsis of changes in the welfare state suggested a reduction of support 
for the unemployed. Yet, despite this, losses in post-government household 
income after job loss decreased. The reason for this proved to be lower 
losses in incomes before transfers and taxes. Apparently, improving labor 
market circumstances and increasing female labor force participation offset 
the reduction in welfare state benefits and even changed men’s economic 
well-being after job loss for the better in the United States. On the other 
hand, this dependence on a well-functioning labor market makes American 
men increasingly vulnerable to recessions. Unfortunately, I do not have 
data that covers the great recession after 2008. Yet, the analysis suggests 
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that the American welfare state is less able to buffer the consequences of 
job loss when there is no rapid re-employment than during the beginning 
of the 1980s. That said, American men who lost their jobs during the recent 
recession do profit from increasing family income support. In 2011, the share 
of female breadwinner couples in which the women earns most rose to 24 
per cent (Wang et al. 2013).
German men, on the other hand, faced deteriorating labor market 
conditions during the study period. However, the welfare state has been 
able to offset increased losses despite cut-backs. Nevertheless, I found an 
interesting interaction between changes in the welfare state and the labor 
market: After the Hartz Reforms in 2004, which, among other things, cut 
benefits for long-term unemployed, re-employment rates increased, but this 
did not lead to a decrease in losses before taxes and transfers. Apparently, 
the jobs that the unemployed take up after the Hartz Reforms are in the 
low pay sector and do not improve their life situation (Gießelmann 2009, 
2014). Still, inclusion into the labor market fosters social integration and also 
improves overall life satisfaction, even among the working poor, as Alber 
and Heisig (2011) show. However, the authors also conclude that low job 
quality reduces this effect considerably so that the benefits of an activation 
policy such as the Hartz Reforms may be low.
Among women, household characteristics have a much more direct 
influence on outcomes after job loss than among men. The differences in 
labor force participation and in the share of income provided in a household 
lead to a great variation on outcomes after job loss. This variation ranges 
from female sole breadwinners in single mother households to marginally 
employed women in couple households. Among female sole breadwinners, 
almost all of the losses in earnings are losses in pre-government household 
income. Among marginally employed women in couple households, the 
signif icance of women’s losses in earnings for household income are negli-
gible. The earner configuration is directly connected to the division of paid 
and unpaid work in couples: two-earner couples usually share more of the 
housework than male breadwinner couples. Thus, the way in which couples 
organize the separation of the sphere of work and the sphere of family is 
also important should women lose their jobs. The connection is different 
compared to men’s, because now it is not the buffer that changes with 
different household arrangements but the importance of women’s earnings 
for household income. Analyses of average outcomes among women after 
job loss do not capture this complexity. That said, some patterns that I found 
for men could also be observed for women: The welfare state has a larger 
influence in Germany, especially in the lower strata. Also, family income 
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support is stronger in the upper strata. Over historical time, however, the 
results remain unclear. There are some indications that women’s employ-
ment in couple households becomes more important and thus their job 
losses have a stronger influence on household income.
Comparing household types, I also found the highest losses among single 
women. Interestingly, only in West Germany did I f ind that single mothers 
are worse off than single women without children. To test the influence of 
public childcare on income losses after job loss, I additionally considered 
East Germany, where childcare is more prevalent. In accordance with my 
expectations, income losses due to job loss among single mothers are lower 
in East Germany. Clearly, the estimates are not very robust in East Germany 
because of the low number of cases. Still, I count this as evidence in favor 
of the importance of childcare for single mothers. After job loss, childcare 
attenuates the conflict of the sphere of work and the sphere of family in their 
life courses and enables them to f ind a new and well-paid job more rapidly.
This chapter showed that the family is an important factor for economic 
well-being after job loss in couple households. Other household members’ 
incomes can signif icantly reduce economic insecurity caused by displace-
ments. The analyses also demonstrated that income buffering through the 
family is not equally distributed: some profit more from it than others. In 
the following section, I take a closer look at the family buffer by considering 
its two components: existing additional incomes in the household and the 
increase of other household members’ incomes (the added worker effect).
7 Household Strategies to Buffer Job 
Loss
In this chapter, I take a closer look at the family income buffer after men’s 
job losses. As depicted in the previous chapter, household composition has 
an important impact on income security after job loss because economic 
risks are pooled inside the household. In other words, if one job is lost, there 
may still be others who provide income in the household. In this chapter, 
I focus on the family income buffer after men’s job losses for two reasons: 
f irst, men’s job losses are more severe for household incomes than women’s 
because men are often the main earners, as depicted in the previous chapter. 
Second, the family income buffer after men’s job losses is more complex in 
terms of the intra-family structure. While the family buffer after women’s 
job losses mostly consists of their partners’ existing full-time earnings, as 
mentioned before, the family buffer among men consists of two sources 
that I aim to disentangle in this chapter: f irst, the extent to which partners 
already provide income before job loss; and second, increases in partners’ 
incomes triggered by displacements. The latter factor is known as the 
“added worker effect” (AWE) (Lundberg 1985). Thus, while women’s job 
losses cement prevalent intra-household gender division into male main 
earners and female supplementary earners or housekeepers, men’s job losses 
challenge this arrangement. The aim of this chapter is to show if and how 
family income buffering after men’s job losses emerges given this tension.
In this chapter, I analyze existing earnings among women in couple 
households as well as incidences and the magnitude of the AWE in order to 
gauge the importance of these two buffering mechanisms relative to each 
other. The literature review in Chapter 1 showed that many studies have 
already explored the AWE. However, most researchers relied on economic 
theory of household behavior to explain the effect. In this chapter, I want to 
add to the literature by probing explanations for the added worker effect that 
derive from family and life course sociology, as proposed in my theoretical 
considerations in Chapter 2. In the following, I f irst formulate hypotheses 
that follow from my theoretical considerations. The hypotheses in this 
chapter begin with an “S”, to signify that they pertain to strategies that 
households pursue to buffer income losses. Then, I test these hypotheses 
empirically.
My theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2 goes beyond the as-
sumption of New Home Economics that the family is a decision-making 
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unit, and conceptualizes families as consisting of linked life courses (Moen 
2003). Consequently, decisions about the allocation of work after one person 
loses a job are negotiated between family members. Following Rusconi 
and Solga (2008), I consider three levels that shape these decision-making 
processes: the individual level; the internal structure of the family; and 
the family as a unit. Therefore, I expect differences between individuals, 
differences between household types, and differences between countries 
with different institutions and normative expectations that affect people 
because they are in a family. Nevertheless, the framework acknowledges 
that economic reasoning also shapes decision-making processes inside 
families. I argue, however, that constraints on the three levels influence 
the outcomes. Thus, my framework is not an alternative to New Home 
Economics, but rather an extension that provides a more encompassing 
explanation of the added worker effect.
7.1 Hypotheses
The added worker effect may not only occur after partner’s job loss. Job 
losses may also be anticipated and hence some women may increase their 
hours even before the event. Stephens (2002) found some evidence that this 
is the case in the United States. Consequently, in some couple households, 
women’s work hours are part of a larger strategy of risk pooling. If they live 
with men who have risky careers, women may adapt by increasing their 
incomes (Hypothesis S.1). For example, a woman may observe that her 
partner’s job is in a sector with high labor turnover. To safeguard family 
income, she then decides to work more. This could also be a mechanism 
through which linked life courses influence one another.
On the individual level, the most obvious constraint that should inhibit 
the occurrence of the added worker effect is the hours a person already 
works. Full-time workers have little leeway to increase their income. The 
only possibility would be a change of job, which is often not feasible. As 
mentioned above, this is one reason why I do not consider men’s reactions 
to women’s job losses. They mostly already work full-time.
Even if women work part-time, an increase in hours is often not possible 
because of “hours constraints” in the current job (Altonji and Paxson 1992; 
Reynolds and Aletraris 2010). That is to say, most jobs are tied to a certain 
number of work hours. The only way to increase hours is to change jobs. This 
may be easier in the United States than in Germany because job changes 
are more common on the American labor market. Thus, the incidence of the 
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added worker effect should be most likely among women who are not on 
the labor market (Hypothesis S.2). Among those who already work, it should 
occur more often in the United States than in Germany (Hypothesis S.2a).
In addition to labor force status prior to partner’s job loss, education and 
previous career should play an important role. In both countries, high edu-
cation should lead to high incidence of the AWE because the labor market 
usually offers more opportunities for highly educated women (Hypothesis 
S.3). Beyond this, the effects of education are presumably mediated by the 
educational system and the labor market structure, as argued in Chapter 
2. The German labor market is generally organized around occupational 
labor markets (OLM) where educational credentials are important. On 
the American labor market, on the other hand, internal labor markets 
(ILM) dominate where educational credentials are of lesser importance. 
Therefore, education should play a bigger role for the occurrence of the AWE 
in Germany than in the United States: The educational gradient should be 
steeper in Germany (Hypothesis S.3a).
The difference between these two systems should be especially apparent 
in the case of women who are inactive on the labor market before their 
partners become unemployed. In both countries, a considerable share of 
women in couple households are inactive because they leave their jobs after 
childbirth. This is more prevalent in West Germany than in the United 
States. Among these women, skills may devaluate because they remain 
unused. This happens because either skills become outdated or employers 
perceive them as outdated. Yet, this effect may be less strong in Germany 
where educational certif icates preserve employability because OLMs are 
prevalent. Even after a spell of inactivity on the labor market, applicants can 
still prove that they acquired certain skills using these credentials. Thus, 
among inactive women in Germany, the occurrence of the added worker 
effect should be higher for those with at least a vocational training degree 
compared to less educated women (Hypothesis S.4). The American labor 
market, on the other hand, offers many entry level positions that require no 
credentials because of the ILMs. Consequently, the occurrence of the AWE 
among low-skilled women who are inactive on the labor market should not 
differ much from high-skilled inactive women (Hypothesis S.5).
Additionally, there is a clear gender segregation on the labor market that 
may hamper women’s ability to increase their earnings after their partner’s 
job losses (Reskin 1993). Typical “women’s jobs” are often lower paid than 
“men’s jobs”. Also, there may be constraints in the flexibility or work hours. 
For example, Petrongolo (2004) shows that many women involuntarily work 
part-time in Europe. Also, f ixed-term contracts are more common among 
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women than among men controlled for productivity. Thus, I expect that 
the income gain through the added worker effect is lower on average than 
men’s losses due to job loss (Hypothesis S.6).
Between households, differences in gender specif ic roles inside the 
household should inf luence the occurrence and the magnitude of the 
added worker effect. Broadly, I distinguish two arrangements: traditional 
couples, where men work and women stay at home with children and 
modern couples where both are employed and there are children in the 
household. Thus, the group of modern couples also comprises 1.5-earners 
where women work part-time and men work full-time. I do not consider 
couples without children in the household in this comparison because their 
division of paid and unpaid work usually differs from couples with children 
(see operationalization below). I expect the added worker effect to be more 
likely in modern couples (Hypothesis S.7). There are two reasons for this: 
First, they are less affected by the norm that women are responsible for 
housework and consequently should not work. Second, they have experi-
ence in negotiating housework duties under the constraint that both are 
employed. However, modern couples are defined through female labor force 
participation and thus all modern couples should face the problem of hours 
constraints, as described above. The empirical analysis will show whether 
constraints on the labor market or within the family are more important 
if children are present in the household.
The effects of being in a family consist of normative expectations and 
institutional arrangements, which often also have their roots in norms. 
Generally, in West Germany, working mothers are not as normatively ac-
cepted as in the United States (Fortin 2005). However, over time, acceptance 
grew in West Germany, especially after reunif ication (Lee et al. 2007). Still, 
this should lead to a lower incidence of the added worker effect among West 
German women compared to American women if children are present in 
the household. On the side of institutions, the tax system and the welfare 
state should play a role, as previous research has indicated. Both countries 
have a joint taxation system that should lead to more traditional household 
arrangements. However, the American tax system counteracts disincentives 
for female employment (Johnson and Rohaly 2009). Hence, the American 
tax system supports the emergence of modern couples whereas the German 
tax system impedes this.
The welfare state also proved to be related to the added worker effect 
in previous research. High benefit levels lead to a smaller added worker 
effect, because family income support becomes less important to maintain 
a certain standard of living if the welfare state is generous. As depicted in 
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Chapter 3, unemployment benefits are generally lower in the United States 
than in Germany. Furthermore, in both countries, regular unemployment 
benefits are not means-tested, implying that no effects beyond the influence 
of the benefit level should exist. Yet, in Germany, those who have had low 
incomes before job loss may directly receive benef its for the long-term 
unemployed (“Arbeitslosengeld II”) if these are higher than the regular 
unemployment benef its, which are set at 60 per cent of former wages. 
Benefits for long-term unemployed are means tested, which should lead to a 
lower AWE among low-income households. Taken together, the institutional 
conf igurations suggest that the added worker effect should occur more 
often and with greater magnitude among women in the United States than 
in Germany (Hypothesis S.8). Within Germany, low-income households 
should have a lower AWE than high-income households (Hypothesis S.8a).
Another aspect of the welfare state that should play a role in shaping the 
AWE is the availability of childcare. If parents have the option to leave their 
children in childcare facilities during the day, their chances to organize the 
work family nexus increase. First, this benefits the formation of modern 
dual-earner couples. Second, this increases the f lexibility of the couple 
regarding paid work. Both factors should lead to a higher incidence of the 
AWE if the partners do not already both work full-time. In chapter 3, I con-
cluded that families in the United States more often have access to childcare 
than families in West Germany. However, in East Germany, the availability 
of childcare is even higher than in the United States. Also, the acceptance 
of working mothers is higher (Lee et al. 2007). Therefore, the AWE among 
couples with children should occur most often in East Germany and least 
often in West Germany (Hypothesis S.9). Clearly, both hypotheses S.8 and 
S.9, about cross-national differences, are not about specif ic institutions but, 
on the whole, nation-specific models of female employment. Unfortunately, 
with only three country cases, I cannot disentangle the effect of single 
institutions.
In addition to these hypotheses, I also want to explore the connection 
between the AWE and social inequality. In the previous chapter, I showed 
that family income support after job loss is higher among high-income 
households. I explained this f inding with educational homogamy: women 
and men in couples usually have similar earning potential. In this chapter, 
I aim to further analyze the social gradient in the family income buffer 
among men by looking at their partner’s employment before and after job 
loss. The question is, whether the higher buffer in more affluent households 
originates from a higher AWE or from higher previous earnings among 
their partners.
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The chapter is structured as follows: First, I describe some additional 
operationalizations that go beyond the description of the data sets in 
Chapter 4. Then, I report descriptive statistics and explore the question of 
whether people whose partners become unemployed have higher hours and 
earnings even before it occurs. Finally, I present estimates of the incidence 
and the magnitude of the added worker effect. The chapter concludes with 
a discussion of the results.
Operationalization of the AWE
To test the occurrence and the magnitude of the added worker effect, I 
measure the effect of partner’s job losses and unemployment on work 
hours and earnings. Partner’s job losses are measured in the same way 
as individual job losses, described in Chapter 4. Furthermore, I restricted 
the age of both partners to 25 to 55 to focus on the prime working age 
population. Also, I excluded all women who are in education before their 
partners become unemployed so that their possible work hours are not 
restricted. Thus, women are at risk of the event partner’s unemployment 
(PUE) if they are between 25 and 55, not in education, and are living with 
a working partner within the same age group.
To measure the added worker effect, I use changes in weekly work 
hours and individual earnings. The incidence of the added worker effect is 
defined as a two or more hour change in weekly work hours.37 I consider the 
incidence of the AWE regardless of its timing: If an increase of two hours or 
more occurs in the year of partner’s job loss or two years afterward I record 
its incidence. The magnitude of the added worker effect is then def ined 
as relative changes in individual labor earnings. To obtain estimates that 
are comparable to the results in the previous chapter, I calculate women’s 
changes in earnings relative to their partners’ prior labor earnings. Thus, I 
can f ind out how much of the relative loss in earnings depicted in the previ-
ous chapter is offset by increases in women’s earnings and also compare 
the results to the magnitude of the family income buffer. I jointly compare 
average changes in earnings with those before the event in both years after 
37 Weekly work hours are calculated using annual work hours divided by 52. Annual work 
hours are provided in the CNEF (see Chapter 4 for details). Unfortunately, the GSOEP, from which 
the German data in the CNEF is taken, does not measure annual working hours. In the CNEF, 
they are therefore imputed using available information on hours at the time of the interview 
and work spells in the previous year. There are some problems with the variable, as the level 
of hours in Germany seems to be too high compared to other data sources. However, because I 
mainly analyze changes, this should not pose a problem.
HOUSEHOLd STRATEGIES TO BUFFER JOB LOSS 193
a partner’s unemployment (PUE). In my hypotheses, I formulated expecta-
tions about modern couples. I operationalize these as two employed adults 
living together with one or more children under the age of 16. I distinguish 
between full- and part-time employment to show the difference between 
modern and so called partly-modernized couples.
7.2 Partner’s labor force participation before job loss
Before I turn to the estimation of the added worker effect, I report descrip-
tive statistics for the data set used in this chapter. Also, I analyze whether 
women anticipate their partners’ job losses and increase their incomes 
even before the event. Compared to the other analyses in this study, I use 
a different data set in this chapter. It consists of a sub-sample of the main 
data set that only contains women and men in couple households. Beyond 
the already established constraint that individuals need to have the same 
partnership status throughout the episode, I further restrict the sample 
to those who live together with the same person for f ive years around job 
loss – two years before and two years after. Therefore, I remove all persons 
who experienced some form of partnership break-up or who changed their 
partners within this period.
However, the restriction to stable couples may render the sample selec-
tive and thus may bias results (Nilsson 2008). Previous research found that 
job loss increases the probability of divorce, especially for those with short 
partnership durations and those whose partners have been laid off instead 
of f ired due to plant closings (Charles and Stephens 2004).38 However, it is 
unclear whether this selectivity is related to the occurrence and magnitude 
of the added worker effect. It may be that those who would have increased 
their hours leave because they are generally more active in life and do not 
want to carry the burden of an unemployed partner. On the other hand, 
it may also be that those who would not ameliorate the situation leave, 
because they do not want to work more to maintain their standard of living. 
Additional analyses, not presented here, depict that women who leave a cou-
ple after men’s job losses are slightly more likely to be full-time employed, 
better educated, and contribute relatively more to household income than 
those who stay. Thus, men lose partners who could have buffered more of 
38 My analyses in Chapter 5 support this f inding: Men in couples who experience job loss are 
more likely to experience a break-up (see Table 5.3 and Table 5.4). Note that I did not control 
for the selectivity of job loss in the analyses.
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their losses through existing incomes. Still, only about three per cent of the 
couples experience a break-up after men’s job losses.
Given the aim of my study and the small number of break-ups, it is 
questionable whether a correction for selection is desirable. Since I want 
to explain differences in incomes after job loss, I am more interested in an 
added worker effect that actually occurs and not in one that could have 
occurred. Thus, my endeavor is of a descriptive nature. If a woman leaves 
after her partner’s job loss, there is no additional income and thus this 
person’s income is not buffered through the family.
Table 7.1 presents descriptive statistics for women whose partners experi-
ence unemployment (PUE in the table and in the following text) and women 
whose partners remain employed. The results repeat the finding presented in 
Chapter 5 that unemployment is concentrated among already disadvantaged 
households. For example, household income is lower in the group with PUE 
on average two years before PUE. The data also reveal a difference in educa-
tional attainment that resembles the previous findings on education and the 
incidence of unemployment on the individual level: Women whose partners 
become unemployed are also less educated than those whose partners stay 
employed. This is caused by educational assortative mating (Blossfeld 2009).
Taking a closer look at work hours prior to PUE in Table 7.1 shows that the 
initial situation of women is very diverse, as expected. There are substantial 
shares of non-employed, part-time employed, and full-time employed in both 
countries. However, Table 7.1 also depicts the aforementioned higher female 
labor force participation in the United States: Almost half of the women in 
couple households are full-time employed whereas in West Germany only 
about a quarter works full-time. On average, women contribute 25 per cent 
and 20 per cent of household income in the United States and West Germany, 
respectively. Overall, this confirms that men are often the main income 
provider in both countries. As expected, the male-breadwinner model is 
more prevalent in West Germany than in the United States.
Comparing work hours between the two groups in Table 7.1 yields some 
evidence that West German women anticipate their partner’s unemploy-
ment while American women do not. In West Germany, the share of full-
time employed women is higher in the group with PUE. Yet, the share of 
non-employed women is also slightly higher. In the United States, on the 
other hand, women whose partners become unemployed are more likely 
to be non-employed and less likely to work full-time. This would suggest 
no anticipation of partner’s unemployment. However, the groups with and 
without PUE differ on characteristics that may also influence employment 
and earnings. Thus, to test Hypothesis S.1, I have to control for these factors.
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Table 7.1  Individual characteristics of women with and without partner’s job loss 
and subsequent unemployment (PUE) in the United States and West 
Germany
United States 
With PUE Without PUE 
Employment 
Not employed (%) 24.6 19.4 
Part-time: ≤ 30h/wk. (%) 32.4 32.6 
Full-time: > 30h/wk. (%) 43 48 
Avg. HH income share (%) 24.6 25.1 
Children 
w/ children <16 in HH (%) 75.4 70 
w/ children <5 in HH (%) 37.3 32.8 
Education 
Less than High School (%) 12.5 8.1 
High School (%) 49 39.5 
Greater than High School (%) 38.4 52.4 
Sociodemographics 
Avg. Age 37.4 38.5 
Black (%) 8.5 8.3 
HH Income (2007 $) 27559 33274 
N Episodes 588 23457 
West Germany 
With PUE Without PUE 
Employment 
Not employed (%) 35.8 34.9 
Part-time: ≤ 30h/wk. (%) 36.2 38.4 
Full-time: > 30h/wk. (%) 28 26.8 
Avg. HH income share (%) 20.2 19 
Children 
w/ children <16 in HH (%) 65.1 62.5 
w/ children <5 in HH (%) 24.1 24.6 
Education 
Without Voc. Training (%) 43.1 23.6 
Voc. Training (%) 48.5 60 
Higher Education (%) 8.5 16.4 
Sociodemographics 
Avg. Age 39.3 39.6 
Migrant (%) 33.7 17.8 
HH Income (2007 €) 17359 21127 
N Episodes 363 24202 
Two years before PUE
Sources: GSOEP, PSID, and CNEF, author’s calculations
196 THE IMPAC T OF LOSING YOUR JOB 
Figure 7.1  Work hours among women before partner’s job loss and in matched 
control group in the United States and Germany
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Figure 7.1 shows women’s average work hours two years before PUE for the 
group with PUE and a matched control group without PUE. As in other 
parts of this study, I used Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) to f ind a control 
group that is equal on a set of relevant variables (see Chapter 4 for details).39 
The results in Figure 7.1 show that West German women whose partners 
will become unemployed contribute more than a comparable control group 
whose partners do not become unemployed two years later. However, the 
difference does not reach common levels of statistical signif icance. In the 
United States, even after matching, the share of household income women 
without PUE provide is larger. According to this, German women whose 
partners hold unstable jobs react to this by increasing their work hours 
39 For this analysis I used: education; partner’s education; partner’s tenure; age; partner’s age; 
presence of children under 16 and 5; work experience; race/migration background; partner’s 
work hours; and post-government household income. Differences between the results for the 
group with PUE between Table 7.1 and 7.2 result from discarded cases because there is no match 
in the control group.
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whereas American women do not. Thus, there is some weak support for 
Hypothesis S.1, which states that women anticipate their partners’ displace-
ments in West Germany. In the United States, on the other hand, Hypothesis 
S.1 is not supported. A tentative explanation for this cross-national differ-
ence is that the German labor market is much more segregated into stable 
and unstable positions. For example, public servants have a much lower 
probability of job loss than people not working in the public sector. In the 
United States, on the other hand, almost all jobs are unstable to a certain 
extent, because there is little employment protection. Therefore, it is easier 
for German women to tell if their partner holds a risky job.
In Figure 7.2, I further disaggregated the analysis of women’s work 
hours prior to partner’s unemployment by quartiles of post-government 
household income. The results show that women’s labor force participation 
differs markedly between the quartiles in both countries: In high-income 
households, women work much more hours than in low-income households. 
This is not surprising given that most working age men work full-time and 
Figure 7.2  Work hours among women before partner’s job loss and in matched 
control group by quartiles of post-government household income in 
the United States and Germany
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thus total household income partly depends on the work hours of the second 
earner. The driving force behind this seems to be educational assortative 
mating, which leads to couples where both have high earning potential. 
Hence, Figure 7.2 shows one reason why the family buffering effect is larger 
among high-income households, as depicted in Chapter 6.
Furthermore, Figure 7.2 shows that anticipation of partner’s unemploy-
ment is more likely among high-income households in both countries. In 
the United States, this applies only to the fourth quartile and the difference 
between the two groups is not large. In Germany, on the other hand, I f ind 
higher work hours among those whose partners become unemployed in 
all quartiles except for the f irst. Apparently, men in the f irst quintile in 
Germany who become unemployed face a double disadvantage in terms 
of family income support: they are often the sole income providers and 
their partners work little, regardless of job security. Hence, the poorest 
households in Germany are least prepared for job loss in terms of private 
strategies to buffer the loss.
7.3 Incidence of the AWE
As introduced in Chapter 4, I use Difference-in-Difference (DiD) models 
with a matched control group to estimate the occurrence and magnitude of 
the AWE. As shown above, treatment and control group differ on variables 
that may influence the AWE. Therefore, I apply Coarsened Exact Matching 
(CEM) to increase the comparability of those with and without partner’s job 
losses in my DiD models (Iacus et al. 2012). Table 7.2 lists the used variables 
and respective coarsenings. These variables are also used in the analyses 
to differentiate the added worker effect.
Table 7.3 shows the matched treatment and control groups as well as 
the group with PUE that could not be matched in the two countries. The 
presented statistics for the matched groups are weighted in the same way as 
in the upcoming analyses. Therefore, the percentages in the categories that 
have also been used for matching are similar in the matched samples. The 
continuous variables, on the other hand, differ slightly, because I matched 
on the above mentioned coarsenings. Overall, the coarsenings produced 
reasonable balance on these variables. Furthermore, matching on working 
in the industrial sector also balanced service and public sector employment. 
Even average yearly labor income, on which I did not match, is quite similar 
in the two matched groups.
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Table 7.3 also depicts the number of episodes with PUE that could not 
be matched to the control group because there was no similar case. This 
applies to about 20 per cent of the cases in both countries. The columns 
titled “not matched” in Table 7.3 show descriptive statistics for this group. 
Obviously, this group consists of more extreme cases. For example, women 
with a migration background in Germany and blacks in the United States 
are overrepresented among those without a match. Interestingly, German 
women in the “not matched” group work more on average, whereas Ameri-
can women in this group work less than the matched cases. Clearly, given 
the nation-specif ic female labor force participation rates, both are extreme 
cases in their respective countries.
Table 7.2  Coarsenings of variables used for CEM analyzing the occurrence and 
magnitude of the AWE
Variable Coarsening 
Individual characteristics 
Age 25-40 vs. 41-55 
Education US: Less than High School, High School, Greater than High 
School 
Ger.: School without voc. training, Vocational training, 
Higher education 
Minority US: Black, non-black 
Ger.: Migration background, no migration background 
Prev. weekly work hours 0, <30, >30 
Work experience <50% of time since left school, >50% 
Income share in HH <40%, >40% 
Sector Industrial sector and other 
Partner’s characteristics 
Partner’s age 25-40, 41-55 
Partner’s education US: <High School, High School, College 
Ger.: School w/o voc. training, voc. training, tertiary 
education 
Partner’s tenure in prev. job Below and above 5 years 
Year of partner’s job loss US: 1982-1990, 1991-2006 
Ger.: 1986-1996, 1997-2008 
Household characteristics 
Children under 16 in HH yes, no 
Children under 5 in HH yes, no 
Post-gov. household income Above and below median 
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To test the incidence of the added worker effect, I estimate DiD linear prob-
ability models with cluster robust standard errors.40 Thus, the estimated 
coeff icients show the difference in probabilities that the AWE occurs 
between the group with partner’s unemployment and the group without. 
The estimates are controlled for the incidence of individual job loss and 
changes in the number of children below age f ive. This is done to control 
for possible changes within women’s life courses that may influence their 
work hours.
Cross-national comparison
Figure 7.3 depicts the baseline results for the incidence of increases in 
women’s work hours in the year of their partners’ job losses or two years 
afterward. The magnitude of the effect can be read from the position of the 
triangles on the x-axis. The y-axis separates the effects in the two countries. 
The lines around the triangles represent the 90 per cent confidence intervals 
of the estimates. If the confidence intervals do not cross zero, the effect is 
statistically signif icant on the ten 10 per cent level.
The interpretation of the effects depicted in Figure 7.3 is as follows: In 
the United States, the probability that a woman increases her work hours 
because of her partner’s unemployment is about 14 percentage points 
higher than in the matched control group. Thus, partner’s unemployment 
causes a signif icant increase in the probability that women increase 
their work hours in the United States. In West Germany, by contrast, the 
incidence of the AWE is much less frequent: Partner’s unemployment 
leads to half a percentage point increase in the probability of an increase 
in work hours. Yet, the effect is not signif icantly different from zero. 
Note that the large standard errors in West Germany also result from 
the lower sample size (see Table 7.3). This result supports Hypothesis S.8, 
which states that the added worker effect should occur more often in the 
United States than in Germany. The reason for this is, presumably, the 
country-specif ic mix of low unemployment benef its, a tax system that 
supports the emergence of dual-earner households, higher acceptance 
of employed women, and the high-turnover labor market in the United 
States.
40 Standard errors are clustered on the individual level because I have several observations 
per person within an episode, and often several episodes within one individual.
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A closer look at the data that I do not present here reveals that the results 
depend strongly on the behavior of the control group. West German women 
do increase their work hours after their partners become unemployed: about 
44 per cent increase paid work by at least one hour per week. Yet, in the 
matched control group, about 43 per cent also work more hours than before. 
Thus, an increase in hours is a fairly common behavior among German 
women with the characteristics depicted above. Partner’s unemployment 
does not lead to an increase that goes much beyond this trend. Thus, the DiD 
estimate is small and non-significant in West Germany. In the United States, 
on the other hand, 64 per cent of the women who experience partner’s 
unemployment increase their work hours, compared to 50 per cent in the 
matched control group. This comparison illustrates the merits of the DiD 
approach: It depicts changes that are due to an event and go beyond com-
mon trends. Further robustness checks also confirm that the trends in work 
hours are similar in the two groups even before partner’s unemployment. 
Thus, the common trends assumption needed for a valid DiD design holds. 
In the following I only present the DiD estimates.
Figure 7.3  Estimated probability of the AWE among women in the United States 
and West Germany
 Western Germany
 United States
−.06 −.04 −.02 0 .02 .04 .06 .08 .1 .12 .14 .16 .18
Estimated effect
Error bars show the 90 per cent condence interval.
Sources: GSOEP, PSID, and CNEF, author’s calculations
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These considerations also explain why other researchers f ind an added 
worker effect in Germany while I do not. Previous studies by McGinnity 
(2002) or Prieto-Rodríguez and Rodríguez-Gutiérrez (2003) did not use a DiD 
design to control for trends among women who did not experience partner’s 
unemployment. Therefore, the effects they report cannot be ascribed to 
partner’s job loss. Instead, my results suggest that they report the effects of 
trends in female employment within life courses that occur independent of 
their partners’ job losses. Yet, McGinnity (2002) only included women who 
are not active on the labor market before their partner’s unemployment. To 
test whether previous work hours are important, I disaggregate the AWE 
in the following analysis.
Labor market influences
Figure 7.4 shows that women’s labor market integration two years before 
partner’s unemployment inf luences the occurrence of the AWE in the 
United States but not in West Germany. In the United States, an increase 
in hours is most likely if women have been inactive on the labor market 
two years earlier. Thus, the expectation expressed in Hypothesis S.2, that 
hours constraints among those who already work inhibit an increase in 
work hours, is supported in the United States. In West Germany, on the 
other hand, the estimates do not differ much and none of the coeff icients 
are signif icantly different from zero. Consequently, hours constraints 
do not seem to be of importance for the occurrence of the AWE in West 
Germany.
The analysis of the occurrence of the AWE separated by previous work 
hours also reveals that women in the United States are able to increase their 
hours, even if they are currently working. This confirms Hypothesis S.2a, 
which states that the high-turnover labor market in the United States offers 
opportunities to change jobs and thereby circumvent hours constraints 
in the current job. Interestingly, full-time working women increase their 
work hours more frequently than part-time working women. This suggests 
a positive influence of the modernity of the couple on the AWE. I return 
to this point later when I analyze the impact of different intra-couple 
arrangements.
In Figure 7.5, I further disaggregated the effects among women with 
different prior labor force attachment by education. In the f igure, triangles 
now represent the effects for the lowest education group, circles the medium 
group, and squares the highest group. I use the educational categories shown 
in Table 7.2. Overall, my expectation formulated in Hypothesis S.3, that 
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higher education generally leads to a higher occurrence of the AWE, is 
not supported. Such a connection exists only among women who are not 
employed. Women who already work, however, show a different pattern. 
Consequently, there is also no general trend toward a steeper educational 
gradient in Germany. Thus, Hypothesis S.3a, which stated such a relation-
ship, has to be rejected. I now take a closer look at the only group where 
such a pattern exists: women who are inactive on the labor market prior 
to their partners’ displacements.
Among women who are not employed prior to their partners’ unemploy-
ment there is a positive relationship between education and the occurrence 
of the AWE in both countries. Low-educated women who are not employed 
are less likely to increase their hours to compensate job loss in their house-
hold. This difference between the educational groups is slightly higher in 
West Germany. This supports Hypothesis S.5, which states that education 
should play a lesser role in the United States among inactive women because 
there are a large number of entry-level jobs for them and credentials are 
less important. Yet, the pattern in West Germany is not as expected: The 
Figure 7.4  Estimated probability of the AWE among women by previous work 
hours in the United States and West Germany
 Full−time > 30h/wk.
 Part−time  30h/wk.
 Not working
 Full−time > 30h/wk.
 Part−time  30h/wk.
 Not working
United States
Western Germany
−.1 −.05 0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25 .3
Estimated effect
Error bars show the 90 per cent condence interval.
Sources: GSOEP, PSID, and CNEF, author’s calculations
206 THE IMPAC T OF LOSING YOUR JOB 
largest difference is between vocational training and university and not 
between those without a degree and the rest, as Hypothesis S.4 would 
have suggested. Still, women with vocational training are slightly (but not 
signif icantly) more likely to increase their work hours. Hence, Hypothesis 
S.4, which states that vocational training should especially increase the 
occurrence of the AWE among inactive women because it preserves their 
employability, is only partly supported. Vocational degrees seem to be 
important but higher education degrees seem to boost the occurrence of 
the AWE much more.
Interestingly, among full-time working women in both countries, the 
effect of education is reversed: The incidence of the AWE is higher among 
the low-skilled. This may be interpreted as a result of hours constraints 
in jobs: Increasing hours is often only possible through changing jobs. 
Low-skilled workers usually remain in entry level positions and a move 
to a job with higher hours is possible without forfeiting promotions on 
Figure 7.5  Estimated probability of the AWE among women by previous work 
hours and education in the United States and West Germany
 Full−time > 30h/wk.
 Part−time  30h/wk.
 Not working
 Full−time > 30h/wk.
 Part−time  30h/wk.
 Not working
United States
Western Germany
−.3 −.1 .1 .3 .5 .7
Estimated effect
Low Edu Med. Edu
High Edu 90% Confidence Interval
Error bars show the 90 per cent condence interval.
Sources: GSOEP, PSID, and CNEF, author’s calculations
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the internal job ladder. For high-skilled women, on the other hand, job 
changes presumably do not lead to higher wages because they more often 
already climbed higher in the internal hierarchy. Unlike inactive and 
full-time working women, the results for part-time working women are 
inconclusive. There is a common pattern in both countries that medium 
education is connected to the highest occurrence of the AWE. Still, there 
are also outliers in both countries that are diff icult to explain. Clearly, 
the group of part-time working women is very diverse in both countries 
because they contain both marginally employed women and women who 
work nearly full-time.
Overall, the results in Figure 7.5 provide some evidence in support 
of the notion that differences in the labor market structure between 
the United States and Germany, namely the prevalence of OLMs and 
ILMs, shape the effects of education on the occurrence of the AWE. 
However, this is restricted to non-employed women. In Germany, high 
education seems to be an important asset for inactive women, allowing 
them to increase their hours after partners’ job losses. In the United 
States, on the other hand, the lower importance of credentials seems 
to level educational differences in the occurrence of the AWE among 
inactive women. If women are already working, however, the effects of 
hours constraints and achieved job positions seem to be stronger than 
the effects of education.
Household and welfare state influences
Next, I turn to the influence of the inner-couple structure on the occurrence 
of the AWE. First, in Figure 7.6, I examine the effects of having children 
under 16 in the household. The analyses are therefore comparable to those 
about income losses in different household types presented in the previous 
chapter. There, I found that family income support after men’s job losses 
is stronger among couples without children in the household. The results 
in Figure 7.6, however, depict that the AWE occurs more often in couples 
without children than in couples with children. This is more pronounced 
in the United States. Consequently, high family income support among 
couples without children, depicted in Chapter 6, is not due to a high oc-
currence of the AWE, but rather due to a partner’s high previous labor 
force attachment.
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Figure 7.6  Estimated probability of the AWE among women with and without 
children under 16 in the household in the United States and West 
Germany. Error bars show the 90 per cent condence interval
 Children <16 in HH
 No Children <16 in HH
 Children <16 in HH
 No Children <16 in HH
United States
Western Germany
−.1 −.05 0 .05 .1 .15 .2
Estimated effect
Sources: GSOEP, PSID, and CNEF, author’s calculations
The strong difference between couples with and without children in the 
United States in Figure 7.6 appears somewhat unexpectedly. There are 
two possible explanations that may also have a combined effect: First, 
households with children have higher need than those without and, conse-
quently, have to buffer more of the lost income to maintain their standard 
of living. Second, mothers often work fewer hours than women without 
children and therefore have greater possibilities to increase employment. 
In the following, I explore this further by focusing on the AWE among 
mothers only.
Figure 7.7 presents evidence that high previous work hours do not 
prevent American mothers from increasing their hours. Apparently, 
modern, double full-time couples with children are most likely to have 
the AWE in the United States. This conf irms Hypothesis S.7 for the United 
States: Apparently, women in couples that are less affected by traditional 
gender role expectations and have experience in sharing paid and unpaid 
work are more likely to increase their work hours after their partners 
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become unemployed. In West Germany, on the other hand, the pattern 
is reversed: Non-working mothers are more likely to increase their hours 
after men’s job losses. Yet, the differences are small and the conf idence 
intervals are large. Therefore, being in a modern couple does not affect 
the incidence of the AWE in West Germany. However, this is not a proof 
that traditional gender role expectations have less influence on the AWE 
in West Germany, since the effect among non-working mothers is also 
small and non-signif icant.
Interestingly, the effect of already being employed does not seem to 
influence part-time employed American women in the same way. Among 
them, the incidence of the AWE is lowest. This may be caused by the stronger 
prevalence of traditional gender norms in these so called 1.5-earner couples. 
Here, women are often more (if not completely) responsible for domestic 
work (Stier and Lewin-Epstein 2000). Apparently, in these couples, an in-
crease of women’s hours, which may even make the wife the main earner, is 
Figure 7.7  Estimated probability of the AWE among women with children under 
16 in the household by previous work hours in the United States and 
West Germany
 Full−time > 30h/wk.
 Part−time  30h/wk.
 Not working
 Full−time > 30h/wk.
 Part−time  30h/wk.
 Not working
United States
Western Germany
−.2 −.15 −.1 −.05 0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25 .3 .35
Estimated effect
Couples with children < 16
Error bars show the 90 per cent condence interval.
Sources: GSOEP, PSID, and CNEF, author’s calculations
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not desired. Inactive women with children in the United States even show 
a higher effect than part-time working women. This may partly be caused 
by the low barrier to labor market re-entry on the American labor market. 
Also, these couples are presumably in higher need of additional income 
than those where women already work.
My theoretical considerations also suggest that institutional factors 
shape the occurrence of the AWE in couples with children. Besides the 
already mentioned effects of labor market structure and the welfare state, 
I expect that the availability of childcare increases the occurrence of the 
AWE. To test this, I include East Germany in the analyses where childcare is 
widely available and employed mothers are more common.41 The results in 
Figure 7.8 do not support Hypothesis S.9, which states that the occurrence 
of the AWE is highest in East Germany. Instead, the estimated effect in 
East Germany is even slightly lower than in West Germany. The reasons 
41 Descriptive statistics for the East German sample are in Table A.4 in the Appendix.
Figure 7.8  Estimated probability of the AWE among women with children under 
16 in the household in the United States, West Germany, and East 
Germany
 Eastern Germany
 Western Germany
 United States
−.1 −.05 0 .05 .1 .15 .2
Estimated effect
Couples with children < 16
Error bars show the 90 per cent condence interval.
Sources: GSOEP, PSID, and CNEF, author’s calculations
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for this are unclear. Maybe the unfavorable situation on the East German 
labor market, with persistently high levels of unemployment, decreased 
the chances of East German women increasing their hours. Another pos-
sible interpretation is that availability of childcare is less important for the 
occurrence of the AWE. Instead, differences in the welfare state and labor 
market institutions are of greater importance, as the comparison to the 
United States shows.
Finally, I explore the question of how the AWE is distributed among the 
social strata. Figure 7.9 depicts that the difference in the occurrence of the 
AWE between households above and below the median post-government 
household income is not large in both countries. In Germany, there is a 
slight tendency toward a higher incidence in the upper strata. This supports 
Hypothesis S.8a, which states that means-tested benefits for the long-term 
unemployed, which some low-income households receive directly after job 
loss, have a disincentive effect on the AWE. Yet, given the large standard 
errors, the difference does not seem to be substantial. Clearly, the effect 
described in Hypothesis S.8a should only affect the lowest income groups 
and not all households below the median. Unfortunately, the small number 
of cases inhibits a further analysis of this effect. In the United States, the 
incidence of the AWE is also slightly larger in more affluent households. 
Overall, these results suggest that the incidence of the AWE does not affect 
the inequality of income trajectories much. Instead, it is likely that the 
previous earner arrangement, which I depicted in the previous section, 
is more important for family income support among men who become 
unemployed. Yet, the analysis so far has only considered increases in work 
hours. Whether the AWE really influences household incomes can only be 
ascertained by considering changes in earnings. I explore this aspect in 
the following section.
7.4 Magnitude of the AWE
To assess the magnitude of the AWE, I now analyze changes in women’s 
labor earnings after their partners’ unemployment. As described above, I 
consider changes in women’s wages as a percentage of prior pre-government 
household income. This enables me to compare the magnitude of the AWE 
with the effect of men’s job losses on pre-government household income, 
depicted in the previous chapter. In doing so, I am able to show which part 
of the family income buffer, as introduced in the previous chapter, is due 
to the AWE. This is possible because the estimated changes in women’s 
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earnings calculated as percentages of prior pre-government household 
income can be interpreted as buffering effects. As in the other analyses, I 
present difference-in-difference estimates of these relative changes. Thus, 
the estimates in the following are differences in changes between the group 
with partner’s unemployment and the group without.
Given the f inding in the previous section that the occurrence of the 
AWE is unlikely in West Germany, Figure 7.10 yields a surprising result: the 
effect of partner’s unemployment on women’s earnings is positive in West 
Germany. Moreover, it is even slightly greater than in the United States. 
That said, the confidence interval around the effect in Germany is large, 
indicating a huge amount of uncertainty. Yet, also in the United States, 
the effect is not statistically signif icant. Therefore, this is evidence against 
Hypothesis S.8, which states that the AWE also has a greater magnitude in 
the United States compared to West Germany. Apparently, fewer German 
women increase their hours after their partner’s job loss, but if they do, 
Figure 7.9  Estimated probability of the AWE among women above and below the 
median of prior adjusted post-government household income in the 
United States and West Germany
 Above Median HH Inc.
 Below Median HH Inc.
 Above Median HH Inc.
 Below Median HH Inc.
United States
Western Germany
−.1 −.05 0 .05 .1 .15 .2
Estimated effect
Error bars show the 90 per cent condence interval
Sources: GSOEP, PSID, and CNEF, author’s calculations
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they are able to add more to household income on average than American 
women. On the other hand, American women add little to household in-
come despite high commitment after their partner’s job loss. This is partly 
accounted for by different overall trends in earnings in the two countries 
among women, which I have already described in the previous chapter. In 
the United States, earnings grow much stronger on average than in West 
Germany in the period of observation. Thus, for American women, it is much 
harder to increase their earnings beyond this trend. This has consequences 
for economic well-being relative to other households. In the United States, 
where everybody has growing income, stagnation implies relative losses. 
The results in the United States thus mirror the diff iculties households 
face in keeping up with others’ incomes after job loss. In Germany, on the 
other hand, income growth among women without partner’s job loss is less 
pronounced. Consequently, it is easier for women to increase their earnings 
relative to others.
Figure 7.10  Estimated eect on earnings among women due to partner’s 
unemployment as percentage of prior pre-government household 
income in the United States and West Germany
 Western Germany
 United States
−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Estimated differences (% points)
Error bars show the 90 per cent condence interval
Sources: GSOEP, PSID, and CNEF, author’s calculations
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Still, both estimates in Figure 7.10 are small and not significantly different 
from zero. Leaving aside confidence intervals, American women are able 
to make up for about two percentage points of former pre-government 
household income. In West Germany, women increase their earnings by 
3.5 percentage points of pre-government household income on average. 
Compared to losses of about 20 percentage points of former pre-government 
household income in the United States and 25 percentage points in West 
Germany, as depicted in the previous chapter, this analysis shows that 
women are a long way from offsetting men’s losses in earnings through the 
AWE. This confirms Hypothesis S.6, which states that gender segregation 
on the labor market prevents a complete substitution of men’s earnings 
through women’s earnings after job loss. Clearly, this is often not necessary, 
because men’s losses are also buffered by unemployment benef its and 
re-employment. Still, the low estimates suggest that a complete substitution 
would not be possible even if it was necessary.
To learn more about the magnitude of the AWE in different household 
types, I graph the results separately by the presence of children under 16 in 
Figure 7.11. In the United States, I f ind the same pattern as for the occurrence 
of the AWE: an increase in income on the part of women after men’s job 
losses occurs only in couples with children. Among them, women are able 
to increase their earnings by more than two per cent. In couples without 
children, however, women’s incomes even decrease on average after men’s 
job losses. Apparently, there are different processes at work in the latter 
group. Several tentative explanations are possible. It could be, for example, 
that in some couples, both lose their jobs simultaneously because of local 
labor market circumstances. Unfortunately, no regional information below 
the state level is available in the United States. Also, if the displacement was 
because of health reasons, the reduction among women could be because of 
care responsibilities. Another explanation could be that some couples move 
away after men’s job losses and some of the losses in earnings may originate 
from women’s resulting job changes. Further analyses, not presented here, 
show some evidence in favor of the latter explanation.
In West Germany, by contrast, Figure 7.11 shows the opposite pattern: 
the magnitude of the AWE is larger among women in couple households 
without children under 16. Thus, the higher magnitude of the AWE in West 
Germany compared to the United States, depicted in Figure 7.10 above, is 
driven by couples without children. The higher magnitude of the AWE 
among German women without children is diff icult to explain. One tenta-
tive explanation could be that a number of these women stayed at home 
after their children moved out and now have the capacity to increase their 
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income as their partners become unemployed. In this case, the prevalent 
gender role expectations about “good mothers who stay at home” do not 
restrain these women (anymore) and thus they can increase their earn-
ings. This may also explain the huge difference between couples without 
children in the United States and Germany: In the American case, much 
fewer women become housewives after childbirth and stay in this role. In 
addition, residential mobility in Germany is much lower than in the United 
States, thus inhibiting wage losses among women that occur after moving 
away (Sánchez and Andrews 2011).
The comparison between the magnitude of the AWE in couples with 
children between the United States and Germany in Figure 7.11 provides 
further evidence of the importance of gender norms for women’s employ-
ment after men’s job losses. American women with children provide 
slightly more income after their partner’s job loss than German women. 
This happens despite the diff iculties they face in increasing their earnings 
Figure 7.11  Estimated eect on earnings among women due to partner’s 
unemployment as percentage of prior pre-government household 
income by presence of children <16 in the United States and West 
Germany
 Children <16 in HH
 No Children <16 in HH
 Children <16 in HH
 No Children <16 in HH
United States
Western Germany
−8 −6 −4 −2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Estimated differences (% points)
Error bars show the 90 per cent condence interval.
Sources: GSOEP, PSID, and CNEF, author’s calculations
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beyond the overall trend, as indicated above. Thus, apparently a substantial 
AWE is possible in Germany, as the results for couples without children 
under 16 depict, but it is hampered by prevailing gender role expecta-
tions that locate mothers in the domestic sphere and men in the sphere 
of employment. Even as men are temporarily unable to fulf ill the role as 
the main provider of income after job loss, gender roles remain largely 
stable in West Germany.
Compared to the family income buffers presented in the previous 
chapter, the analyses in this chapter reveal the importance of the AWE 
in family income support after men’s job losses. In West Germany, total 
family income buffering after job loss amounts to about ten percentage 
points among men in couples with children and about 20 percentage points 
among men in couples without children (see Figure 6.6 in the previous 
chapter). As mentioned in the previous chapter, the family income buffer 
measures the difference between the losses in individual earnings and 
in pre-government household income after job loss. Thus, I can directly 
compare my measure of the magnitude of the AWE, which is measured as 
a percentage of prior pre-government household income, with the buffering 
effect. If German women in couples with children increase their earnings 
by about three percentage points of pre-government household income, 
this reduces their partners’ losses by three percentage points. The three 
percentage points are thus a part of the ten percentage point family buffer. 
Thus, the share of the AWE in total family income buffering among couples 
with children is 30 per cent. Likewise, among German couples without 
children, the increase in incomes on the part of women after men’s job 
losses reduce partner’s losses by about f ive percentage points, which is 
about 25 per cent of the total family buffer. Thus, in West German couples 
with children, the AWE is more important for total buffering through the 
family. In the United States, the family buffer after men’s job losses among 
couples with children is about six percentage points and among couples 
without children about 13 percentage points (see Figure 6.6 in the previous 
chapter). The AWE in couples with children decreases men’s losses by about 
four percentage points and therefore contributes 50 per cent of total income 
buffering through the family. Among couples without children, on the other 
hand, the negative effect suggests that trends in women’s earnings even 
reduce the family income buffer.
Thus, the analyses reveal that the composition of the family buffer is 
different in the two countries. In West Germany, existing second incomes 
in a household with children are more important for the family buffer than 
the AWE, whereas in the United States the AWE and existing incomes are 
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equally important. In both countries, the AWE is more important within 
the family buffer among women with children. This f its with the idea that 
mothers have greater possibilities of increasing their income, because 
they work fewer hours on average than women without children in the 
household. Also, the need for the household to increase incomes is higher 
in households with children, because there are more dependents and men’s 
lost jobs are often the main income source.
To analyze the magnitude of the AWE among women with children 
under 16 in the household more closely, I now show the effects separated 
by previous work hours in Figure 7.12. The results in the United States 
show that modern households have the greatest income gain through the 
AWE. This again supports Hypothesis S.7, which states that modern norms 
about gender roles should facilitate the AWE, because they allow couples 
to switch the main earner. Interestingly, I now also f ind high effects for 
part-time working women but no effects among inactive women. This may 
be because being on the labor market opens up chances for wage increases. 
The high incidences of the AWE among inactive mothers in the United 
States, depicted in the previous section, apparently do not pay off. This 
may be due to very low wages in the entry level jobs they obtain. In West 
Germany, on the other hand, dual full-time couples with children do not 
have high wage gains. However, their number is small in West Germany. 
The more common dual-earner arrangement, the 1.5-earner family, has a 
little higher wage gain than male breadwinner households. Still, the dif-
ference is not large, suggesting a smaller influence of household structure 
in West Germany. That said, it may be that women in couples with more 
modern values still leave their jobs after childbirth in West Germany, 
because the possibilities for them to keep their jobs and care for children 
are scarce. Maybe some of those take up a job again after their partner’s 
job losses.
Finally, I examine differences in income gains through the AWE among 
social strata. The results in Figure 7.13 suggest that these are higher in high-
income households in both countries. Given the higher previous incomes 
among men in the upper parts of the household income distribution, the 
difference in absolute terms is even higher because one percent of high 
earnings is more than one percent of low earnings. The lower income gains 
in households below the median in West Germany is supporting evidence in 
favor of Hypothesis S.8a. Presumably, the means tested benefits (“Arbeits-
losengeld II”) that some low-income households receive immediately after 
job loss have disincentive effects with regard to the AWE in Germany. As in 
the analysis of the incidence of the AWE, however, the difference is small 
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and further analyses would be needed that focus entirely on the lowest 
quartile. This, however, is not possible given the already small number of 
cases.
Thus, both components of the family buffer after men’s job losses – the 
AWE and women’s previous earnings – are larger in high-income house-
holds in both countries. Thus, the unequal distribution of family income 
support among men, depicted in the previous chapter, emerges from 
both existing incomes and the AWE in the United States and Germany. 
The analyses in the previous chapter yielded a family buffer of about 
f ive percentage points in households below the median and about ten 
percentage points above the median in the United States (see Figure 6.9 
in the previous chapter). Compared to the values in Figure 7.13, this leads 
to a share of the AWE of one third both above and below the median 
in the United States. In West Germany, the family buffer is about ten 
percentage points below and 15 percentage points above the median. This 
Figure 7.12  Estimated eect on earnings among women with children under 16 in 
the household due to partner’s unemployment as percentage of prior 
pre-government household income by previous work hours in the 
United States and West Germany
 Full time
 Part time
 Not working
 Full time
 Part time
 Not working
United States
Western Germany
−5−4−3−2−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415
Estimated differences (% points)
Couples with children < 16
Error bars show the 90 per cent condence interval
Sources: GSOEP, PSID, and CNEF, author’s calculations
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implies that the AWE is more important among low-income households 
where it accounts for about 35 per cent, compared to 25 per cent in high-
income households. Thus, low-income households in West Germany can 
somewhat ameliorate the lower prevalence of second incomes through 
the AWE.
7.5 Summary: The added worker effect in linked life courses
In this chapter, I analyzed the family income buffer after men’s job losses 
in greater detail. I considered two paths through which the partner of 
an unemployed man may stabilize household income. The f irst path is 
providing additional earnings before partner’s job loss, i.e. forming a dual-
earner couple. The second path is increasing work hours and earnings after 
Figure 7.13  Estimated eect on earnings among women due to partner’s 
unemployment as percentage of prior pre-government household 
income above and below the median of prior adjusted post-
government household income in the United States and West 
Germany
 Above HH Inc. Median
 Below HH Inc. Median
 Above HH Inc. Median
 Below HH Inc. Median
United States
Germany
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Estimated differences (% points)
Error bars show the 90 per cent condence interval.
Sources: GSOEP, PSID, and CNEF, author’s calculations
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partner’s job loss. The latter path is known as the “added worker effect” 
(AWE). The analysis served two aims: f irst, to analyze the embeddedness 
of the added worker effect after men’s job losses in (linked) life courses; 
and second, to gauge the impact and the relative importance of these two 
paths of income buffering through the family. In the following, I discuss the 
results generated in this chapter in the light of the life course perspective.
Building on the life course perspective, I identif ied influences on the 
added worker effect on three levels: the individual, the household, and 
the state, all of which are connected. Among these levels, influences on 
the household level have often been overlooked in previous analyses of 
private income buffering strategies. This is surprising given that these 
strategies originate from within the household. I argue that the structure 
of the household has important effects on how women’s incomes buffer 
men’s income losses after job loss. Previous analyses show that women’s 
employment behavior is strongly affected by the household context while 
men’s employment behavior is not (Blossfeld and Drobnič 2001a). This is 
because women in most couples undertake more of the domestic duties, 
like childcare, than men, even if they are employed (Shelton 1990). Thus, 
women have to reconcile the sphere of employment and the sphere of the 
family in their life courses whereas men are less constrained by the sphere 
of the family in their employment behavior. The origin of these household 
arrangements is usually ascribed to traditional gender role expectations 
that regard women as responsible for domestic work and men as responsible 
for market work. These considerations suggest that the AWE should be in-
fluenced by the household context: the more a household follows traditional 
gender roles, the less likely the AWE is if the roles are stable. It is of special 
interest to study the AWE in households that adhere to traditional gender 
roles, because when men lose their jobs the legitimation of their roles as 
“breadwinners” is taken away.
My analyses found evidence in favor of the hypothesis that household 
structure influences the AWE. Yet, this influence is mediated by individual 
and institutional factors. In the United States, the influence of the couple 
context is strong: modern dual-earner couples with children both have 
higher incidences of the AWE and higher income gains through the AWE 
than traditional male-breadwinner households. This supports my expecta-
tion that couples who are experienced in jointly combining work and family 
have a higher AWE because it is easier for them to switch earner roles. In 
male-breadwinner households, on the other hand, a change in roles between 
the former breadwinner and the homemaker is presumably inhibited by 
gender norms.
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In West Germany, institutional differences and the higher prevalence of 
traditional gender role expectations presumably lead to different patterns. 
The data suggests that the AWE is strongest in couples without children in 
West Germany. I interpret this as the result of strong gender role expecta-
tions if there are children in the household: Mothers who do not stay at home 
with young children are often regarded as “bad mothers” in West Germany. 
Couples without children, on the other hand, are not restricted by this 
normative pressure. In contrast, among mothers, I found a slight positive 
effect of already working part-time on the AWE compared to non-working 
mothers. This may also be interpreted as an effect of modern gender roles 
in the household. Yet, full-time working mothers do not show the same 
effect. It has to be kept in mind, however, that full-time working mothers 
are rare in West Germany because of normative pressures, a tax system 
that favors 1.5-earner families, and the lack of childcare facilities. Thus, in 
comparison with the United States, it is less the earner configuration that 
drives the results and more the presence of children: Mothers always have 
a lower AWE than women without children in West Germany. One possible 
interpretation of this f inding is that a couple’s adherence to modern gender 
roles cannot be interpreted from the earner configuration in West Germany, 
because the institutional circumstances generate high incentives for women 
to be inactive on the labor market, even though the couple has a modern 
approach to sharing paid and unpaid work.
Beyond the reported variance of the AWE on the household level, I 
found further differences between individuals as well as between the two 
country cases. Firstly, I found that women in West Germany, unlike their 
American counterparts, do not increase work hours after their partner’s 
job losses. In terms of increases in earnings, however, they even surpass 
American women. Apparently, it is easier in Germany to increase earn-
ings without increasing hours. A tentative explanation could be that job 
changes to higher paid jobs are easier in West Germany than in the United 
States. Maybe occupational labor markets in Germany offer this possibility. 
Another possible explanation is that overall wage growth in the United 
States is higher, which makes it more diff icult for women to increase their 
earnings beyond this trend.
Despite lower increases in earnings in the United States, the estimates 
of the incidence and the magnitude of the AWE are more often statistically 
signif icant or closer to statistical signif icance than in West Germany. This 
conf irms my expectation that the AWE is a more common phenomenon 
in the United States than in West Germany. There are several reasons for 
this that cannot easily be disentangled in a two-country comparison. First, 
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the labor market in the United States provides more job offers, which are 
obviously needed for the AWE to occur. Second, welfare state benef its are 
lower in the United States, which increases the need for the AWE. Third, 
the normative acceptance of working mothers is higher in the United 
States. The strong influence of the third factor is visible in the difference 
Table 7.4  Summary of hypotheses and results about household strategies to 
buer job loss
Hypothesis Result 
S.1 Women increase their incomes before 
partner’s job loss 
Conrmed in West Germany, not 
conrmed in the United States 
S.2 The AWE is most likely among women 
who are inactive on the labor market 
Conrmed in the United States, not 
conrmed in West Germany 
S.2a The AWE should occur more often in 
the United States than in West Germany 
among those who already work 
Conrmed 
S.3 High education should lead to high 
incidence of the AWE 
Not conrmed, only among inactive 
S.3a The positive educational gradient in the 
occurrence of the AWE is steeper in West 
Germany than in the United States 
Not conrmed, only among inactive 
S.4 Among inactive women in Germany, 
the occurrence of the added worker 
eect is higher for those with at least a 
vocational training degree compared to 
less educated women 
Conrmed, but weak evidence 
S.5 The occurrence of the AWE among 
low-skilled women who are inactive on 
the labor market does not dier much 
from high-skilled inactive women 
Conrmed 
S.6 The income gain through the AWE is 
lower on average than men’s losses due 
to job loss 
Conrmed 
S.7 The AWE is more likely in modern 
couples than in traditional couples 
Conrmed in the United States, not 
conrmed in West Germany 
S.8 The AWE occurs more often and with 
greater magnitude among women in 
the United States than in Germany 
Conrmed for occurrence, not 
conrmed for magnitude 
S.8a In West Germany, low-income 
households have a lower AWE than 
high-income households 
Conrmed, but weak evidence 
S.9 The AWE among couples with 
children should occur most often in East 
Germany followed by the United States 
and West Germany 
Not conrmed 
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between couples with and without children in West Germany, as reported 
above.
The impact of labor market structure becomes visible in the analysis of 
the influence of education. In the United States, non-employed women have 
high incidences of the AWE almost regardless of education. Hence, there 
is a high number of job opportunities for re-entrants to the labor market. 
In West Germany, on the other hand, only women with a vocational or 
university degree are able to increase their hours after partner’s job loss. 
This evidence supports the idea that the American labor market structure 
seems to promote the occurrence of the AWE. Among women who are 
already working, however, I could not f ind the same effects of education. 
Apparently, their possibilities to increase hours are mainly influenced by 
the characteristics of the jobs they hold.
In sum, the AWE is a much more complex phenomenon than suggested by 
previous analyses, which assumed a simple connection between men’s job 
losses and women’s work hours or earnings. Individual level characteristics 
like employment and education interact with couple and country level 
influences in shaping this income buffering strategy. These f indings are 
not only interesting for analysts of income mobility, but also yield insights 
into the mutual influence of life courses within couples. There seem to 
be couples with a higher f lexibility of roles in the household than oth-
ers. Especially if they pursue already dual-earner arrangements, couples 
seem to be willing to assign the role of the main earner to women. In more 
traditional households, on the other hand, this does not seem to be possible. 
Clearly, my analyses presented here only scratch the surface of these issues 
and further analyses that include values and detailed information about 
domestic work are needed to prove my point. Unfortunately, my data does 
not provide such information. Therefore, future research should address 
this topic in greater detail.
Beyond these insights about the embeddedness of the AWE in the life 
course, the analyses also showed that the AWE has a considerable impact on 
household income after job loss. In West Germany, the AWE accounts for 20 
to 30 per cent of the family income buffer after men’s job losses. In the United 
States, the AWE adds nothing to the family buffer among couples without 
children but accounts for about one half of family income support among 
couples with children. Thus, women’s existing incomes in the household are 
more important for the buffering of income losses through men’s unemploy-
ment in West Germany and among American couples without children.
Higher family buffers in the upper half of the household income distribu-
tion seem to be connected to earner configurations in households. In the 
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United States, dual-earner households with children profit most from the 
AWE. In West Germany, couples without children have the highest income 
gains after partner’s job loss. This is the group in West Germany that is most 
likely to be a dual-earner couple, since couples with children have difficulties 
establishing such an earner configuration given low institutional support 
and normative barriers. Also, in both countries, dual-earner couples are likely 
to be in the upper part of the household income distribution before men’s job 
losses. Besides educational homogamy, which leads to couples where both 
have high earning potential, modern gender roles seem to be of importance 
here. Households that do not adhere to the traditional segregation of paid and 
unpaid work between men and women are better off before and after job loss.
Thus, the growth in the number of dual-earner couples experienced over 
the recent years and the accompanying change in gender role expectations 
smooth couples’ income trajectories. Yet, as mentioned before, it also makes 
the couple vulnerable to women’s job losses. Maybe this leads to an AWE 
among men after their full-time working partners lose their jobs. It is beyond 
the scope of this study to analyze this. Also, the number of cases where 
women in dual full-time couples lose their jobs is very small, especially in 
West Germany. Yet, as mentioned earlier, especially in the United States 
female breadwinner households are growing in numbers (Wang et al. 2013). 
An analysis of men’s behavior after their partner’s job losses in those couples 
would be interesting to learn more about inner couple processes after job 
loss. Do those men take the chance to restore their traditional roles? An 
analysis of time diaries in these households would presumably yield many 
insights into the couple level processes here as well. These questions may 
serve as a starting point for future research. In the following chapter, I sum 
up the f indings of the present study and draw conclusions.
8 Conclusion
This book contributes to the growing literature on economic insecurity 
(Western et al. 2012). This dynamic perspective on inequality provided 
many insights about the stability of positions within the social stratif ica-
tion. Furthermore, this line of research showed how institutional arrange-
ments shape social mobility over the life course (Fritzell 1990; McManus 
and DiPrete 2000). Research on trigger events over the life course proved 
to be an especially fruitful approach to understanding the mechanisms 
through which institutions influence economic insecurity (DiPrete 2002). 
This literature identif ied job loss as one of the main causes of downward 
social mobility (Burkhauser and Duncan 1989; DiPrete and McManus 
2000a; McKernan and Ratcliffe 2005, Brand 2015). However, despite obvi-
ous connections to life course research in this literature – and especially 
“life course regimes” (Mayer 1997, 2001) – scholars often analyzed trigger 
events independent of the life courses they occurred in. I argue that this 
omission limits the insights about economic insecurity that this approach 
can yield. Therefore, I proposed to extend the trigger events framework by 
embedding it into the sociology of the life course. In the present study, I 
analyzed the economic insecurity due to job loss and unemployment in the 
United States and Germany with special focus on group differences that 
follow from the life course perspective. In this concluding chapter, I f irst 
recapitulate the proposed enhancements of the trigger events approach. 
Second, I summarize key f indings from the empirical analyses and show 
the extent to which the extended trigger events approach leads to new 
insights about economic insecurity. Finally, I discuss how my findings relate 
to debates about the increase in economic instability, the diffusion of risks, 
and welfare state policies directed at the unemployed that I sketched in the 
introductory chapter of this study.
The trigger events approach suggests that there are three important 
aspects of economic insecurity due to job loss: f irst, the incidence of job 
loss; second, the economic consequences of job loss and factors that buffer 
the consequences; and third, “counter-mobility strategies” that individuals 
and households pursue to offset the consequences. Previous studies build-
ing on this framework mainly considered institutional influences on the 
three aspects. DiPrete (2002) argues that institutions influence the rate at 
which trigger events occur, for example through employment protection 
legislation. Also, institutions influence the consequences, for example by 
providing welfare state benefits. Furthermore, through the amelioration of 
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the consequences they set incentives for counter-mobility strategies, such 
as re-employment or employment of other household members. However, 
I argued that this perspective is too narrow to fully understand economic 
insecurity due to job loss. Following the comparative literature on welfare 
states, I expected that this phenomenon is jointly influenced by the market, 
the family, and the welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1999; Sainsbury 1999). 
While the focus on institutions captures some market and welfare state 
influences, it misses the influence of the family and the household. Clearly, 
the notion of counter-mobility strategies includes some of the influence 
that families have on economic insecurity, for example through additional 
incomes in a household triggered by job loss. This phenomenon is also 
known as the “added worker effect” (Lundberg 1985). However, to explain 
the occurrence of the added worker effect, the trigger events approach 
reverts to institutional differences again. Yet, I argue that the influence of 
the family is more complex. To include this and to broaden the scope of the 
trigger events approach, I embedded it in the sociology of the life course.
The life course framework offers three heuristics that aid the analysis of 
life courses (Mayer 2004; Huinink and Feldhaus 2009): First, life courses are 
self-referential processes. This suggests that life courses have to be analyzed 
in their entirety, because each state within a life course is influenced by 
previous states. Second, life courses are multilevel processes. This points 
to the different levels in which life courses proceed, for example, families, 
f irms, or countries. Each of these levels has distinct influences on the life 
course. Third, life courses are multidimensional processes because they 
encompass different life domains, such as work and family. Using these 
heuristics, I situated job loss and unemployment within the life course. 
The self-referentiality of the life course suggested the need to consider the 
previous life course up to job loss. The life course as a multilevel process 
helped to structure market, family, and state influences. And f inally, the 
multidimensionality of the life course aided the analysis of family influ-
ences because it pointed to frictions at the interface between work and the 
family that shape the impact of job loss.
To derive theoretical expectations about the inf luence of the family 
and the household on economic insecurity due to job loss, I resorted to 
the large literature about family influences over the life course. The key 
concept in this literature is that life courses are linked within the household 
(Elder 1994; Moen 2003). That is to say, they exert mutual inf luence on 
each other. However, this mutual influence is not symmetrical: men’s life 
courses have different influences on women’s life courses than vice versa. 
Thus, gender is an important dimension in this regard (Krüger and Levy 
CONCLUSION 227
2001). Also there are different levels on which the household influences life 
courses: the external-couple level and the inner-couple level (Rusconi and 
Solga 2008). The external-couple level comprises all factors that shape lives 
because someone is in a couple, such as tax law or role expectations. The 
inner-couple level, on the other hand, includes decision-making processes 
within the household, such as deciding who is employed and who does 
the housework. Although much of the literature on the family and the 
life course mainly deals with couple households, I argue that the same 
categories may also be applied to single adult households. This literature 
showed several channels through which the family influences employment. 
Therefore, I concluded that there are differences in economic insecurity 
due to job loss between household types.
Furthermore, I also considered theories about unemployment dynam-
ics over the life course to ref ine the expectations about the effects of job 
loss on economic well-being. I concluded that it is important to consider 
labor market structure to understand economic insecurity due to job loss. 
Educational systems play an important role in shaping this structure 
by allocating different types of skills and thus def ining nation-specif ic 
pathways of labor market mobility (Marsden 1990). Additionally, there are 
also interactions with social policy (DiPrete et al. 1997; Estevez-Abe et al. 
2001). Welfare state institutions shape the occurrence of job loss through, 
for example, employment protection legislation. They also influence the 
choices available to the unemployed, such as unemployment insurance. 
Because of these factors, unemployment dynamics differ strongly both 
between and within countries (DiPrete et al. 1997; Keys and Danziger 2008; 
Giesecke and Heisig 2010). Especially among the lower strata, the incidence 
and duration of job loss and unemployment proved to be higher in general. 
Therefore, I expected differences between the social strata in economic 
insecurity due to job loss.
Taken together, the theoretical considerations suggested that there are 
differences between individuals, households, and countries in the economic 
insecurity that job loss causes. Going beyond previous research, which 
mainly dealt with cross-national differences, I also expected differences 
between social strata and household types in nation-specif ic patterns. 
These differences surface in all three aspects that the trigger events ap-
proach considers: the incidence of job loss, the consequences of job loss, 
and counter-mobility strategies. By showing the stratif ication of economic 
insecurity, I linked the dynamic with the traditional perspective on social 
stratif ication in this study.
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To measure economic insecurity, I analyzed household panel data from 
the United States (PSID) and Germany (GSOEP). In these data sets, I identi-
f ied involuntary job losses followed by at least one month of unemployment 
to gauge the incidence of job loss. Then, I estimated the consequences by 
looking at relative changes in post-government household income adjusted 
for household size. To uncover the effect of job loss, I used a Difference-
in-Difference design with statistical matching. To assess the capacity of 
welfare state programs and the household in buffering income losses due 
to job loss, I disaggregated post-government household income into its 
sources (DiPrete and McManus 2000a). The impact of the welfare state was 
measured by considering the impact of job loss before and after taxes and 
transfers. Likewise, the family income buffer was measured by comparing 
the impact of job loss on individual labor earnings with the impact on total 
private household income. The last step of analysis took a closer look at the 
family income buffer by analyzing the added worker effect.
8.1 Key findings
In this section, I summarize the main f indings of this study and discuss the 
broader picture of economic insecurity due to job loss that emerges from the 
results. This is followed by a discussion of the signif icance of the f indings 
for current debates about job loss and economic insecurity in the following 
section. The results for Germany apply only to West Germany unless stated 
otherwise. For the sake of brevity, I only use “Germany” in the following.
Generally, the findings about the incidence of job loss and unemployment 
in Chapter 5 confirmed earlier results that already disadvantaged individu-
als are more likely to be affected. This includes, among others, low-skilled 
workers, ethnic minorities, and people with low household income. This 
polarization of employment instability seems to be more pronounced in 
Germany, where it grew even after the 1980s. Re-employment probabilities 
are stratif ied in the same way: Lower strata have higher chances of remain-
ing unemployed than higher strata in both countries.
Yet, beyond these results, I also found differences in the incidence of 
job loss and unemployment between household types. This aspect has not 
received much scholarly attention so far. Single adult households – including 
single parents – face much higher rates of job loss than couple households. 
This was in line with my expectations that men and women in couple 
households should have more stable employment careers than singles. 
Furthermore, male singles and mothers in couple households have lower 
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re-employment probabilities. Thus, the household type a person lives in is 
connected to economic insecurity.
To look into the causes of the connection between household type and 
the occurrence of job loss, I conducted further analyses. The theoretical 
considerations suggested that there are several possible reasons for this 
f inding. First, this may be due to selection into single adult households of 
people who have lower chances on the labor market. Second, singles may 
sort into unstable jobs because of preferences or employer discrimination. 
Third, there may be discrimination in lay-off decisions. The results show 
that all three factors contribute to the higher incidence rate of job loss 
among single adult households. Yet, the importance of the factors differs 
between the type of single adult household and between the two countries. 
Single men without children have the highest probabilities of job loss in 
both countries. This remains even after controlling for job characteristics 
to rule out selection into unstable jobs. Yet, in the United States, this type 
of selection explains a considerable fraction of the difference; this is not 
the case in Germany. Nevertheless, in both countries, single men without 
children are laid off more often than comparable men in couple households 
even after controlling for all of this. One tentative explanation for this 
may be that employers dismiss them more often because they do not have 
to care for a family. Among single women without children, I only f ind 
higher incidences of job loss in the United States. Single mothers, on the 
other hand, differ less from women in couple households once selection 
into these households is controlled for.42 Also, selection into unstable jobs 
appears to be common among them in both countries. Further analyses of 
risk aversion among single men and the importance of work among single 
mothers suggest that the taking of unstable jobs is not due to preferences. 
Instead, singles and single mothers presumably obtain fewer offers for 
stable jobs. An explanation for this could be that they are considered less 
productive, and in the case of single mothers also less flexible, than women 
and men in couple households.
Thus, the analysis of the incidence of job loss and unemployment showed 
that already disadvantaged individuals are more often affected. Conse-
quently, the previous life course clearly influences economic insecurity due 
to job loss. This does not only apply to the previous labor market career. 
Household formation over the life course is also connected to these pro-
cesses. People with precarious careers less often form a family, as previous 
research depicted (Oppenheimer 2003). My results showed that not being in 
42 There are too few single fathers in the data sets to draw conclusions about them.
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a couple household further increases instability because of lowered chances 
of obtaining a stable job and employer discrimination in lay-off decisions. 
The direction of causality is unclear: Do people remain single because of 
the unstable careers or does being single lead to unstable careers? Further 
research should address this issue. However, regardless of the direction 
of causality, singles and single mothers are faced with higher economic 
insecurity than women and men in couple households. This issue is of 
growing importance because both the US and Germany experience an 
unprecedented growth of single adult households (Eckhard 2014; Kreider 
and Elliott 2009)
Chapter 6 showed that income trajectories after job loss differed mark-
edly between the United States and Germany. Among men, Americans have 
higher relative losses in post-government household income than Germans, 
both in the year of job loss and in the subsequent years.43 The results confirm 
earlier f indings by DiPrete and McManus (2000a). Yet, unlike their results, 
I found that German men still face losses four years after job loss. Thus, in 
both countries, job loss leaves scars in post-government household income 
trajectories on average. However, these scars are much larger in the United 
States than in Germany. The processes that generate this outcome differ fun-
damentally between the two countries. In the United States, lower welfare 
state benefits lead to high initial losses. In the long run, individual earnings 
recover, but not fast enough to keep track with the overall upward trend in 
earnings among those who did not become displaced. Thus, among men in 
the United States, the scars are largely due to foregone earnings that they 
would have realized if they had remained employed. In Germany, on the 
other hand, the welfare state buffers much more of the lost earnings, both 
initially and in the long run, than in the United States. Individual earnings 
recover more slowly than in the United States, which reflects the higher 
incidence of long-term unemployment. Yet, the large degree of government 
help ameliorates this. Other household members’ incomes – the “family 
buffer” – proved to be an important factor reducing economic insecurity 
due to job loss in both countries. Yet, as expected, the family buffer is more 
important for income stability for American men than for German men.
The analysis at different points in historical time revealed that the long-
term consequences of job loss among German men became more severe 
over time. While they completely recovered within two years during the 
1980s, they face persistent scars in their income trajectories thereafter. Thus, 
43 Note that all income losses I refer to in this study are relative losses, measured as a fraction 
of prior income.
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the f inding by DiPrete and McManus (2000a) that German men rapidly 
return to their previous household incomes after job loss applied only to 
the favorable labor market circumstances during the 1980s. Subsequently, 
long-term unemployment increased and, consequently, many were not able 
to offset income losses through entering a new job. The measured welfare 
state buffer even increased during this time, indicating that more people 
relied on welfare state benefits. Unexpectedly, after the Hartz Reforms in 
2004, which lowered benefits for the long-term unemployed, the welfare 
state buffer and losses in post-government household income remained 
almost the same. Yet, I found an indirect effect of the reforms: Despite 
growing re-employment rates, losses in individual earnings remained high. 
Thus, presumably, the Hartz Reforms pushed more unemployed into new 
jobs. However, most of these jobs paid so little that the overall situation 
did not improve.
In the United States, on the other hand, economic well-being of those who 
became displaced even improved slightly between the 1980s and 2007. De-
spite cut-backs in unemployment insurance, which are visible in a reduced 
welfare state buffer, American men were able to offset income losses after 
job loss to a larger degree, because of more rapid recovery in earnings and 
an increasing family buffer. The latter f inding reflects the growing number 
of dual-earner couples in the United States. Thus, men in the United States 
became more reliant on private sources of income buffering and thus on 
a functioning labor market. Although my data does not span the Great 
Recession after 2009, it is plausible that the accompanying breakdown of 
the labor market reversed this trend. Presumably, the consequences of job 
loss during the Great Recession were larger than in previous recessions, not 
only because the magnitude of the downturn was greater, but also because 
welfare state protection was lower.
Women’s income trajectories after job loss differ considerably from men’s. 
First, their job losses affect post-government household income, on aver-
age, much less in both countries. This is because the majority of employed 
women are additional earners in couple households with a male main 
earner. However, in the United States where female labor force participation 
is higher, women’s job losses affect household income to a greater degree 
than in Germany. Consequently, American women’s income trajectories 
after job loss are more similar to men’s than those observed in Germany. 
This became even more pronounced over time as the number of households 
with two full-time employed adults grew. Thus, the decrease in household 
income losses among American men was accompanied by an increase 
among women. Yet, these analyses proved to be less meaningful for women 
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because their employment participation is much more diverse than among 
men. Whereas most men are the prime earners in their households, working 
women’s roles vary between marginal employment and being the main 
breadwinner. This clearly depends on the household type: For example, 
mothers in couple households are often additional earners, whereas single 
mothers are the main earners. Therefore, women’s household income 
trajectories after job loss can only be understood taking the household 
context into account.
Analyzing income trajectories after job loss separately by household 
type provided further evidence that the family buffer has an important 
impact on economic insecurity due to job loss. Single adult households 
who do not have this income buffer fare signif icantly worse than couple 
households after job loss in both countries. Interestingly, this does not 
differ much between singles without children and single mothers, except 
in West Germany where single mothers have the highest household income 
losses due to job loss, by far. I expected that single mother’s losses may be 
ameliorated through widespread availability of childcare facilities, because 
they increase the f lexibility single mothers have when searching for a 
new job. Consequently, they should more often f ind a well-paid job after 
displacements. A comparison with East Germany, where the availability 
of childcare is greater than in West Germany, yielded some evidence in 
favor of this expectation. Single mother’s household income losses due to 
displacements are smaller in East Germany.
Within the group couple households, I found differences in household 
income losses after men’s displacements in both countries: In couple 
households with children, income losses are higher. This is presumably 
due to different intra-couple divisions of paid and unpaid work. In couple 
households with children, gender role expectations and institutions that 
follow from these often cause women to take up the role of the homemaker. 
Thus, these women contribute little to household income before job loss 
and household income mainly relies on men’s earnings. The smaller family 
buffer in this group also suggests that the distribution of roles does not 
change much, even after the main breadwinner lost his job. After women’s 
job losses, the f indings are vice versa. Having children in the household 
decreases the household income losses their displacements cause. This is 
due to the same logic: women in couple households with children usually 
contribute less to household income.
Taking a closer look at the family income buffer in Chapter 7, the expecta-
tion that intra-household divisions of paid and unpaid work often survive 
the disruption generated by men’s job losses was confirmed in the United 
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States. The added worker effect, the increase in women’s work hours and 
incomes after men’s displacements, occurred less often in couples that have 
a traditional division of paid and unpaid work. American mothers in couple 
households who are inactive on the labor market increase their hours after 
their partners’ job losses less often than comparable mothers who already 
work more than 30 hours per week. Thus, the intra-household level influ-
ences economic insecurity due to men’s displacements in the United States 
in two ways: Modern couple households where mothers are employed buffer 
men’s losses both through higher previous earnings and higher increases in 
earnings on the part of the women. Thus, traditional earner arrangements 
are surprisingly stable, even if the man can temporarily not fulf ill his role 
as the main breadwinner.
In Germany, on the other hand, the added worker effect occurs much less 
often than in the United States and contributes less to the family buffer. 
This f inding confirmed the expectation that the mix of high welfare state 
benefits, a tax system that encourages the formation of male breadwinner 
households, and comparatively low female labor force participation leads 
to a lower occurrence of the added worker effect than in the United States. 
Nevertheless, some women increase their earnings to compensate their 
partners’ earnings losses. Yet, I observed this mainly among women without 
children in the household. Mothers rarely add earnings after their partners 
become displaced. I interpreted this as the consequence of strong gender 
role expectations in Germany that mothers should mainly care for children. 
The f inding that women without children compensate their partner’s losses 
may be due to women who stayed housewives even as their children grew 
older. If their partners lose their jobs after the children become self-reliant, 
they have the capacity to increase their earnings unconstrained from the 
expectation that “good” mothers stay at home.
Beyond these couple-level and welfare state influences, the analyses also 
depicted that added worker effect is influenced by labor market related 
factors. High education proved to be connected to the occurrence of the 
added worker effect among women who are inactive on the labor market 
before their partners become displaced in both countries. Thus, education 
preserves labor market chances. This effect is even stronger in Germany, 
reflecting the higher importance of educational credentials. Among women 
who are already working full-time, on the other hand, the effect is reversed: 
Highly educated women who work full-time are least likely to increase 
their hours after their partners’ job losses in both countries. I interpreted 
this as an effect of internal labor markets. Highly educated women who 
work full-time are usually in higher positions where they cannot change 
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their earnings easily. Their current job may be f ixed to a certain amount 
of hours and changing jobs would forfeit the position they acquired within 
the internal hierarchy. Low-educated women, on the other hand, presum-
ably work more often in entry-level jobs where changing jobs to increase 
earnings is easier.
In addition to differences between household types, I also analyzed 
household income trajectories after job loss in different social strata. With 
this perspective, I aimed at combining the dynamic and the conventional 
perspective on social inequality. In this study, I measured social strata as 
quartiles of post-government household income prior to job loss. The results 
confirmed the expectations that income trajectories and income buffers 
after displacements differ between the positions in the social stratif ica-
tion from which the affected originated. Among men, the results differed 
strongly between the two countries. In Germany, the middle quartiles 
fared best after job loss, whereas in the United States, the upper quartile 
had the lowest losses. The pattern among women, on the other hand, is 
more similar in the two countries: the highest strata lose most in the long 
run after job loss.
These differences stem from country-specif ic influences of the market, 
the family, and the welfare state in each quintile. In Germany, men in 
middle-class households already have the lowest losses in earnings after 
job loss. This is presumably due to the portability of skills in the sectors 
of the labor market they are in. Middle-class men are most likely to be 
in the occupational labor markets that the German vocational training 
system generates. The vocational certif icates they hold enable them to 
f ind a comparably well-paid job in a different f irm (Marsden 1990). Those 
at the margins of the income distribution, on the other hand, are presum-
ably in different segments of the labor market with more f irm-specif ic 
skills. The results for German women are similar, yet less pronounced. 
In the United States, there are few differences in men’s earnings losses 
due to displacements between the quartiles. Among American women, by 
contrast, earnings losses are largest among the upper strata. I expected such 
an outcome in the United States because of the prevalence of internal labor 
markets. This labor market structure prohibits labor market re-entry into 
high positions in the new company because most skills are f irm-specif ic. 
Instead, most unemployed re-enter in entry-level positions, which causes 
the highest losses among those who had high earnings before. It remained 
unclear why I only found this pattern among women in the United States.
The analysis also showed that the magnitudes of the family buffer and 
the welfare state buffer differ among the strata. The pattern is similar in 
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both countries and for both genders: the family buffer is higher among 
the upper strata and the welfare state buffer is higher among the lower 
strata. The reason for the unequal distribution of family income buffering is 
assortative mating (Blossfeld 2009). Men and women often form households 
with partners that have similar education and earnings. Thus, those who 
are more affluent before displacement are better protected from earnings 
losses through the family buffer than more deprived households. This is 
especially apparent among men because women’s incomes, which make up 
the family buffer, differ much more than men’s, as indicated above. Further 
analyses revealed that the difference in the family buffer among the strata 
is mainly due to existing second incomes in the household. More affluent 
households more often have two full-time earners. Yet, I also found a slightly 
higher added worker effect in the upper strata. Given the conclusions about 
the impact of modern arrangements of paid and unpaid work described 
above, this is not surprising: Modern couples are both more affluent on 
average because of two incomes and are more flexible in shifting earner 
roles between them.
The welfare state buffer is larger among low-income households, mainly 
because unemployment benefits are only paid relative to previous earnings 
up to a ceiling in both countries. Beyond a certain labor income, unemploy-
ment benef its do not increase anymore. In Germany, the difference in 
the welfare state buffer between the upper and the lower strata is more 
pronounced than in the United States. This is presumably due to the ex-
istence of a minimum income scheme in Germany. Unlike in the United 
States, in Germany there is an income below which no unemployed can 
fall.44 The closer the household was already to this safety net, the higher 
is the welfare state buffer. In the United States, on the other hand, there 
is no universal minimum income scheme. Moreover, some low-income 
households may not even be eligible for unemployment benefits, because 
of earnings requirements in some states. Thus, the welfare state offsets 
the inequality of outcomes that higher family buffers among high-income 
households generates to some extent.
Overall, this study showed that embedding the trigger events approach 
in the life course framework leads to a number of important insights that 
have so far not been considered by other scholars. Most notably, the large 
differences between household types, both in the incidence and in the 
44 Clearly this applies with the exception of sanctions imposed if the unemployed fail to 
comply with certain requirements such as active job search. The Hartz Reforms increased use 
of such sanctions.
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consequences of displacements, clearly advance the knowledge about the 
distribution of economic insecurity. Apparently, there is a link between fam-
ily formation and economic insecurity. This has so far only been analyzed 
with family formation as a dependent variable (Oppenheimer 2003; Krey-
enfeld 2010). A notable exception is the work by Jacob and Kleinert (2014), 
who analyzed household influences on unemployment duration. Also, the 
influence of the position within the social stratif ication has received little 
attention so far. Previous work addressing this issue provided little insight 
into the reasons for differences between the strata (DiPrete and McManus 
2000b; Vandecasteele 2011, 2015).
My analyses of incidences, consequences, buffering effects, and 
counter-mobility strategies showed that economic insecurity due to 
job loss is unequally distributed. Labor market and family inf luences 
lead to higher incidences and more severe consequences among already 
vulnerable groups. The welfare state offsets some of these inequalities. 
Yet, some groups, like single adult households, single mothers, and low-
income households are more affected by economic insecurity due to job 
loss than others. Furthermore, the distribution of economic insecurity 
differs signif icantly between the United States and Germany. Overall, the 
German welfare state offsets more of the insecurity than its American 
counterpart. Yet, the German system seems to have blind spots since single 
mothers in West Germany are faced with high losses after displacements. 
This results presumably from the more traditional family model in West 
Germany.
8.2 Significance of the findings for current debates
As mentioned in the introduction to this study, job loss and economic inse-
curity are subject to a number of current public and scientific debates. These 
debates cover trends over time in insecurity, the distribution of risk, and 
the eff iciency of different welfare state policies in ameliorating economic 
insecurity. The results of the present study address some of the issues that 
these debates raised. In the following, I briefly discuss the insights that the 
results generated in this study contribute to the debates.
In both the United States and Germany, some scholars and journal-
ists reported a general trend toward growing economic insecurity over 
time (Hacker 2006; Gosselin 2009; Butterwegge 2012). My analyses show 
whether this increase was due to job loss and unemployment between 
the 1980s and the 2000s before the Great Recession. In the United States, 
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the answer is clear among men: Within the period of observation of this 
study, neither the incidence of job loss, nor its consequences became more 
severe on average. If anything, job loss and unemployment became less 
widespread and average losses decreased. This happened despite cut-backs 
in unemployment insurance. The reasons for this trend are improving labor 
market circumstances and growing female labor force participation so 
that fewer couple households relied on men’s earnings alone. Clearly, this 
led to growing economic insecurity after women’s job losses in the United 
States. Thus, the present study also points to gender differences, which have 
been often overlooked in debates on growing economic insecurity so far. 
Hence, I conclude, that women’s job losses contributed a little to growing 
economic insecurity. Men’s displacements, on the other hand, do not seem 
to be connected to this trend. Unfortunately, my data did not extend to the 
time during and after the Great Recession when job loss became a major 
source of economic instability again (Hout et al. 2011).
In Germany, I found evidence that economic insecurity due to job loss 
grew over time. However, unlike the claims of many observers this trend is 
not due to the Hartz Reforms but began much earlier. After reunif ication 
in 1990, the German economy entered a downturn. This increased the 
risk of becoming displaced and entering longer spells of unemployment. 
Consequently, the scars that displacements leave in household income 
trajectories increased between the 1980s and the 1990s and subsequently 
remained at this higher level. Thus, economic insecurity due to job loss 
grew largely because of unfavorable conditions on the labor market and not 
because of welfare state reforms. The Hartz Reforms in 2004 only had an 
indirect effect, according to the results of this study. The reforms, among 
other things, cut benef its for the long-term unemployed, implemented 
activation policies, and reduced the regulation of non-standard work. After 
the reforms, re-employment rates increased; at the same time, household 
income losses remained high. Thus, many who re-entered the labor mar-
ket after the Hartz Reforms obtained low-paid jobs that did not improve 
their economic well-being. Therefore, after the Hartz Reforms, economic 
insecurity due to job loss, at least as measured in this study, remained 
the same. Yet, more of those affected by displacements returned to the 
labor market instead of becoming long term unemployed. Whether being 
long-term unemployed and poor or employed and poor is more beneficial 
for them is a different issue that is beyond the scope of the present study 
(for a discussion, see: Alber and Heisig 2011).
A related debate focuses on the changing distribution of risk within 
modern capitalist societies. Broadly speaking, there exist two conflicting 
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points of view: on the one hand, some claim that risks becoming detached 
from traditional structures of social inequality such as social classes (Beck 
1986). Instead, life becomes more precarious for everyone as risks become 
a “temporal” phenomenon that hit everyone at some point during their 
life courses (Leisering and Leibfried 1999). The second perspective, on the 
other hand, insists that risks are still largely structured by social class 
(Breen 1997; Groh-Samberg 2004). Instead of growing precariousness for 
everyone, these scholars claim that life becomes riskier only for those who 
are already disadvantaged. One reason for this may be the accumulation 
of disadvantages over the life course (DiPrete and Eirich 2006).
The results in this study refute the hypothesis of a uniform impact of 
displacements regardless of social class. Job loss is a risk that occurs more 
often among the lower strata throughout the period of observation in both 
countries studied here. In Germany, there are even signs of a growing in-
equality in the risk of displacement. The distribution of income trajectories 
after job loss is also unequal. In the United States, I f ind that men com-
ing from high-income households fare best after job loss. Thus, the most 
privileged group is also less affected in the rare case that job loss occurs 
among them. Among American women, the opposite is true: the upper 
strata lose most. These two f indings are obviously connected, as discussed 
above: Women in the upper strata contribute more to household income 
on average. Therefore, their displacements are more severe for household 
income. In Germany, the middle strata fare best after job loss, whereas those 
at the margins of the income distribution experience the highest losses. 
Thus, I do not f ind the same social gradient as in the incidence of job loss. 
Apparently, displacements have a high impact among the upper strata in 
Germany. Yet, the probability that they experience this event is low. These 
results underscore the importance of considering both the incidence and 
the consequences of risks to draw conclusions about the distribution of 
economic insecurity.
Finally, the results in this study also provide insights about the impact of 
different welfare state regimes on the consequences of job loss. The policy 
approaches in the United States and Germany to deal with displacements 
and unemployment differ tremendously. In the United States, welfare 
state benefits only support the unemployed for a short time; consequently, 
rapid re-employment is important to maintaining a household’s stand-
ard of living. Thus, economic well-being after job loss mainly relies on 
private strategies. In Germany, on the other hand, welfare state benef its 
are higher and more long-lasting. Even though the German system saw 
a major overhaul at the beginning of the 2000s with the Hartz Reforms, 
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as mentioned above, the difference between the two systems remained 
large. Previous research showed that unemployment leaves greater scars 
in earnings and household income trajectories in the United States than 
in Germany (DiPrete and McManus 2000a; Gangl 2004). The reason stated 
for this difference is that longer-lasting unemployment benefits enable the 
unemployed to search longer for suitable post-unemployment jobs. This 
increases the chances of f inding a well-paid job. The results in this study 
conf irm the f inding that scars in post-government household income 
trajectories are larger in the United States than in Germany among men. 
Yet, the difference is no longer as big, as DiPrete and McManus (2000a) 
observed during the 1980s. This is due to the growth of long-term unem-
ployment in Germany after 1990. Yet, despite this trend, German men fare 
better after job loss by the standards of this study throughout the period of 
observation. Among women, losses in post-government household income 
are almost equal in the two countries on average. Yet, the analyses showed 
that the group of women is very diverse in both countries. Some, such as 
single mothers, face huge losses while, for example, marginally employed 
women in couple households have almost no losses in household income 
after job loss. Therefore, it is diff icult to gauge the effect of the welfare 
state among them.
Thus, like previous studies, my results conf irm the expectation that 
high and long-lasting unemployment benef its are benef icial for those 
who lose their jobs in the long run. A welfare state that relies mainly on 
private initiative, on the other hand, leads to a high incidence of downward 
social mobility after displacements. Thus, the idea that unemployment 
benefits lead to rising unemployment and “poverty traps” because they set 
disincentives to taking up a new job is not supported (Siebert 1997). Instead, 
the trends over time in Germany suggest that the business cycle seems 
to play a larger role for the incidence of long-term unemployment than 
unemployment benefits: Long-term unemployment increased between the 
1980s and the 1990s while unemployment benefits remained unchanged. 
Other studies that examined the determinants of unemployment duration 
draw similar conclusions (Gangl 2003; Schmieder et al. 2012).
In sum, the present study provided many insights that advance the 
knowledge about economic insecurity due to job loss in the United States 
and Germany. In particular, I included a dimension that public and sci-
entif ic debates on this topic disregarded: the household and the family. 
This perspective pointed to a number of interesting aspects of economic 
insecurity that have so far been overlooked. Most notably, it showed the 
importance of gender and gender roles within households. The impact of 
240 THE IMPAC T OF LOSING YOUR JOB 
job loss proved to differ strongly among household types and roles within 
these households. Also, there are indications that unemployment, economic 
insecurity, and household formation are connected over the life course. This 
study provided f irst insights into this issue but further research is needed 
to ascertain this link.
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Table A.2  Household characteristics of persons with and without job loss and 
subsequent unemployment in eastern Germany
E. Germany, Men 
Cont. employed Job loss & unempl.
Avg. household size 3.2 3.1 
Avg. no. of children 0-18 1.1 1.1 
Household types 
Single w/o kids 9.5 13.1 
Single w/ kids (%) 1 1.4 
Couple w/ kids (%) 64.7 65.9 
Couple w/o kids (%) 14.5 12.5 
Other (%) 10.3 7.2 
Household types total (%) 100 100 
E. Germany, Women 
Cont. employed Job loss & unempl.
Avg. household size 3.2 3.3 
Avg. no. of children 0-18 1 1.1 
Household types 
Single w/o kids 5.4 2.1 
Single w/ kids (%) 6.1 10.7 
Couple w/ kids (%) 58.9 63.4 
Couple w/o kids (%) 15.4 12.1 
Other (%) 14.1 11.8 
Household types total (%) 100 100 
All variables measured two years prior to job loss.
Sources: GSOEP and CNEF, author’s calculations
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Table A.4  Descriptive statistics of the matched and unmatched samples for the 
analysis of the AWE in eastern Germany
East Germany 
Women 
Matched Not matched 
Without PUE With PUE With PUE
Employment 
Avg. weekly work hours 30.9 31.3 30.4 
Not employed (%) 17.8 17.8 15.9 
Industrial sector (%) 16 16 29.5 
Service sector (%) 32.2 30.2 22.7 
Public sector (%) 34 35.9 31.8 
Avg. yearly labor income (€) 16976 16836 14653 
Avg. HH income share (%) 34.8 36.4 34.4 
Children 
w/ children <16 in HH (%) 61.2 61.2 63.6 
w/ children <5 in HH (%) 12.1 12.1 27.3 
Education 
Without voc. training (%) 1.1 1.1 22.7 
Voc. Training (%) 79.4 79.4 47.7 
Higher Education (%) 19.6 19.6 29.5 
Sociodemographics 
Avg. Age 38.7 38.5 38 
Migrant (%) 0 0 6.8 
Avg. yearly eq. hh. inc. (€) 17004 16871 15165 
Partner 
Partner w/o Voc. Tr. (%) 1.1 1.1 22.7 
Partner Voc. Training (%) 94.7 94.7 59.1 
Partner Higher Edu. (%) 4.3 4.3 18.2 
Partner’s tenure (yrs.) 7.6 7.2 8.6 
N Episodes 2435 281 44 
All variables measured two years prior to job loss.
Sources: GSOEP and CNEF, author’s calculations

 List of Abbreviations
AFDC Aid to Families with Dependent Children
ATT Average Treatment Effect on the Treated
AWE Added Worker Effect
CA Cumulative Advantage
CEM Coarsened Exact Matching
CIA Conditional Independence Assumption
CNEF Cross National Equivalence File
DiD Difference-in-Difference
EITC Earned Income Tax Credit
EPL Employment Protection Legislation
FATT Feasible Average Treatment Effect on the Treated
GDR German Democratic Republic
GSOEP German Socio Economic Panel
ILM Internal Labor Markets
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLM Occupational Labor Markets
PSID Panel Study of Income Dynamics
PSM Propensity Score Matching
PUE Partner’s Unemployment
SEO Survey of Economic Opportunity
SNAP Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
SRC Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan
TANF Temporary Aid for Needy Families
UI Unemployment Insurance
US United States of America
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